United States v. Carlos Smith , 529 F. App'x 241 ( 2013 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 12-2553
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CARLOS JAMAL SMITH
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-10-cr-00075-001)
District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 17, 2013
Before: SMITH, FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 20, 2013)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Carlos Jamal Smith appeals from his judgment of conviction in the Western
District of Pennsylvania, arguing that the District Court erred in overruling his objection
under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and in failing to hold an evidentiary
hearing pursuant to United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1975). For the reasons
stated below, we will affirm.
I.
Because we write principally for the parties, we will set forth only the factual
background and procedural history necessary to our analysis.
In a superseding indictment, Smith, an African American, was charged with one
count of conspiring to maintain drug-involved premises in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846and 856(a)(1), and four counts of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of
crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). All five counts alleged
that the offenses were committed while Smith was on pre-trial release as provided by 18
U.S.C. § 3147. The charges were based on controlled buys of crack cocaine from Smith
that were purportedly recorded on audio and video devices by confidential informant
Frankie Turner in collaboration with Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Michael Poulos.
Before trial, Smith moved for a Starks hearing to challenge the admissibility of the
recordings. The District Court granted the motion, ordering: “To the extent the parties
are unable to stipulate as to the admissibility of the recordings the court will schedule a
pretrial hearing to review the proffered recordings and issue rulings on the admissibility
of the same thereafter.” App. II at 62-63. Although the District Court subsequently
conducted a pre-trial status conference and a pre-trial motion hearing, it never held a
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Starks hearing. Smith, for his part, never again referenced his Starks request and did not
object to the introduction of the recordings into evidence at his eventual trial.
During jury selection, thirty-two potential jurors, including three African
Americans, were chosen from the venire. The District Court required the parties to
exercise all of their peremptory strikes. See United States v. Ruuska, 883 F.2d 262, 266
(3d Cir. 1989) (describing “struck jury” system). After striking two jurors, including one
African American, Juror Number 163, for race-neutral reasons,1 the Government
exercised its four remaining peremptory challenges by striking the last four potential
jurors, including another African American, Juror Number 87, from the venire list. Smith
raised a Batson objection, which the District Court overruled.
Smith was convicted on the conspiracy and two of the four distribution charges.2
After trial, Smith filed multiple motions for judgment of acquittal, arguing, inter alia, that
the District Court erred in failing to hold a Starks hearing. The District Court denied the
motions, and Smith timely appealed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction over Smith’s case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and
we have jurisdiction over his appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
1
Smith does not appeal the District Court’s finding that the Government exercised
its peremptory challenge as to Juror Number 163 in a race-neutral manner consistent with
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2
The jury was deadlocked on the other two distribution charges.
3
In analyzing Smith’s Batson argument, we review for clear error the District
Court’s factual determination that discriminatory intent did not motivate the
Government’s peremptory strikes. United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir.
2003). In considering Smith’s Starks claim, we review for an abuse of discretion the
District Court’s decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Hines, 628
F.3d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 2010). But if Smith forfeited his claim, we will review the District
Court’s decision for plain error, and if Smith waived his claim, we will not review the
District Court’s decision. Gov’t of the V.I. v. Rosa, 399 F.3d 283, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2005).
III.
A.
Smith argues that the District Court erred in overruling his objection as to Juror
Number 87 under Batson, which held that “the Equal Protection Clause forbids the
prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race.” 476 U.S. at 89.
Overcoming the presumptive validity of a peremptory strike is a three-step process:
(1) the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the strike was based on race;
(2) the Government must state a race-neutral reason for the strike; and (3) the trial court
must determine whether the strike was purposefully discriminatory. DeJesus, 347 F.3d at
506. The defendant bears the burden of persuasion at each step, but the Government
shoulders the burden of production at the second step. Lark v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,
645 F.3d 596, 619 (3d Cir. 2011).
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At the first step, a court considers, among other factors, “how many members of
the cognizable racial group are in the venire panel,” and whether there is a “pattern of
peremptory strikes” against those members. Id. at 620 (citation and quotation omitted).
Before the District Court, Smith argued that the strike of Juror Number 87 was race-
based because the Government challenged two out of the three African Americans in the
jury pool. Since the Government does not contest the point, we will assume, without
deciding, that the District Court correctly found that Smith made a prima facie showing
of a Batson violation.
In step two, a court examines whether the Government’s rationale is “facially
race-neutral,” regardless of whether it is “persuasive, or even plausible.” DeJesus, 347
F.3d at 506. Before the District Court, the Government explained that it exercised its first
two peremptory strikes for race-neutral reasons, and that it did not intend to use its last
four challenges. But because it was required to use up all of its challenges, it exercised
its leftover strikes “straight from the bottom [of the jury list] up,” thereby removing Juror
Number 87. App. III at 213. Because no “discriminatory intent [wa]s inherent” in the
Government’s justification, the District Court did not clearly err in finding that it was
race-neutral on its face. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality
opinion).
Smith’s appeal focuses on the third step, during which a court determines whether
the Government’s proffered reasons are pretextual by consulting “all of the circumstances
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that bear upon the issue of racial animosity,” Coombs v. DiGuglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 262
(3d Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted), including the relative rates of peremptory strikes
“compared to the final composition of the jury,” id. (citation omitted). Smith argues that
the Government’s approach disproportionately affected African Americans, and that the
District Court failed to analyze whether striking jurors from the top or middle of the jury
list would have yielded a different result.
However, as the District Court pointed out, the Government struck four
Caucasians, three of whom were challenged for the same reason as Juror Number 87. See
id. (explaining that evidence of purposeful discrimination exists where the Government’s
proffered reason applies equally to two otherwise similar panelists of different races, only
one of whom is struck by the Government). The District Court also demonstrated “some
engagement with the evidence,” id. (quotation omitted), reasoning that it was “more
logical” to exclude jurors from the bottom of the list than from the top or middle thereof.
App. III at 216. The District Court did not clearly err in finding that the Government’s
strike of Juror Number 87 was not purposefully discriminatory.
B.
Smith also claims that the District Court erred in failing to hold a hearing on the
admissibility of the recordings pursuant to Starks, where we held that “the burden is on
the government to produce clear and convincing evidence of authenticity and accuracy as
a foundation for the admission of such recordings.” 515 F.2d at 121 (quotation omitted).
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The Government counters that Smith waived his right to a Starks hearing. The District
Court agreed with the Government, ruling, in response to Smith’s motions for judgment
of acquittal, that he waived his right to a Starks hearing by making “a strategic decision
to capitalize on the nature and quality of the video and audio recordings as part of his
defense at trial.” App. II at 116.
“[W]aiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quotation omitted). The record
reflects that before trial, Smith moved for a Starks hearing, showing that he was aware of
his right to challenge the admissibility of the recordings. The District Court granted
Smith’s Starks motion “[t]o the extent the parties [we]re unable to stipulate as to the
admissibility of the recordings.” App. II at 62. But Smith did not mention his Starks
motion during the later pre-trial status conference that he requested or the pre-trial
hearing on his unrelated motion in limine. Then, at trial, he explicitly declined to object
to the introduction of the recordings. App. III at 336. Indeed, he strategically relied on
the recordings to cross examine Trooper Poulos, id. at 356-62, demonstrating his
abandonment of his right to a Starks hearing. See Rosa, 399 F.3d at 291 (recognizing
waiver where a defendant refrains from objecting for tactical reasons). In these
circumstances, we conclude that Smith waived his right to a Starks hearing.
IV.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment of conviction.
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