Dunn v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections , 490 F. App'x 429 ( 2012 )

BLD-231 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-1544
___________
JOHN DUNN III,
Appellant
v.
SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; MICHAEL
KLOPOTOSKI; JEROME WALSH; ULLI KLEMM; NORMAN DEMMING;
DORINA VARNER; ROBIN LUCAS; JAMES PALL; ALL MEMBERS OF THE
RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS COMMITTEE; NANCY FEDOR; D.O.C.
STAFFS
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 09-02542)
District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 19, 2012
Before: SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed July 30, 2012)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
John Dunn III, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment for prison and
correctional employees in his civil rights action. For the following reasons, we will
summarily affirm. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
In December 2009, Dunn filed an in forma pauperis complaint, which he later
supplemented, alleging that current and former employees of the State Correctional
Institution at Dallas and the Department of Corrections violated the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc5,
and the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, by denying him religious
accommodations while he was confined in the prison. Specifically, Dunn alleges that he
was denied access to certain religious objects – including plants, herbs, crystals, tarot
cards, runes, spices, and an altar cloth – in his cell; that he was not permitted to grow his
hair or beard; and that he was denied a religious advisor and instead directed to practice
his Wiccan faith in the privacy of his cell. He sought damages, fees, and costs, as well as
injunctive and declaratory relief. The United States District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and Dunn filed a
timely pro se appeal.
We exercise plenary review over a District Court’s grant of summary judgment. A
grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if our review reveals that “there is no
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genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “We review the facts in the light most favorable
to the party against whom summary judgment was entered.” Coolspring Stone Supply,
Inc. v. Am. States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993).
We first address Dunn’s contention that he has been denied the right to exercise
his religion freely, as guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Prison inmates do not forfeit their constitutional right to freely exercise their religion
when they enter the prison gates. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam).
Incarcerated inmates, however, enjoy their rights under a more limited framework than
the average citizen. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). Indeed,
the fact of incarceration and the valid penological objectives of deterrence of crime,
rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security may justify limitations on the
exercise of constitutional rights by an inmate. See DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 50-51
(3d Cir. 2000) (en banc). A prison regulation that impinges on an inmate’s right to free
exercise of religion is valid “if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
To determine the reasonableness of a prison regulation, we consider four factors,
namely: (1) whether the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest; (2) whether alternative means of exercising the right remain open to the
prisoners; (3) what impact accommodation of the asserted right will have on prison
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guards, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and (4) the availability of
“obvious, easy alternatives” to the challenged regulation. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91.
The District Court considered these factors and properly concluded that the prison
authorities’ restrictions were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
As to the claim that Dunn was denied possession of certain items, the District Court
found that prison officials had a legitimate interest in maintaining order, security, and
discipline within the prison. For example, the defendants submitted that they denied
Dunn’s request for runes and tarot cards because those items could be used by inmates to
manipulate others, posing a security concern. See, e.g., Mayfield v.Tex. Dep’t of
Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 610-11 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that runestones and tarot
cards could be used for “gambling, trafficking, and trading” and thus “pose a unique
security risk”). Similarly, defendants relied on statements that the grooming policy
detailed in Administrative Directive 807 helps limit hiding places for contraband and is
important for inmate identification purposes for the staff. See Cole v. Flick, 758 F.2d
124, 131 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1985) (relying on identical factors to conclude that hair length
directive is not an invalid infringement on First Amendment rights).
The District Court found that even with the restrictions, Dunn’s right to practice
religion was not substantially or significantly burdened and that he had various means of
religious expression available to him, including the ability to pray and conduct religious
rituals in his cell, as Dunn himself admitted in his deposition. The Court also found that
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Dunn retained some means of individual religious expression, including possession of
certain religious objects and books and the ability to correspond and visit with an outside
spiritual advisor, a Wiccan priestess. For the reasons stated by the District Court, we
agree that summary judgment on the free exercise claims was warranted.
The District Court also did not err in granting summary judgment to the
defendants on Dunn’s RLUIPA claims. RLUIPA prohibits the government from
imposing “a substantial burden” on a prisoner’s religious exercise, even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government shows that the burden
is in furtherance of a “compelling governmental interest” and is the least restrictive
means of furthering that interest. See Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir.
2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)). A “substantial burden” exists where (1) a
follower is forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting
benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates versus abandoning one of the
precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit; or (2) the government puts
substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his
beliefs. Id. at 280.
As we have just noted, on summary judgment, the defendants identified
significant, legitimate penological interests underlying their policies, including the
restriction on Dunn’s hair length. Moreover, Dunn failed to point to evidence sufficient
to establish the threshold element of this claim, namely, a “substantial burden” on the
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exercise of his religion as a result of enforcement of the regulation. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc-1(a). Dunn contends that “[h]air is considered to be the natural receptacle of the
vital essence . . . of the body,” but he does not explain how failure to maintain long hair
affects his particular religious beliefs. See Washington, 497 F.3d at 277-78 (noting that
in religious discrimination claims pursuant to RLUIPA, the plaintiff bears the burden of
persuasion on whether the challenged practice substantially burdens the plaintiff’s
practice of religion). He has thus failed to establish a substantial burden on religious
exercise.
Dunn also alleged that the defendants violated his rights under the Equal
Protection Clause, but he failed to provide any competent summary judgment evidence
that similarly situated faiths are treated differently. See Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322 n.2 (“We
do not suggest, of course, that every religious sect or group within a prison - however few
in number - must have identical facilities or personnel.”). Accordingly, we agree that
summary judgment on the equal protection claim was warranted. See Williams v.
Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2003).
Finally, for the reasons given by the District Court, Dunn’s complaint did not state
an Eighth Amendment claim sufficient to withstand summary judgment. See Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Nor, we note, did Dunn provide any evidence to
support such a claim.
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Because this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will summarily
affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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