United States v. Patricia Fountain ( 2021 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 21-1313
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
PATRICIA FOUNTAIN,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2:12-cr-00155-001)
District Judge: Honorable Joel H. Slomsky
____________________________________
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
August 12, 2021
Before: McKEE, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 13, 2021)
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OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Federal prisoner Patricia Fountain appeals from an order of the District Court denying
her motion for a reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Gov-
ernment has filed a motion for summary affirmance. For the following reasons, we will
affirm.1
In 2013, Fountain was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States, filing
false claims, and Hobbs Act extortion for her role in a scheme with her co-defendant hus-
band in which she used her knowledge as an employee of the Internal Revenue Service to
recruit individuals to file fraudulent tax returns in order to wrongfully claim refunds,
which were divided between Fountain and the recruited individuals. Additionally, she
extorted recruited individuals who refused to pay her a portion of their tax refunds. For
these crimes, she was sentenced to 228 months in prison.
In August 2020, Fountain filed a pro se motion for compassionate release. See
generally 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (providing that a sentence may be reduced if “ex-
traordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction”). She argued that her med-
ical conditions rendered her especially vulnerable to COVID-19. These conditions in-
cluded obesity, concerning blood work levels, high serotonin levels, migraines resulting
from adrenoleukodystrophy, cognitive decline, anxiety, depression, panic attacks, and
post-traumatic stress disorder. She also alleged that the COVID-19 precautions taken by
Alderson Federal Prison Camp were inadequate in that inmates were unable to social
1
Although we have entertained the Government’s motion, we remind the Government
that such a motion should typically be filed before the appellant’s opening brief is due.
See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4(b).
2
distance and were not tested for COVID-19, some staff members did not wear masks, and
the prison did not have adequate sanitation supplies or ventilation.
The District Court denied her motion, determining that (1) her medical conditions,
even in the context of the pandemic, did not constitute extraordinary and compelling cir-
cumstances, and (2) the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weighed against her release. Foun-
tain appealed and has filed a brief. The Government seeks summary affirmance.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for abuse of discre-
tion the District Court’s determination that the sentencing factors under Section 3553(a)
do not weigh in favor of granting compassionate release. United States v. Pawlowski,
967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020). “[W]e will not disturb the District Court’s decision un-
less there is a definite and firm conviction that it committed a clear error of judgment in
the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
A district court may reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment “after considering
the factors set forth in § 3553(a) . . . if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling rea-
sons warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Those sentencing factors require the courts to consider, inter alia, the nature and circum-
stances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for the
sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide
just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public from future crimes by the
defendant, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. 18 U.S.C.
3
§ 3553(a). Compassionate release is discretionary, not mandatory; therefore, even if a de-
fendant is eligible for it, a district court may deny compassionate release upon determin-
ing that a sentence reduction would be inconsistent with the § 3553(a) factors. See Paw-
lowski, 967 F.3d at 330; United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1102 (6th Cir. 2020)
(finding no abuse of discretion where “the district court found for the sake of argument
that an extraordinary and compelling circumstance existed . . . but that the § 3553(a) fac-
tors counseled against granting compassionate release”).
The Government argues that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in de-
termining that compassionate release was inconsistent with the Section 3553(a) factors.
We agree.
The District Court considered Fountain’s assertion that she was a “non-violent,
first time, white-collar offender,” (Mot. at 2), but properly emphasized the serious nature
and circumstances of her offenses, and her commission of several disciplinary infractions
while incarcerated, including fighting another inmate. The Court also concluded that
Fountain’s release would neither reflect the seriousness of her offenses, promote respect
for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, nor protect the public
from further crimes she may commit, and noted that she had served less than half of her
228-month sentence. The Court concluded also that reducing Fountain’s sentence would
frustrate the goal of avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities. We cannot say that the
District Court committed a clear error of judgment in its assessment of the Section
3553(a) factors.
4
Based on the foregoing, Fountain’s challenge to the District Court’s order does not
present a substantial question. We therefore grant the Government’s motion and we will
summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
5