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James Coppedge v. City of Philadelphia , 514 F. App'x 80 ( 2013 )


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  •     GLD-088                                               NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-4014
___________
JAMES COPPEDGE,
Appellant
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, JAMES C. VANDERMARK, ASSISTANT CITY SOLICITOR
FOR: JOAN DECKER, COMMISSIONER OF DEEDS; LEONARD B. ZUCKERMAN, ESQ.,
ATTORNEY FOR HOMESTEAD, INC. AN ARM OF J.P. MORGAN CHASE;
ANDREW L. MARKOWITZ, ESQ., ATTORNEY FOR J.P. MORGAN CHASE
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2:12-cv-01917)
District Judge: Honorable Thomas N. O'Neill
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 28, 2012
Before: FUENTES, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 14, 2013 )
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
James Coppedge appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his claims and its denial
of his motions for recusal and reconsideration. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
1
§ 1291, and our review is generally de novo, see Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.,
    664 F.3d 38
    ,
41 (3d Cir. 2011), although we review recusal and reconsideration decisions for abuse of
discretion. See Delalla v. Hanover Ins.,
    660 F.3d 180
    , 183 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011); Lazaridis
v. Wehmer,
    591 F.3d 666
    , 669 (3d Cir. 2010). We may affirm the District Court on any
ground supported by the record. EEOC v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
    930 F.2d 329
    ,
331 (3d Cir. 1991).
Coppedge’s filings are not easily deciphered. To the extent that he directly
challenges a state-court judgment pertaining to a mortgage foreclosure action, we agree
with the District Court that, for substantially the same reasons discussed below,
Coppedge’s attack is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 1 See Great W. Mining &
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP,
    615 F.3d 159
    , 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (prohibiting
actions where “the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state
judgments”). Alternatively, to the extent that Coppedge’s filings, when construed
liberally, allege claims that survive Rooker-Feldman scrutiny, see Lance v. Dennis,
    546 U.S. 459
    , 464 (2006) (per curiam), we conclude that he has failed to articulate sufficient
facts to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Burtch v. Milberg Factors,
Inc.,
    662 F.3d 212
    , 225 (3d Cir. 2011).
Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff must be given leave to amend his complaint if it is
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,
    293 F.3d 103
    , 114
(3d Cir. 2002). “Among the grounds that could justify a denial of leave to amend are
1
D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman,
    460 U.S. 462
     (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
    263 U.S. 413
     (1923).
2
undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice, and futility.” Shane v. Fauver,
    213 F.3d 113
    , 115 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig.,
    114 F.3d 1410
    , 1434 (3d Cir. 1997)). Based on Coppedge’s filings both below and in this Court,
which are at best unresponsive to judicial requests, we have no trouble concluding that
affording additional leave to amend would be futile.
Finding no abuse of discretion in the denial of recusal or reconsideration, and
finding no substantial question presented in general by this appeal, we will summarily
affirm. See Murray v. Bledsoe,
    650 F.3d 246
    , 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also
3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
3