Williams v. Temple University Hospital ( 2010 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 05-4101
_____________
ROBIN V. WILLIAMS,
Appellant,
v.
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL; DISTRICT COUNCIL 1199C,
Appellees.
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-2789)
District Judge: Petrese B. Tucker
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on October 6, 2010
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN, AND ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: November 12, 2010 )
_____________________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________________________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
1
Robin Williams brought this action in federal court, claiming that, after she was injured
on the job and obliged to take leave, her employer, Temple University Hospital
(“Temple”), fired her from her full-time position and offered her a part-time position
instead. As well as we can discern, she alleges that her firing was in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The District Court granted Temple‟s motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm, but on different grounds from those
discussed in the decision of the District Court.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we set forth only the facts and history
that are relevant to our conclusion. Because defendants Temple and District Council
1199C (“District Council”) made a facial challenge to jurisdiction under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), as well as a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we take
Williams‟s allegations to be true. Williams worked for eight years at Temple in various
positions. In July 1997, while employed as a full-time technical assistant in the radiology
department, she was injured in an unknown manner at work. As a result, she filed a
worker‟s compensation claim and went on leave.
Williams was returned to “full duty status” and “sent back to work” in March
1998. However, when she returned to work, the head of Temple‟s administrative
department informed her that her position had been eliminated. (A letter announcing her
termination was actually first placed in her file in January 1998, but she was not notified
of this.) She was offered in its stead a part-time, night-shift and weekend position in the
2
dietary department, which she apparently did not accept. Williams alleges that she
learned later that her position had not, in fact, been eliminated.
In response to her firing, Williams consulted a representative of her union,
District Council 1199C. District Council filed a grievance on her behalf. How and
whether this grievance was addressed is unknown; however, Williams did not regain her
job and has not been “paid out.” Some time after the grievance was filed, Williams wrote
to District Council and received a letter in response from its president, Henry Nicholas,
offering to “help” her, but that promise was “false.” She also wrote letters to Temple,
which received no answer.
Williams filed discrimination charges against Temple with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission in 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2004. The EEOC found her 2004
charges untimely and issued her a right-to-sue letter on June 1, 2005.1 On June 23, 2005,
Williams, appearing pro se, filed suit against Temple, District Council, and certain
individual employees of Temple.2 In August 2005, District Council filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), failure to
state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and lack of proper service; shortly thereafter,
Temple filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to
state a claim.
The District Court then granted defendants‟ motions to dismiss, finding that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Williams failed to “allege[] any cause of action
1
The disposition, if any, of her prior EEOC charges is unknown.
3
arising under any federal law, [or] . . . violation of any federal statute”; that Williams
failed to state a claim with respect to any state law claims because they were barred by
the statute of limitations; and that “the discrimination claim” was barred by the statute of
limitations.
II.
We exercise plenary review over a district court‟s grant of a motion to dismiss.
United States Dep’t of Trans. ex rel. Arnold v. CMC Eng’g, 564 F.3d 673, 676 (3d Cir.
2009). “Dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of the inadequacy of the
federal claim is proper only when the claim is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by
prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a
federal controversy.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998).
Williams argues that her pro se complaint presented a cognizable federal claim of
disability discrimination under the ADA. We agree. Although we appreciate the
difficulties the District Court must have had in deciphering her inartful complaint,
Williams‟s repeated uses of the word “discrimination,” along with the facts she alleged,
especially the references to the EEOC and the right-to-sue letter,3 were sufficient to
convey that she was alleging a cause of action arising under the ADA. Indeed, the
2
The disposition of Williams‟s claims against the individual Temple employees is
unclear, but those claims are not before us.
3
Williams discusses the EEOC only in a “motion to quash” she filed in response to
Temple and District Council‟s motions to dismiss. The District Court considered and
relied on this information in making its decision. Especially given that Williams
appeared pro se, we believe it is appropriate to take this information into consideration in
evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint.
4
District Court itself later spent a paragraph discussing her “discrimination claim” and
makes reference to federal statutes of limitation in that analysis. It was therefore
incorrect to dismiss Williams‟s claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).4
However, although Williams‟s complaint alleged an ADA claim with sufficient
clarity to invoke federal-question jurisdiction, it did not do so with sufficient particularity
to state a claim under the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).5 In resolving a motion
under 12(b)(6), a district court, accepting the plaintiff‟s factual allegations as true, must
“determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the
plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief. In other words, a complaint must do more than
allege the plaintiff‟s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to „show‟ such entitlement
with its facts.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)). This standard is not an
extraordinarily high one. In Fowler, a case in which we considered post-Iqbal standards
for pleading violations of the ADA, we held that a plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded her
complaint, even though it did not establish the elements of a prima facie case, primarily
because she had “identifie[d] an impairment” and alleged a limitation to sedentary work
which “plausibly suggest[ed] that she might be substantially limited in the major life
activity of working.” Id. at 213. However, in this case, Williams‟s complaint did not
plausibly identify an impairment, allege a limitation, or otherwise indicate how she might
4
Williams argues that she also made a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of denial of due process in
her complaint. But, even reading the complaint with great liberality, it is not possible to
discern an allegation of a § 1983 claim within.
5
be substantially limited in a major life activity. It merely states that she was injured at
work but was later “sent back to work” on “full duty status.” Her complaint therefore
does not allege facts sufficient to give rise to a plausible claim for relief.6
Williams also argues that, as the District Court found that it lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction, it lacked the authority to determine her state-law claims on statute of
limitations grounds. Her argument as stated is correct; a court cannot decide a case on
the merits once it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. In re Orthopedic
“Bone Screw” Prods. Liab. Litig., 132 F.3d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 1997). However, since, as
just discussed, the District Court actually did have jurisdiction, it also had the authority to
resolve Williams‟s state-law claims on the merits under 12(b)(6), see, e.g., Kulick v.
Pocono Downs Racing Ass’n, 816 F.2d 895, 897-98 (3d Cir. 1987), and did so correctly.
A statute of limitations defense may be raised in a 12(b)(6) motion “where the complaint
facially shows noncompliance with the limitations period and the affirmative defense
clearly appears on the face of the pleading.” Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran &
Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994). In this case, Williams does not now
argue that she suffered any harm within the limitations period. Instead, she argues that
her complaint raised the possibility that either equitable tolling or the continuing violation
5
We may affirm a district court‟s decision on any grounds supported by the record. See
Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001).
6
Because Williams‟s complaint does not state a claim for relief under the ADA, it is not
necessary to consider whether the District Court‟s analysis of the applicable statute of
limitations issues is correct. However, we note that a plaintiff under the ADA generally
has 300 days after an act of discrimination occurs to file a claim with the EEOC, not to
file a complaint in federal court, as the District Court suggests. See, e.g., Watson v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 852 (3d Cir. 2000).
6
doctrine applies to extend that period because Temple‟s silence after her termination and
the promises of help allegedly made by District Council misled her into sitting on her
rights and themselves represented a violation of due process. The Complaint does not,
however, bear a construction excusing the seven-year delay in filing suit.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.
7