United States v. Rashaun Puryear , 461 F. App'x 114 ( 2012 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-2022
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RASHAUN R. PURYEAR,
Appellant
_______________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Criminal No. 09-cr-00034-002
(Honorable Kim R. Gibson)
______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 5, 2012
Before: SCIRICA, AMBRO and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 13, 2012 )
_________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
Rashaun Puryear pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and
possession with the intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, and two
counts of distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. Puryear
appeals his sentence, arguing the District Court‟s sentence was unreasonable and its
failure to grant a downward departure substantially overrepresented the seriousness of his
criminal history. We will affirm.1
I.
Puryear was involved in supplying and distributing cocaine base (“crack”) in
Johnstown, Pennsylvania, in partnership with his cousin, Rhazon Dickey. In June 2009,
as part of an ongoing investigation, law enforcement officers and a confidential informant
conducted three controlled purchases for a total of 24.8 grams of “crack” cocaine from
Dickey. After arrest, Dickey admitted Puryear was supplying the cocaine. On December
8, 2010, Puryear pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possession
with the intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, and two counts of
distribution of cocaine base.
The 2010 conviction marked Puryear‟s fourteenth adult criminal conviction. At
the sentencing hearing on April 7, 2011, Puryear was held to be a career offender under
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, based on two previous convictions for controlled substance offenses.
Puryear‟s criminal history points totaled fourteen, which established his criminal history
at Category VI under U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Part A.2 The addition of the career offender status
also independently established him at Category VI. According to the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines, Puryear‟s advisory sentencing range amounted to 188 to 235 months‟
imprisonment.
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
2
Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, a finding of Category VI criminal
history requires thirteen or more criminal history points. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Part A.
2
The District Court heard argument on whether Puryear‟s career offender status
over-represented the seriousness of his criminal history. Puryear argued none of his other
convictions was for violent offenses or firearms violations, but rather involved simple
assault, motor vehicle violations, and public drunkenness. He also presented evidence of
his model conduct while imprisoned. The government in turn argued Puryear‟s previous
crimes involved violence, and emphasized he had been convicted thirteen times in
thirteen years. The Court denied Puryear‟s request for a downward departure from the
advisory sentencing range and ruled Category VI did not substantially over-represent the
seriousness of his criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b).
Next, in consideration of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), Puryear
called six witnesses to testify on his behalf. Each witness testified favorably about
Puryear‟s character and potential to reform. Puryear objected to the disparity between his
sentencing range and the sixty-six month sentence imposed on his co-defendant, Dickey.
Based on this evidence, Puryear requested a sentence between seventy-seven and ninety-
six months. The Court ultimately sentenced Puryear to 120 months‟ imprisonment with
five years‟ probation. This timely appeal followed.
II.
Puryear contends the District Court erred by denying his request for a downward
departure based on a substantial misrepresentation of the seriousness of his criminal
history. We continue to recognize that “„[w]e do not have jurisdiction to review
discretionary decisions by district courts to not depart downward.‟” United States v.
Jones, 566 F.3d 353, 366 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Vargas, 477 F.3d 94,
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103 (3d Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio,
581 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2009)). Jurisdiction to review only arises if the district court‟s
refusal to depart downward “is based on the mistaken belief that it lacks discretion to do
otherwise.” Vargas, 477 F.3d at 103.
Puryear points to many of his convictions being for “run of the mill drug
possessions,” motor vehicle violations, and disorderly conduct, as evidence that his status
as a Category VI offender was a substantial misrepresentation of the seriousness of his
criminal history. The District Court considered “the [defendant‟s] argument and the
information available to the Court,” but “[did] not find the criminal history category
substantially over-represents the seriousness of the defendant‟s criminal history or the
likelihood that he will commit other crimes.” Accordingly, the District Court denied
Puryear‟s request for a downward departure. There is no indication the District Court
mistakenly believed it lacked discretion to grant the request for a downward departure.
Accordingly, we will dismiss this claim for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
III.
Puryear next contends the District Court‟s sentence of 120 months was both
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. He argues it was procedurally
unreasonable because the Court miscalculated the advisory sentencing range by failing to
depart from the career offender guideline and failing to assess him at Category V rather
than Category VI. He also argues his sentence was substantively unreasonable because it
was greater than necessary to comply with the § 3553(a) factors and resulted in disparity
between his sentence and his co-defendant‟s sentence.
4
We review sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 46 (2007); United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
Our review proceeds in two stages. First, we determine whether the district court
committed procedural error; second, we consider the sentence‟s substantive
reasonableness in light of the totality of the factors found in § 3553(a). Tomko, 562 F.3d
at 567.
A. Procedural Reasonableness
Puryear contends his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the District
Court failed to calculate an advisory range without the career offender enhancement, and
failed to consider his criminal history at Category V rather than Category VI. The
District Court must follow a three-step procedure when imposing a sentence: (1) calculate
the applicable Guidelines range; (2) rule on any motions for departure; and (3) consider
all § 3553(a) factors to determine the appropriate sentence. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 577 n.16.
Puryear argues the District Court committed procedural error in miscalculating his
sentencing range by applying career offender points and assessing him at Category VI.
But Puryear does not dispute that the District Court accurately calculated his advisory
sentencing range under the Guidelines. Rather, Puryear is merely repeating his argument
that the Court should have granted his request for a downward departure. By arguing for
a sentencing range under Category V and without the career offender points, he is once
again suggesting the Court abused its discretion in denying his request for a downward
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departure.3 This argument is unavailing because, as discussed above, the Court‟s failure
to grant a downward departure is not reviewable and therefore does not constitute
procedural error.
B. Substantive Reasonableness
Puryear also contends his sentence was substantively unreasonable for two
reasons: first, it resulted in a significant disparity from his co-defendant‟s sentence; and
second, it was greater than necessary under the § 3553(a) factors. Because each
argument lacks merit, we find the sentence to be substantively reasonable.
Puryear points to the sixty-six month sentence received by his co-defendant,
Dickey, as indicative that his own 120 month sentence was unreasonable. 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(6) directs courts to look to “unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” But the intent of §
3553(a)(6) is to promote national uniformity among similarly situated defendants, not
uniformity among co-defendants. United States v. Parker, 462 F.3d 273, 277 (3d Cir.
2006). We have held a defendant “cannot rely upon § 3553(a)(6) to seek a reduced
sentence designed to lessen disparity between co-defendants‟ sentences.” Id. Thus, a
disparity in co-defendants‟ sentences does not constitute error. United States v. Hart, 273
F.3d 363, 379 (3d Cir. 2001).
The District Court explicitly noted “[a]ny disparity with others sentenced for
similar crimes is justified in light of the factors and specific circumstances surrounding
3
Puryear‟s argument would have merit if the District Court failed to rule on his request
for a downward departure. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. But it is clear the District Court
considered and expressly denied Puryear‟s motion for a downward departure.
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you and your crimes.” Under Parker and Hart, Puryear cannot rely on a disparity
between his 120-month sentence and Dickey‟s sixty-six month sentence to prove his
sentence was substantively unreasonable.4
Puryear also argues his sentence was unreasonable under the § 3553(a) factors.
We give deference to a district court‟s determination that the § 3553(a) factors justify the
sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567-68. We affirm “unless no
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular
defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.
The District Court carefully considered each of the § 3553(a) factors in its
sentencing decision, taking into account Puryear‟s age, the severity of his offense, his
criminal history, his personal history, the witness testimony on his behalf, and his risk of
recidivism. After consideration of these factors, the Court sentenced Puryear to 120
months‟ imprisonment, which is sixty-eight months fewer than the lowest range of his
advisory guidelines. We conclude the record “reflects rational and meaningful
consideration” of the § 3553(a) factors. Id. Accordingly, we find the sentence was
substantively reasonable.
4
Even if § 3553(a)(6) were applicable, we have recognized it only applies to “similarly
situated” co-defendants. Parker, 462 F.3d at 278. In contrast to Puryear‟s Category VI,
Dickey‟s criminal history—considerably less extensive than Puryear‟s—was established
at Category IV. That Dickey received sixty-six months while Puryear received 120
months is immaterial even under § 3553(a)(6) because the two co-defendants were not
similarly situated.
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IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.
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