United States v. Rodriguez-Jimenez , 484 F. App'x 645 ( 2012 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 10-1129
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
GERTRUDIS RODRIGUEZ-JIMENEZ
a/k/a ANGEL
Gertrudis Rodriguez-Jimenez, Appellant
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-07-cr-00352-003)
District Judge: Gene E. K. Pratter
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1
April 16, 2012
Before: VANASKIE, ALDISERT and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Filed: May 25, 2012)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
Gertrudis Rodriguez-Jimenez appeals his conviction and sentence, arguing that the
District Court abused its discretion in (1) denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
(2) deciding that he did not qualify for the “safety valve” relief set forth in U.S.S.G. §
5C1.2(a)(1)-(5) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5) in setting his advisory range of
imprisonment, and (3) sentencing him to 152 months of imprisonment. We reject each of
Rodriguez-Jimenez’s arguments and will affirm.
I.
We write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural
history of this case. Accordingly, we set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis.
On July 16, 2008, a grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
returned a second superseding indictment against Rodriguez-Jimenez, charging him with
conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846; distribution of and aiding and abetting the
distribution of 50 or more grams of methamphetamine, in violation of § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(B), and 18 U.S.C. § 2; unlawful use of a communication facility, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 843(b); and distribution of 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation
of § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). The second superseding indictment charged multiple
defendants and contained sixteen counts, but only counts one, four, twelve, fourteen, and
sixteen accused Rodriguez-Jimenez of criminal conduct. The District Court scheduled
trial for May 8, 2009.
On the date set for trial, Rodriguez-Jimenez pled guilty. The District Court
conducted a lengthy plea colloquy, during which Rodriguez-Jimenez testified that he
understood that he was “under oath” and had “to tell . . . the truth.” (S.A. 3.) Rodriguez-
Jimenez also testified that he understood that “the Government [did] not ma[k]e any kind
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of a deal with [him] in exchange for [his] . . . plea,” (S.A. 5), that he was satisfied with
his representation, and that no individual “threatened [him] or coerced [him] or forced
[him] in any way to plead guilty.” (S.A. 15.) The District Court also reviewed the facts
of the underlying conduct, and Rodriguez-Jimenez agreed that they were correct.
Following the review of the facts, the District Court asked Rodriguez-Jimenez if he
understood that it would consider the Sentencing Guidelines in sentencing him and that
he would “be stuck with [his] guilty plea,” even if he received a lengthier prison term
than he expected. (S.A. 13.) Rodriguez-Jimenez testified that he understood, and the
District Court accepted his plea.
Before his sentencing hearing, however, Rodriguez-Jimenez moved to withdraw
his guilty plea. At the evidentiary hearing on the motion to withdraw his plea, he testified
that he was innocent and that he always intended to go to trial, but that he decided to
plead guilty at the last minute due to various alleged misconduct and misrepresentations
by the Government and by his attorney. First, he testified that the prosecutor “told [him]
that if [he] went to trial[,] that [the Government] was going to pick a special jury[,] and
that [he] wouldn’t have an opportunity” to prevail. (S.A. 36.) He also testified that the
prosecutor promised him that his sentence would not exceed forty-five months, and that
his wife feared for her safety because “some agents went to [her] . . . work to look for
her.” (S.A. 37.) Finally, he testified that one of his attorneys “told [him] that the judge is
paid by the government[,] and that the judge would be on the side of the government.”
(S.A. 39.)
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Rodriguez-Jimenez’s attorney denied making any statement suggesting District
Court bias in favor of the Government. Likewise, Bruce Muhlberger, the agent that
Rodriguez-Jimenez claimed visited his wife at her workplace, testified that he went to
Rodriguez-Jimenez’s wife’s workplace to attempt to return confiscated property to her,
but that she was not at work when he arrived and that he did not threaten her. Another
agent testified that Rodriguez-Jimenez’s wife called him several times, and that she did
not “seem at all frightened or concerned that she was talking to a law enforcement
officer” during the calls. (S.A. 83.)
The District Court denied Rodriguez-Jimenez’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, finding “Rodriguez-Jimenez’s presentation meager and disingenuous at best.”
United States v. Rodriguez-Jimenez, No. 2-07-cr-00352-003, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2598, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2010). The District Court noted that Rodriguez-Jimenez
“provided no record facts” in support of his claim of innocence, and that “[h]is excuses
for having taken numerous contradictory positions under oath at his guilty plea hearing as
compared to his new story [in seeking to withdraw his guilty plea] were . . . unpersuasive
and disrespectful.” Id.
On December 18, 2009, the District Court held Rodriguez-Jimenez’s sentencing
hearing. In determining Rodriguez-Jimenez’s total offense level, the District Court
decided that Rodriguez-Jimenez was not entitled to safety valve relief pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(1)-(5) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5), or to a downward adjustment
for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). While the District
Court did not comment specifically on why it denied safety valve relief, the Government
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argued that Rodriguez-Jimenez was not entitled to invoke the safety valve provision
because he had not provided truthful information to the Government about his
involvement in the case, a prerequisite for application of the safety valve under §
3553(f)(5) and § 5C1.2(a)(5). In particular, the Government contended that although
Rodriguez-Jimenez had relevant information, such as how he obtained the
methamphetamine that he helped to distribute, he never provided truthful information to
the Government during any of his four proffer sessions.
The District Court then determined that Rodriguez-Jimenez’s total offense level
was thirty-four and that his criminal history category level was one, resulting in a
Sentencing Guidelines range of between 151 and 188 months of imprisonment. 1 After
hearing testimony and weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the District Court
sentenced Rodriguez-Jimenez to 152 months of imprisonment.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We review a district court’s
order denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse-of-discretion. See United
States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Harris, 44 F.3d
1
Had Rodriguez-Jimenez qualified for safety valve relief, he would have received
a two-point downward adjustment to his offense level, resulting in a total offense level of
thirty-two. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(16). This offense level reduction would have
resulted in a Sentencing Guidelines range of 121 to 151 months of imprisonment.
Additionally, Rodriguez-Jimenez’s sentence was subject to a ten-year mandatory
minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Had he received safety valve relief, the
District Court would have been free to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
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1206, 1210 (3d Cir. 1995)). We review the district court’s sentencing decision for abuse-
of-discretion, assessing whether the district court committed a “significant procedural
error” and “the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” United States v. Wise, 515
F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). If the
district court committed no procedural error, “we will affirm [the district court’s
sentence] unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence
on th[e] particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” United States v.
Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
A.
Rodriguez-Jimenez’s challenge to the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea rests primarily on his claim that he is innocent and always intended to go to trial, but
that he decided to plead guilty at the last minute because he was “under a great deal of
pressure.” (Appellant’s Br. at 5.) Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(d)(2)(B), a defendant must demonstrate “a fair and just reason” to withdraw his or her
guilty plea after the district court has accepted the plea. The relevant factors for
determining if the withdrawal of a guilty plea is fair and just are “(1) whether the
defendant asserts his innocence; (2) the strength of the defendant’s reasons for
withdrawing the plea; and (3) whether the government would be prejudiced by the
withdrawal.” Jones, 336 F.3d at 252 (citations omitted).
If the defendant relies on his or her innocence, the defendant’s claim of innocence
“must be buttressed by facts in the record.” United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 818
(3d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 159 F.3d 322, 326 (7th Cir.
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1998)). “Bald assertions of innocence . . . are insufficient to permit a defendant to
withdraw her guilty plea.” Id. (citing Salgado-Ocampo, 159 F.3d at 326). Furthermore,
the defendant must “give sufficient reasons to explain why contradictory positions were
taken before the district court.” Jones, 336 F.3d at 253 (quoting United States v. Jones,
979 F.2d 317, 318 (3d Cir. 1992)).
We agree with the District Court that Rodriguez-Jimenez has not met his burden
of demonstrating “a fair and just reason” for withdrawing his plea under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B). Most importantly, Rodriguez-Jimenez relies almost
entirely on his claim of innocence, but he fails to provide any record evidence supporting
his claim. His argument thus amounts to nothing more than a bald assertion of
innocence, which does not entitle him to withdraw his plea.
Moreover, we find no error in the District Court’s determination that Rodriguez-
Jimenez did not reconcile his prior inconsistent statements at his plea hearing with his
statements in connection with his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Both Rodriguez-
Jimenez’s allegations of misrepresentations by the prosecution and by his attorney and
his claim that agents threatened his wife directly contradicted his prior sworn testimony
at his plea hearing that he knew that he had no guaranteed sentence and that his plea was
not coerced. Rodriguez-Jimenez makes little attempt on appeal to explain these
inconsistencies. 2 Accordingly, we reject Rodriguez-Jimenez’s argument that the District
Court should have permitted him to withdraw his plea.
2
Rodriguez-Jimenez suggested at his hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea that his claim that agents threatened his wife was consistent with his prior testimony
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B.
Rodriguez-Jimenez next argues that the District Court abused its discretion in
declining to apply the safety valve relief set forth in § 5C1.2(a)(1)-(5) and § 3553(f)(1)-
(5) during his sentencing. The safety valve provision permits the district court to impose
a sentence below the statutory minimum and to grant a two-point downward adjustment
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(16) if the defendant satisfies five criteria. 3 See §
3553(f)(1)-(5); § 5C1.2(a)(1)-(5). One of the five criteria requires the defendant to show
that he or she “has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence
the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of
conduct or of a common scheme or plan.” § 3553(f)(5); § 5C1.2(a)(5). However, “the
fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the
Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a determination by the
court that the defendant has complied with this requirement.” § 3553(f)(5); §
5C1.2(a)(5).
Although not disputing the Government’s assertion that he failed to provide
truthful information to the Government, Rodriguez-Jimenez contends that he is
that his plea was not coerced because the agents threatened his wife rather than him. He
did not, however, raise this argument on appeal. Further, we find no error in the District
Court’s determination that Rodriguez-Jimenez’s testimony on this point was
“unpersuasive,” because two agents’ testimony contradicted Rodriguez-Jimenez’s
allegation. United States v. Rodriguez-Jimenez, No. 2-07-cr-00352-003, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2598, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2010).
3
The District Court applied the November 1, 2008 edition of the Sentencing
Guidelines. Under the November 1, 2008 edition, the two-point downward adjustment
presently found in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(16) was found in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(11). The
language, however, remains identical.
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nonetheless entitled to safety valve relief because the Government already had all of the
relevant information that he could have provided. He also asserts that “the Government,
at [the] time of sentencing, never made any showing that [he] had information which he
could share.” (Appellant’s Br. at 15.)
The Government explained during the sentencing hearing that Rodriguez-Jimenez
attended four proffer sessions, but rather than providing truthful information at these
sessions, he “deliberately put obstacles in place so that he would not have to reveal the
information that [the Government] [was] seeking.” (S.A. 167.) For example, although he
plainly had relevant information about how he obtained the methamphetamine that he
was helping to distribute, he refused to provide that information to the Government. The
Government noted at sentencing that the source of the methamphetamine was important
information that, as of the time of sentencing, the Government still had not discovered.
Accordingly, because Rodriguez-Jimenez had information that he refused to disclose, he
is not entitled to safety valve relief.
C.
Finally, Rodriguez-Jimenez argues that his sentence of 152 months of
imprisonment is unreasonable because “[t]he guidelines, as finally calculated, . . . inflate
the seriousness of the sentence that should have been imposed.” (Appellant’s Br. at 19.)
Specifically, he argues that although he pled guilty and spared the Government the
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burden of a trial, he received no adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in
an unnecessarily high Sentencing Guidelines range. 4
In assessing whether a sentence is reasonable, we consider the Sentencing
Guidelines as “the starting point and the initial benchmark.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 49. We
then consider “whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful
consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Grier,
475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citations omitted). If the district court
appropriately considered the § 3553(a) factors, we “give[] [the] district court[] broad
latitude in sentencing.” United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008).
We find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision to sentence
Rodriguez-Jimenez to 152 months of imprisonment. The District Court properly
calculated the Sentencing Guidelines range and imposed a sentence near the bottom of
that range. Moreover, the parties do not dispute that the District Court gave due
consideration to the sentencing factors under § 3553(a). The fact that Rodriguez-Jimenez
sought to withdraw his guilty plea and baldly asserted his innocence is certainly
inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. And while he may have spared the
Government a trial on the merits, he forced the Government to proceed to a hearing to
defeat his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. As the District Court so aptly pointed out
in explaining why it selected a sentence of 152 months, Rodriguez-Jimenez displayed an
4
Rodriguez-Jimenez also asserts that his sentence is unreasonable because the
District Court declined to apply the safety valve provision. Aside from the argument that
we addressed in Section II(B) supra, however, Rodriguez-Jimenez fails to explain how
this resulted in an unreasonable sentence.
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“attitude of disrespect for the solemnity and integrity of this [criminal justice] system, . . .
lack of remorse, and . . . [an] undeveloped sense of personal accountability.” (S.A. 189.)
In light of these determinations, Rodriguez-Jimenez’s argument that the District Court
did not give adequate weight to his decision to plead guilty is unavailing.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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