United States v. Prawdzik , 484 F. App'x 717 ( 2012 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
Nos. 09-2062 and 09-3547
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DOROTHY PRAWDZIK,
Appellant in 09-2062.
v.
JOHN JACKEY WORMAN,
Appellant in 09-3547.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D. C. Nos. 2-07-cr-00040-003 and 2-07-cr-00040-001)
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on April 27, 2012
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., ROTH and TASHIMA*, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 30, 2012)
*Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth
Circuit, sitting by designation.
OPINION
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
In related appeals arising from the same prosecution and trial, Dorothy Prawdzik
appeals the District Court’s April 7, 2009, judgment of conviction, and John Jackey
Worman appeals the District Court’s August 26, 2009, judgment of conviction. For the
following reasons, we will affirm the judgments of the District Court.
I. Background
On January 23, 2006, the Delaware County District Attorney’s Office began
investigating Worman and Prawdzik after Prawdzik’s younger daughter Chr.B. reported
that she had been sexually abused by Worman from 1997 to 2002, when she was ten to
fifteen years old. Chr.B. described in a handwritten statement how Worman saved
photographs and videotapes of the assaults on a computer at 103 Walnut Street, Colwyn,
Pennsylvania:
When [Worman] started the sex he started to videotape me and then he said he
skans [sic] the video on a disk and saves it into the computer at 103 Walnut Street.
Everything happened in his room. He told me that no one would ever get it.
When he dies, he’ll tell me the password and only I will see the good times we
had. 1
On January 31 and February 2, 2006, Detective Sergeant John Kelly recorded two
consensual telephone conversations in which Chr.B. asked to visit Worman to discuss
1
103 Walnut Street was the home of Worman’s mother, who lived there with
Worman, three of Prawdzik’s children, and Worman and Prawdzik’s child.
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what had happened between them, but Worman refused and questioned whether the call
was being recorded.
Based on Chr.B.’s report, the recorded calls, his own training and experience, and
published information regarding child sex offenders, Detective Kelly applied for and
obtained a search warrant for 103 Walnut Street. The police executed the warrant and
seized computers, hard drives, CDs, cameras, pictures, and VHS tapes. Based on the
evidence seized, Detective Kelly subsequently obtained a search warrant for 492
Westmont Drive, Collingdale, Pennsylvania, the residence of Worman and Concetta
Jackson.
The seized evidence consisted of more than 1.2 million images, including 11,000
video clips, and approximately 60 hours of videotape of Worman sexually assaulting
minors. Included were depictions of Prawdzik sexually abusing four of her nieces and
taping Worman’s assaults on them. Prawdzik admitted that she had sexually abused her
older daughter Cha.B. with Worman and had subsequently sent her children to live with
Worman. Prawdzik further admitted that she had abused her nephew J.P. without any
involvement by Worman.
On December 12, 2006, Detective Kelly called Prawdzik and asked to set up a
meeting to discuss the evidence seized during the searches. Prawdzik met with Detective
Kelly the following day and agreed to be interviewed in a conference room at the local
FBI office. Prawdzik was informed that she was not going to be arrested and was free to
leave at any time. During the meeting, Prawdzik made inculpatory statements, which she
later moved to suppress.
3
On July 24, 2008, a grand jury returned a 56-count Superseding Indictment
charging Worman with the use of a minor to produce visual depictions of sexually
explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (Counts 1-55), and the possession of
child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Count 56). Prawdzik was
charged in Counts 11 through 25, and Jackson was charged in Counts 26 through 55. 2
The District Court denied the defendants’ pre-trial motions to suppress evidence,
to sever defendants, to dismiss the indictment based on the statute of limitations, and to
suppress statements. The District Court granted the government’s motion to admit
evidence, namely the testimony of Cha.B. and J.P., pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) and
414.
On September 4, 2008, Worman and Prawdzik proceeded to trial. During the ten-
day trial, three of Prawdzik’s children and her nephew J.P. testified. In particular, Cha.B.
testified that Prawdzik and Worman sexually abused her in a threesome when she was ten
years old, and J.P. testified that Prawdzik fondled him and engaged in fellatio when he
was between nine and twelve years old. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all 56
counts against Worman and all 15 counts against Prawdzik.
On April 1, 2009, the District Court granted the government’s motion for an
upward departure and sentenced Prawdzik to a term of 30 years’ imprisonment. On
August 12, 2009, the District Court sentenced Worman to a term of 120 years’
imprisonment. Prawdzik and Worman appealed.
2
On September 2, 2008, Jackson pled guilty to Count 46 and was subsequently
sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment.
4
II. Discussion
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
A. Prawdzik
1. Federal Rules of Evidence
Prawdzik contends that the testimony of Cha.B. and J.P. should have been
excluded pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403, and 404(b). 3 We review the District Court’s
evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Williams, 458 F.3d 312, 315
(3d Cir. 2006).
Generally, evidence of other crimes or prior bad acts is not admissible to prove
character or demonstrate action in conformity with those acts, but such evidence may be
admitted “for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
Moreover, “[i]n a case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child
molestation, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of
child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to
which it is relevant.” Fed. R. Evid. 414. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403.
3
Although the parties refer to “Chr.B.” in their briefs, it is clear from the record
that it was Cha.B. who testified at trial regarding the joint sexual abuse by Prawdzik and
Worman.
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The District Court correctly determined that the incidents about which Cha.B. and
J.P. would testify to at trial were acts of “child molestation” falling within the meaning of
Rule 414. The District Court concluded that the testimony was admissible, after
expressly finding that the evidence was relevant and that its probative value was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court further explained
that the evidence was also admissible under Rule 404(b) to show Prawdzik’s state of
mind, motive, opportunity, or absence of mistake. Because the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of Cha.B. and J.P., we will affirm.
2. Suppression of Statements
Prawdzik contends that statements made during her December 2006 meeting with
Detective Kelly should be suppressed because she was in custody and questioned without
being advised of her Miranda rights. We review the conclusion of whether a person was
“in custody” for Miranda purposes de novo and the underlying factual findings for clear
error. United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2005).
Miranda warnings “are required only where there has been such a restriction on a
person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,
495 (1977). Where, as here, the individual has not been formally arrested, “something
must be said or done by the authorities, either in their manner of approach or in the tone
or extent of their questioning, which indicates they would not have heeded a request to
depart or to allow the suspect to do so.” See United States v. Leese, 176 F.3d 740, 743
(3d Cir. 1999).
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Prawdzik concedes that she voluntarily agreed to the meeting, was informed that
she was free to leave, and chose to be interviewed at the FBI office. Prawdzik does not
contend that any coercive tactics were used, and she acknowledges that she took breaks
during the interview, never indicated that she wanted to stop the interview, and never
asked for an attorney. After reviewing the record, it is clear that Prawdzik was not “in
custody” and thus Miranda warnings were not required. We will thus affirm the District
Court’s denial of Prawdzik’s motion to suppress her statements.
3. Severance
Prawdzik contends that the District Court erred by declining to sever her trial from
that of co-defendant Worman. We review the District Court’s denial of a motion for
severance for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 369 (3d Cir.
2001).
If the joinder of defendants in an indictment appears to prejudice a defendant, the
court may sever the defendants’ trials. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. The defendant has,
however, “a heavy burden in gaining severance.” United States v. Quintero, 38 F.3d
1317, 1343 (3d Cir. 1994). Indeed, “[t]here is a preference in the federal system for joint
trials of defendants who are indicted together.” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534,
537 (1993). Moreover, “Rule 14 does not require severance even if prejudice is shown;
rather, it leaves the tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district court’s sound
discretion.” Id. at 538-39.
Prawdzik briefly argues that her right to a fair trial was compromised since the
voluminous evidence admitted against co-defendant Worman would not have been
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admissible against her in a separate trial. Prawdzik is not entitled, however, to a separate
trial “merely because the evidence against a co-defendant is more damaging that that
against [her].” See United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 62 (3d Cir. 1976). Rather,
“the proper inquiry is whether the evidence is such that the jury cannot be expected to
‘compartmentalize’ it and then consider it for its proper purposes.” Id. A review of the
record shows that the jury could ‘compartmentalize’ the evidence, which included, for
example, some images depicting Worman and other images depicting Prawdzik. We
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Prawdzik’s motion
for severance.
4. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
Prawdzik argues that the District Court erred by denying her motion for judgment
of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 because the images for Counts 11 through 20
do not meet the statutory definition of sexually explicit material and there is no
connection between Prawdzik and the images for Counts 21 through 25, which show her
infant niece being sexually assaulted by Worman. We review de novo the District
Court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.
United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005). We “view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government and must sustain a jury’s verdict if a reasonable
jury believing the government’s evidence could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
government proved all the elements of the offenses.” United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d
160, 163 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted).
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To determine whether a visual depiction of a minor constitutes a “lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person” under 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A), the
court considers the following factors: 1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is
on the child’s genitalia or pubic area, 2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is
sexually suggestive, i.e., in a place or pose generally associated with sexual activity, 3)
whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, or in inappropriate attire, considering
the age of the child, 4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude, 5) whether
the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity,
and 6) whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in
the viewer. United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1989) (adopting the
factors from United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986)).
Prawdzik cursorily argues that the images do not meet the Dost factors. To the
contrary, the images meet every Dost factor, and a reasonable jury could find the images
to be a “lascivious exhibition” within the statutory meaning. We also reject Prawdzik’s
argument that merely because she is not portrayed in the images for Counts 21 through
25, there is no evidence connecting her to them. In fact, Prawdzik herself admitted to
bringing her niece to Worman, posing her niece in front of the camera, and watching as
Worman sexually assaulted the infant. We find, therefore, that the District Court
properly denied Prawdzik’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.
5. Sentence
Prawdzik first contends that she was entitled to a four-level reduction pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 due to her minor role in the offense. We review the District Court’s
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denial of a downward adjustment de novo when based on a legal interpretation of the
Guidelines but only for clear error when based primarily on factual determinations.
United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1207 (3d Cir. 1994). As the District Court noted,
Prawdzik played a central role and used her relationship of trust with her nieces to
procure them for the crimes committed. We will affirm the denial of a reduction based
on minimal participation.
Prawdzik also argues that the District Court erred by departing upward and
sentencing her to 360 months’ imprisonment. We review de novo the District Court’s
decision to depart upward as to whether the increase was permissible and review the
reasonableness of the degree of the departure for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 1999). A district court may depart from the
Guidelines if it finds that “there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines.” United States v. Stuart, 22 F.3d 76, 82-83
(3d Cir. 1994).
The District Court thoroughly considered the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
and departed upward pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8 for “extreme conduct,” meaning
conduct that was “unusually heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to the victim.” See
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8. The record reveals that Prawdzik abused the trust of her children,
nieces, and nephews and exploited those relationships to commit, in the words of the
District Court, “unspeakable acts which defy belief.” Indeed, even after abusing her own
daughter with Worman, she sent her children to live with him, and she brought her ten-
10
month-old niece to Worman and recorded his sexual assault of her. We conclude that the
upward departure was permissible and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion
in the degree of that departure.
B. Worman
Worman’s sole argument on appeal is that the District Court erred by denying his
motion to suppress evidence gathered as a result of the searches of 103 Walnut Street and
492 Westmont Drive. Although he acknowledges that the searches were conducted
pursuant to search warrants, Worman contends that the warrants were invalid because
they were based on impermissibly stale information.
We review the District Court’s suppression ruling for clear error as to its factual
findings and exercise plenary review over its legal conclusions, e.g., United States v.
Tracey, 597 F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2010). Age of the information supporting a warrant
application is a factor in determining probable cause. United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d
1318, 1322 (3d Cir. 1993). Age alone, however, does not determine staleness. Id.
Rather, staleness is a contextual inquiry in which we must also examine the nature of the
crime and the type of evidence. Id.
In the context of child pornography, we have repeatedly recognized that “persons
with an interest in child pornography tend to hoard their materials and retain them for a
long time.” United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 528 (3d Cir. 2010). Indeed,
“pedophiles rarely, if ever, dispose of child pornography.” United States v. Zimmerman,
277 F.3d 426, 434 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing Harvey, 2 F.3d at 1322). We have also
distinguished between adult and child pornography, explaining that “presumably
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individuals will protect and retain child pornography for long periods of time because it is
illegal and difficult to obtain.” Id. Of course, we do not hold that information
concerning child pornography crimes can never grow stale.
Worman argues that the information supporting the search warrant for 103 Walnut
Street was impermissibly stale because the sexual abuse of Chr.B. ended at least three
years prior to the search warrant application. We disagree. The affidavit indicates that
Worman abused Chr.B. over a five- or six-year period in his room at 103 Walnut Street,
took pictures and videos of the abuse, and scanned the videos to his computer. The
affidavit also states that Worman and Chr.B. had recent contact by phone. Detective
Kelly noted his extensive personal experience and training related to child sexual abuse
and child pornography, as well as his opinion that individuals interested in child
pornography tend to retain such material for extended periods of time. Given the long
period of repeated sexual abuse and the fact that Worman transferred the videotapes of
the assaults to his computer, we conclude that there was a “substantial basis” for the
magistrate judge to conclude that the affidavit established probable cause. In sum, we
will affirm the denial of Worman’s motion to suppress evidence.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgments entered by the District
Court.
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