Harris v. Romine , 77 F. App'x 568 ( 2003 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2003 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    9-11-2003
    Harris v. Romine
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 01-3580
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    Recommended Citation
    "Harris v. Romine" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 279.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003/279
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 01-3580
    GEORGE HARRIS,
    Appellant
    v.
    DON ROM INE, Warden,
    U.S.P. Lewisburg, USA
    ____________
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    (D.C. Civ. No. 00-cv-01490)
    District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley
    ____________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    April 1, 2002
    Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO, and W EIS, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: September 11, 2003)
    ____________
    OPINION
    WEIS, Circuit Judge.
    In 1988, a jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
    Virginia found George Harris guilty of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise
    1
    (“CCE”) in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 848
    , 28 counts of distributing cocaine in violation of
    
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    , four counts of unlawfully using a communication facility to facilitate
    drug-trafficking in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 843
    (b), and two counts of interstate travel in
    aid of racketeering in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1952
    (a)(3). A conviction for conspiracy in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
     was vacated on motion of the Government.
    The Court sentenced Harris to life in prison on the CCE charge and to 35
    years, to be served consecutively with the life sentence, on the remaining counts. Harris’s
    direct appeal was unsuccessful, and his motion pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     to vacate his
    sentence was denied in 1992.
    In 1995, Harris filed a second section 2255 motion, contending that the trial
    court had erred by failing to instruct the jury that it had to agree unanimously on the
    specific violations that constituted the continuing series required for a CCE conviction.
    The District Court acknowledged that some courts required such an instruction, but it
    concluded that the lack of such an instruction was not error. After the Supreme Court
    held to the contrary in Richardson v. United States, 
    526 U.S. 813
    , 818-19 (1999), Harris
    sought leave to file a successive section 2255 motion raising a claim based on the Court’s
    decision. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the request. 1
    1
    Richardson did not state a rule of constitutional law. See Richardson, 
    526 U.S. at 818-19
     (deciding the case on statutory grounds); see also 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     ¶ 8
    (standards for approving a successive section 2255 motion).
    2
    Harris then filed a 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
     petition in the District Court for the
    Middle District of Pennsylvania. He contends that (i) his conviction was constitutionally
    invalid because no Richardson instruction had been given and (ii) his sentence was
    unlawful under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000). The Government’s
    response argued that Harris was not entitled to seek relief via section 2241. In his reply,
    Harris made two new, but related, arguments: that (i) his indictment did not adequately
    charge a conspiracy in violaution of 
    21 U.S.C. § 8462
     and (ii) his life sentence on the
    CCE conviction violated Apprendi.
    The District Court dismissed the petition on the ground that Apprendi was
    not applicable retroactively on collateral review and, therefore, Harris could not proceed
    under section 2241. Harris appealed to this Court and we held the case c.a.v. pending the
    decision in Largo v. Bailey, 01-1643, where a similar issue had been raised. The panel in
    that case handed down its opinion on June 11, 2003 and we now proceed to disposition of
    Harris’ appeal.
    Under the explicit terms of section 2255, unless a section 2255 motion
    would be “inadequate or ineffective,” a habeas petition under section 2241 cannot be
    entertained by a court. See Application of Galante, 
    437 F.2d 1164
    , 1165 (3d Cir. 1971).
    Section 2255 is not “inadequate or ineffective” merely because the sentencing court has
    2
    This argument is frivolous - the section 846 conviction was vacated on the
    Government’s motion.
    3
    previously denied relief or because the gatekeeping provisions of section 2255 make it
    difficult to prosecute successive motions. See In re Dorsainvil, 
    119 F.3d 245
    , 251 (3d
    Cir. 1997) (explaining that a prisoner could resort to section 2241 if he “had no earlier
    opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that an intervening change in
    substantive law may negate”).
    In Okereke v. United States, 
    307 F.3d 117
    , 119 (3d Cir. 2002), this Court
    held that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Okereke’s Apprendi claims by
    recharacterizing his section 2255 motion as a motion for relief pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
    . We explained that section 2255 was neither “inadequate or ineffective for Okereke
    to raise his Apprendi argument.” Okereke, 
    307 F.3d at 121
    .
    In this case, the District Court properly concluded that Harris could not
    proceed under section 2241.3 We recognize that Okereke involved a successive section
    2255 motion (treated by the District Court as a section 2241 petition), whereas Harris’
    petition was submitted and treated as one brought under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
    . However, this
    variation is a distinction without a difference as to the District Court’s jurisdiction to
    reach the merits of an Apprendi claim.
    3
    This Court has arrived at this same conclusion in two other unpublished
    opinions. See Chambers v. Romine, 
    2002 WL 1283398
    , *2 (3d Cir. May 6, 2002) &
    Largo v. Bailey, 
    2003 WL 21356962
    , *2 (3d Cir. June 11, 2003).
    4
    Those persons convicted in federal court who wish to collaterally attack
    their convictions must proceed through motions pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    . Section
    2241 may be invoked only when section 2255 proves “inadequate or ineffective” to test
    the legality of the detention. Harris has not shown us that his section 2255 petitions have
    been inadequate or ineffective simply because he was previously denied relief. See In re
    Dorsainvil, 
    119 F.3d at 251
    .
    The District Court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear
    Harris’ section 2241 petition. Accordingly, the order of the District Court will be
    affirmed.
    5
    _________________________
    TO THE CLERK:
    Please file the foregoing Opinion.
    /s/ Joseph F. Weis
    Circuit Judge
    6
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-3580

Citation Numbers: 77 F. App'x 568

Judges: Sloviter, Ambro, Weis

Filed Date: 9/11/2003

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024