United States v. Teel ( 2004 )

Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
12-13-2004
USA v. Teel
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 03-4856
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-4856
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WAYNE TEEL,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 02-cr-00761)
District Judge: Honorable Marvin Katz
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
Date: November 30, 2004
Before: RENDELL, ALDISERT and MAGILL1 , Circuit Judges.
(FiledDecember 13, 2004)
OPINION OF THE COURT
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The Honorable Frank J. Magill, Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
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ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Wayne Teel appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea and refusal to downwardly depart. We have jurisdiction over the
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000). We will affirm in part and dismiss the
appeal in part.
I.
Because we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts, procedural
history and contentions presented, we will not recite them except as necessary to the
discussion.
II.
A criminal defendant has no automatic right to withdraw a guilty plea. United
States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir. 1986). A defendant whose guilty plea has
been accepted by the district court after the inquiry required by Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, may not withdraw the plea without good reason. This Court
has recognized three factors in evaluating plea withdrawals: (1) whether the defendant
asserts his innocence; (2) whether the government would be prejudiced by the
withdrawal; and (3) the strength of the defendant’s reasons for moving to withdraw.
United States v. Trott, 779 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1985). We have also recognized that
“[a] shift in defense tactics, change of mind, or the fear of punishment are not adequate
reasons to impose on the government the expense, difficulty and risk of trying a defendant
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who has already acknowledged his guilt by pleading guilty.” United States v. Brown, 250
F.3d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 2001).
Here, the district court correctly denied Teel’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Before allowing Teel to plead guilty, the district judge clearly explained the three counts
against him and that each of these counts would have to be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. The court also set forth the factual bases of each of the offenses charged in the
indictment. Teel’s guilty plea was accepted only after a full inquiry to determine that it
was voluntary.
Teel does not assert his innocence. He seeks to withdraw his plea because he had
hoped that charges in two other bank robberies would be transferred to the federal court.
Teel claims that he thought he was pleading guilty to these two robberies as well. These
charges were not, however, mentioned when Teel pled guilty to the federal charges.
After the commission of the three crimes which formed the basis of the federal
indictment, Teel was charged in Montgomery County for a separate and unrelated
robbery and in Philadelphia for two separate additional robberies. Neither the
Montgomery County nor Philadelphia robberies were related to the federal indictment.
Teel’s reasons to withdraw his guilty plea are inadequate and the district court correctly
denied the motion.
III.
We lack the jurisdiction to review a district court’s refusal to downwardly depart
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if the court understood its authority but exercised its discretion not to grant a downward
departure. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 627 (2002). Here, the district court
refused to grant a downward departure because Teel’s criminal history indicated a need
to incarcerate him to protect the public and his mental impairment was “not significant.”
Teel has made no showing that the district court misunderstood its authority.
Accordingly, we lack the jurisdiction to review its decision. If we had the authority to
review the merits, we would affirm the district court’s denial of Teel’s motion for the
downward departure.
IV.
We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and conclude
that no further discussion is necessary. We hold that the district court correctly denied
Teel’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We lack the jurisdiction to review the district
court’s refusal to grant a downward departure. Accordingly, the judgment of the district
court will be affirmed in part and the appeal dismissed in part.
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