Lepore v. Lanvision Systems, Inc. , 113 F. App'x 449 ( 2004 )

Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
10-19-2004
Lepore v. Lanvision Sys Inc
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 03-3619
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 03-3619
__________
JANE LEPORE
Appellant
v.
LANVISION SYSTEMS, INC.
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Civ. No. 00-cv-04144)
District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 28, 2004
___________
Before: ROTH, BARRY, and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 19, 2004)
__________
OPINION
__________
1
Garth, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Jane Lepore appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Appellee LanVision Systems, Inc. (“LanVision”) on Lepore’s claims
of sex and/or pregnancy discrimination and retaliation. The District Court had
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1291. W e will affirm.
I.
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we recount the facts and
procedural history only as they are relevant to the following discussion.
LanVision is a software developer with its headquarters located in Cincinnati,
Ohio. Jane Lepore began working for LanVision at its headquarters on July 8, 1996, as a
Project Manager. In February 1997, LanVision reorganized and Lepore was transferred
to Indirect Sales as an Application Specialist. Several months later, Lepore assisted her
supervisor, Paul Burke, in the search for two additional application specialists to join the
Indirect Sales team . That search resulted in the hiring of Nick Jovings and Mark Zajicek.
As a result of a second reorganization, in April 1998, the Indirect Sales team was
dissolved and Lepore, Jovings and Zajicek were transferred to Direct Sales. Lepore
retained her position as Application Specialist and began reporting to Larry Smeage, the
National Director of Sales. One month later, Jovings left Direct Sales and was assigned
to Professional Services.
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Lepore was pregnant and nearing her due date when she was transferred. Smeage
assigned Lepore to work under Terry Costello, a Direct Sales team leader, for the interim
period before her maternity leave was to commence. Prior to Lepore’s leave, Smeage and
Lepore had a discussion about Lepore’s upcoming childbirth and issues related to
childcare. Smeage conveyed his wife’s difficulty with leaving her child and returning to
work, and in particular their difficulties in finding childcare. According to Smeage,
“basically [he] let her [Lepore] know that as far as childcare, and so on, that she may want
to look into that . . . proactively, since she – you know, part of her job is to be on the road
traveling.” Smeage Dep. at 18. After Lepore told Smeage that she had already arranged
for childcare, Smeage responded “I don’t know, you might change your mind after having
your first baby, you might not want to come back to work.” Id. at 204-205. Lepore
testified that she did not believe Smeage’s raising the childcare issue was discriminatory,
but that she “was dumbfounded that he would discourage [her] . . . .” Id. at 205-206.
Lepore went on medical leave on May 11, 1998. She gave birth on May 21, 1998,
at which time her maternity leave officially began. During her leave, Lepore moved to
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania with her husband and child. Lepore’s statutorily-mandated
12-week maternity leave expired on July 21, 1998. Lepore informed Terry Costello that
she did not intend to return to work until August 12, 1998, taking a combination of paid
and unpaid leave for the remaining period.
Adopting a program of company-wide downsizing, between February 1, 1998 and
3
January 31, 1999, LanVision reduced its workforce from 123 to 75 employees through
terminations and resignations. In particular, management decided to keep only one
Application Specialist in the Direct Sales group. Smeage chose to keep Terry Costello,
the team leader. Lepore testified that Costello was the right person to retain because of
her seniority and experience. See Lepore Dep. at 294. On August 6, 1998, Smeage
informed Lepore that she had been terminated. LanVision laid off 12 percent of its
workforce during that time. Zajicek transferred to Professional Services on the West
Coast for one month until he too was laid off in September 1998.
II.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of LanVision. First, it
found that Lepore failed to make out a prima facie case of gender and pregnancy
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seq., the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.,
and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa.C.S. § 951 et seq., in
connection with her termination by LanVision. The District Court determined that
Lepore was terminated as part of a corporate reorganization that included a reduction in
force, and that no similarly situated individuals outside the protected class were retained.
Second, the District Court rejected Lepore’s FMLA claim for LanVision’s failure
to reinstate her upon her return from maternity leave, finding that Lepore failed to satisfy
her evidentiary burden of demonstrating either discriminatory intent or retaliation.
4
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment
and apply the same standard as the District Court, i.e., whether there are any genuine
issues of material fact such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Debiec v. Cabot Corp., 352 F.3d 117, 128 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2003)
(citation omitted). “One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to
isolate and dispose of factually unsupportable claims or defenses . . . .” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Applying that standard here, we conclude that the
District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of LanVision.
A. Title VII and PHRA
In order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination in a reduction in force
case arising under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected
class, (2) she was qualified for the position in question, (3) she was terminated, and (4)
individuals not within the protected class were retained. In re Carnegie Center Assocs.,
129 F.3d 290, 294-95 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Once the prima facie case is
successfully made, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s termination. See Texas Dep’t of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then
prove that the defendant’s reason was a pretext for a discriminatory motive. Burdine, 450
U.S. at 254. Claims arising under the PHRA are governed by the same legal standard as
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that applied to Title VII. See Gomez v. Allegheny Health Servs., 71 F.3d 1079, 1083-84
(3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
The central issue here is whether Lepore satisfied the fourth prong of the prima
facie case, that is, whether she demonstrated that individuals not within the protected
class were retained. In a reduction in force case, the persons outside the protected class
are those employees who are “similarly situated,” that is, they work in the same area in
approximately the same position. See Anderson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 297 F.3d
242, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2002).
Lepore points to Jovings and Zajicek as the retained individuals outside the
protected class. She claims that these “[t]wo male peers with less seniority and
experience . . . were retained” while she was terminated. Lepore Br. at 7. We agree with
Lepore that the comparison to Jovings and Zajicek was proper. We conclude, however,
that neither of those individuals was retained and therefore Lepore fails to make a
successful prima facie case.
As to Jovings, it is undisputed that he transferred out of Direct Sales before Lepore
left for maternity leave and before the August 1998 reduction in force. With respect to
Zajicek, while it is true that he transferred to Professional Services for one month, it is
undisputed that he was laid off in September 1998 as part of the same reduction in force
that resulted in Lepore’s termination. Because Lepore cannot point to any similarly
situated employees outside of the protected class who were retained, the District Court
6
correctly concluded that Lepore failed to establish a prima facie discrimination case.
In the alternative, Lepore argues that she has produced direct evidence of
discrimination and that therefore we should also analyze her claim under the mixed
motives analysis set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989). A
plaintiff attempting to prove discrimination by direct evidence faces a “high hurdle.”
Connors v. Chrysler Financial Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1998). Specifically, the
evidence must demonstrate that the “decision makers placed substantial negative reliance
on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision.” Id. In putting forth her mixed
motives claim, Lepore relies mainly on her childcare conversation with Smeage, a
conversation she admitted was not discriminatory. Furthermore, Lepore offers no
evidence that “addresses directly the reasons for implementing the [reduction in force].”
Anderson, 297 F.3d at 249. Based on the foregoing, we find Lepore has not cleared the
high evidentiary hurdle of Price Waterhouse. Her mixed motives claim was therefore
properly rejected.
B. FMLA
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FMLA, a plaintiff must
show that (1) she took an FMLA leave, (2) she suffered an adverse employment decision,
and (3) the adverse decision was causally related to her leave. Conoshenti v. Public Svce.
Electric & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135 (3d Cir. 2004). Once a plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case, the usual McDonnell Douglas, see supra, burden shifting framework is
7
implicated. See Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 432 (3d Cir. 2001).
The District Court found that Lepore successfully made out a prima facie case
under the FMLA. However, in its analysis, it appears to have confused the requirements
for a prima facie retaliation case with those for a prima facie discrimination case.
Consequently, on appeal, the parties argue at length about whether the temporal proximity
of Lepore’s termination to the end of her maternity leave satisfies the causal connection
prong of a prima facie retaliation case. We need not decide that here, however, because
even assuming arguendo that Lepore made out a prima facie retaliation case, summary
judgment was still proper.
In response to Lepore’s claim of retaliation, LanVision proffers the reduction in
force as its legitimate, non-discriminatory business reason for terminating her. Lepore
offers no evidence that the reduction in force was pretextual. Indeed she offers no
evidence that directly addresses the decision to implement the reduction in force in any
way. Lepore’s only evidence is her conversation with Smeage which, as we noted above,
Lepore herself admitted was not discriminatory. Consequently, Lepore fails to carry her
burden of proof on her FMLA retaliation claim and summary judgment was properly
awarded.1
1
Like the District Court below, we need not address LanVision’s contention that the
FMLA is inapplicable under 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii) (FMLA does not cover an employee who
is employed at a worksite at which the employer employs less than 50 employees if the total
number of employees working within 75 miles of that worksite is less than 50) because Lepore’s
FMLA claim fails on the merits.
8
III.
LanVision moved to impose costs and sanctions on Lepore, or, in the alternative,
to dismiss Lepore’s appeal, claiming that Lepore engaged in an undue pattern of delay.
We will deny both motions.
IV.
Accordingly, we will AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.
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