United States v. Wallace , 99 F. App'x 427 ( 2004 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2004 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    6-2-2004
    USA v. Wallace
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 03-3994
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004
    Recommended Citation
    "USA v. Wallace" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 627.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/627
    This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2004 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
    OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    NOS. 03-3994 and 03-3995
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    RICHARD C. WALLACE
    Appellant
    On Appeal From the United States
    District Court
    For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Crim. Action Nos. 02-cr-00299-1
    and 02-cr-00310-1)
    District Judge: Hon. William W. Caldwell
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    May 25, 2004
    BEFORE: ROTH and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges,
    and SCHWARZER,* District Judge
    (Filed: June 2, 2004)
    * Hon. William W. Schwarzer, United States District Judge for the Northern District of
    California, sitting by designation.
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
    Appellant Richard A. Wallace pled guilty to mail fraud and bank fraud pursuant to
    a plea agreement. He was sentenced to serve 37 months of incarceration on each
    conviction to be served concurrently. He now appeals both sentences.
    Section 2F1.1(b)(4)(C) of the sentencing guidelines requires a two-level
    enhancement “if the offenses involved . . . a violation of any prior, specific judicial or
    administrative order, injunction, decree, or process not addressed elsewhere in the
    guidelines . . .” U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(4)(C) (2000 Ed.). Wallace’s presentence
    investigation report (“PSI”) indicated that the Pennsylvania Securities Commission
    (“PSC”), on January 25, 2001, entered a cease and desist order against Apacor Financial,
    Inc., Wallace and others prohibiting the further sale of certain Apacor notes to the public.
    The PSI further evidences that Apacor continued to sell the notes until the end of March,
    2001, with $114,000 worth of notes being sold during the January to M arch period.
    These portions of the PSI were not challenged.
    At the sentencing hearing, Wallace took the position that the § 2F1.1(b)(4)(C)
    enhancement was not applicable to him because a violation of the order must be a
    knowing one and he was not aware of the existence of the cease and desist order “until
    2
    long after it was entered.” App. at 141. According to his own testimony, however, he
    was aware of the order as of early March, 2001, and two or three notes were sold later in
    March. Moreover, Wallace’s testimony about only learning of the order in early March
    was impeached (1) by a statement given by him to the FBI in October 2002 admitting that
    he became aware of the order in February, 2001; and (2) by the statements of two former
    Apacor employees, Gina DeMarco and Arthur Carlson, who told the FBI that Wallace
    was aware of the order as soon as it was entered. There thus was ample record support
    for the District Court’s conclusion that Wallace had knowingly violated the PSC order
    and that there should be a two-level enhancement.
    To the extent that Wallace is arguing that his mental state was so compromised
    during February and March 2001 that he couldn’t knowingly violate the cease and desist
    order, his argument is inconsistent with the District Court’s denial of Wallace’s
    downward departure motion based upon alleged diminished capacity. After a hearing on
    Wallace’s mental state, the District Court denied the motion and found that Wallace did
    not suffer from any significantly reduced mental capacity during the course of the crime.
    The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-3994, 03-3995

Citation Numbers: 99 F. App'x 427

Judges: Roth, Schwarzer, Stapleton

Filed Date: 6/2/2004

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024