Cange v. Philadelphia Parking Authority , 451 F. App'x 210 ( 2011 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-2245
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MARIE CANGE,
Appellant
v.
PHILADELPHIA PARKING AUTHORITY
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-08-cv-03480)
District Judge: The Honorable Thomas N. O‟Neill, Jr.
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 15, 2011
BEFORE: SLOVITER, SMITH, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Filed: November 15, 2011)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge
Appellant Marie Cange sued her employer, the Philadelphia Parking Authority,
alleging discrimination based on national origin. The matter proceeded to trial. The jury
unanimously agreed that Cange had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
her national origin was a determinative factor in the PPA‟s decision to terminate her
employment. However, the jury deadlocked on the question of whether Cange had
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that her national origin was a motivating
factor in the PPA‟s decision to fire her. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
50(b), the District Court granted judgment as a matter of law to the PPA. Cange timely
appealed.
I.
Because we write primarily to explain our decision to the parties, who are of
course familiar with the background of this case, we set forth only those facts and points
of procedural history that are of central relevance to our decision. Cange filed a
complaint against her former employer, the PPA, alleging discrimination based on
national origin, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d and 2000e, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Sta. 1071
(Nov. 21, 1991), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Stat. § 951 et seq.
Cange, who is Haitian by national origin, worked as a parking lot cashier at the
Philadelphia International Airport, and was fired after a random review of video
surveillance showed her sleeping while on duty.
This matter proceeded to trial, with the District Court instructing the jury that
Cange could prove her case using either a mixed-motive or pretext theory of
discrimination. The jury unanimously found that Cange had failed to prove pretext and
she has not appealed that finding. The jury deadlocked, however, on the question of
whether Cange‟s national original was one of the motivating factors in the PPA‟s
termination decision. After dismissing the jury, the District Court took up the PPA‟s
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motion for judgment as a matter of law. Finding Cange‟s evidence to be “critically
deficient of that minimum quantity of evidence from which a jury might reasonably
afford relief,” the District Court granted the PPA‟s motion. See FED.R.CIV.P. 50(b); see
also Raiczyk v. Ocean County Veterinary Hosp., 377 F.3d 266, 268 (3d Cir. 2004).
II.
At trial, the PPA objected to the mixed motive instruction. The District Court
overruled that objection, gave the mixed-motive instruction, but reversed its ruling in
deciding the Rule 50(b) motion and sustained the PPA‟s objection. “Generally, we
review the district court‟s refusal to give certain jury instructions under an abuse of
discretion standard although where ... the question is whether the jury instructions stated
the proper legal standard, our review is plenary.” United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196,
207 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). We exercise plenary review over a
district court‟s decision to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule
50(b). Delli Santi v. CNA Ins. Cos., 88 F.3d 192, 200 (3d Cir. 1996). In determining
whether this motion for judgment as a matter of law was properly granted, we must
“inquire whether there is any legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to
find for [Cange].” Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 453-54 (2000) (internal
quotations omitted). In making this determination, we “must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of [Cange], and [we] may not make credibility determinations or
weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150
(2000). However, “[t]he question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting
the party against whom the [Rule 50(b)] motion is directed but whether there is evidence
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upon which the jury could properly find a verdict for that party.” Lightning Lube, Inc. v.
Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841, 846
(3d Cir. 1978)).
Whether we review this appeal through the prism of the propriety of the actual
jury instruction, or the District Court‟s decision on the Rule 50(b) motion, the analysis is
the same. The determinative question is whether any reasonable juror could find that
Cange‟s evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that her national origin was one of the
motivating factors in the PPA‟s decision to terminate her. The District Court found her
evidence insufficient and we agree. We will, therefore, affirm.
III.
A plaintiff may base her claim of discrimination on a mixed-motive theory by
showing that an adverse employment decision was based on both legitimate and
illegitimate reasons. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240–42 (1989). A
mixed-motive plaintiff is not required to present direct evidence to prove that
discrimination was a motivating factor. See Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 92. In Desert
Palace, the Supreme Court held that to establish a jury question of a Title VII violation
“a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that „race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice.‟ ” Id. at 101. Thus, a plaintiff who can
present only circumstantial evidence of discrimination may proceed under the mixed-
motive theory. See id. However, even under the mixed-motive theory, a plaintiff must
produce some evidence of discrimination. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 99 (the plaintiff
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still must “prove [her] case by a preponderance of the evidence using direct or
circumstantial evidence”) ( citing Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
714 n. 3 (1983)). This requires a showing that the defendant took an adverse
employment action against the plaintiff, and that [national origin] was a motivating factor
for the defendant‟s action. See Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 213 (3d Cir. 2008).
A defendant in a mixed-motive case has a limited affirmative defense if it can
“demonstrate that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor.” Id.The District Court did not err by rescinding its mixed-motive instruction. Quite
simply, this is not a mixed-motive case. Cange prosecuted her claims under the pretext
theory. Nowhere on this record does Cange argue that there were both legitimate and
illegitimate reasons for her termination. Indeed, the PPA does not raise a mixed-motive
defense. Our review of the record convinces us that Cange has always prosecuted her
claims under a pretext theory of discrimination, consistently arguing that discrimination
can be inferred from the PPA‟s disparate treatment of other employees. Recalling that
the jury unanimously found no pretext, there is no inference of discrimination. See St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506–08 (1993). Without an inference that
Cange‟s national origin motivated her employer‟s action, there was no basis for the
District Court to apply a mixed-motive analysis, as the District Court itself recognized
when it rescinded its mixed-motive jury charge.
Even were we to determine that Cange prosecuted her discrimination claims under
a mixed-motive theory, we agree with the District Court that her evidence was
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insufficient. See, e.g., Lightning Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d at 1166. Cange presented no direct
evidence to suggest that her national origin was a motivating factor in her termination.
To the extent that Cange attempted to claim discrimination through circumstantial
evidence of the PPA‟s treatment of other employees, we find no fault with the District
Court‟s conclusion that there was insufficient evidence. To suggest that Cange‟s national
origin was a motivating factor in her supervisor‟s decision to terminate her employment,
she points to the treatment of two other employees, Kim Earland and James Aria. The
record reveals, however, significant factors that distinguished Cange‟s case from
Earland‟s and Aria‟s. The evidence showed, for example, that Aria was asleep while on
break – Cange admitted that she was sleeping while on duty. In Earland‟s case, the PPA
could not conclusively determine that she was asleep while on duty. In pointing to the
treatment received by these two individuals, Cange does not highlight evidence that
would permit a reasonable jury to find her national origin to be a motivating factor in her
ultimate termination.
Having considered the entire record here, we conclude that Cange was unable to
identify a similarly situated comparator. She, therefore, presented insufficient evidence
to permit a jury to find that her national origin was a motivating factor in her employment
termination.
IV.
Lastly, Cange challenges the District Court‟s admission of evidence concerning
the PPA‟s termination of Michael Davis, a non-Haitian, white employee who was fired
for sleeping on the job. Cange argued that the District Court‟s admission of this evidence
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was improper because Davis‟ supervisor was different from Cange‟s. We typically
review such challenges to the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,
Coleman v. Home Depot, Inc., 306 F.3d 1333, 1342 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, however,
Cange never objected at trial to the admission of this evidence on this basis. True
enough, at trial she did object in a motion in limine to the admission of the Davis
evidence, but she only argued that such evidence should be excluded because the PPA
did not timely disclose its existence. She never voiced an objection to the admission of
the evidence because it was irrelevant or unduly prejudicial. “Our Circuit adheres to a
well established principle that it is inappropriate for an appellate court to consider a
contention raised on appeal that was not initially presented to the district court.” Lloyd v.
HOVENSA, 369 F.3d 263, 272–73 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting In re City of Phila. Litig., 158
F.3d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 1998)). Because the District Court was never given an
opportunity to consider Cange‟s substantive objections to this evidence, we will not
consider those arguments now.
V.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, we will affirm the judgment of the
District Court.
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