Lindell Tate v. Lindsay ( 2021 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 20-2820
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LINDELL TATE,
Appellant
v.
LINDSAY, Lieutenant;
FAULTZ, C.O.I. at SCI Somerset
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-00086)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on July 9, 2021
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 23, 2021)
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OPINION *
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PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Lindell Tate appeals from the order dismissing his complaint for failure
to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the judgment of the District
Court and remand for further proceedings.
In his complaint, Tate, a prisoner formerly incarcerated at State Correctional Institution
Somerset, brought one claim against two prison official defendants for failure to protect,
based on the following allegations, which we accept as true at this stage of the proceedings.
One morning while defendant Faultz, a correctional officer, was bringing breakfast trays
to Tate’s cell, Tate informed him that Tate and his cellmate were not getting along and
were having heated exchanges. Tate asked to be moved to another cell, and he proposed
as options two cells that had open beds. Faultz said that he would work on it. After Tate
spoke to Faultz about the issue “at length several times” that morning, Faultz got frustrated
and said that the decision was up to the lieutenant working that day.
Around 11:00 a.m., Tate contacted defendant Lieutenant Lindsay directly via the inter-
com in his cell and told him that he and his cellmate had nearly come to blows a few times
and could no longer tolerate one another. Tate’s cellmate yelled into the intercom that if
one of them was not moved, something was going to happen to one of them. Tate then
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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repeated the same threat. In response, defendant Lindsay told Tate and his cellmate that if
they both were not willing to move cells neither could move. Tate’s cellmate refused to
move, and no action was taken. Defendant Faultz was standing outside Tate’s cell during
the call.
Mid-afternoon, Tate was standing at the door of his cell watching television when his
cellmate attacked him from behind, choked him until he lost consciousness, and tied his
hands and feet behind his back. Tate suffered a “busted lip” in the process. An officer
eventually discovered Tate during rounds, and he was given medical treatment. Tate was
thereafter moved to another cell, and his cellmate was sentenced to 90 days in the restricted
housing unit.
The District Court dismissed Tate’s complaint under 28 U.S.C §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A
for failure to state a claim, adopting a Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation as
its opinion, over Tate’s objections. This timely appeal followed.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint under §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A. See Harnage v. Lightner, 916 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 2019) (per curium); Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state
a claim, “we accept all factual allegations as true” and “construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen, Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d
Cir. 2011) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).
A prison official is liable under the Eighth Amendment for failure to protect an inmate
if the official subjectively knew of and chose to disregard a substantial risk of serious harm
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to an inmate’s health or safety, i.e., if the official was deliberately indifferent to the risk.
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352,
367 (3d Cir. 2012) (“To state a claim for damages against a prison official for failure to
protect from inmate violence, an inmate must plead facts that show (1) he was incarcerated
under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the official was deliberately
indifferent to that substantial risk to his health and safety, and (3) the official’s deliberate
indifference caused him harm.”) (citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Mack
v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2020). The allegations in Tate’s complaint entail that de-
fendants Faultz and Lindsay subjectively knew of his dispute with his cellmate. The rele-
vant questions therefore are whether they disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to
Tate and whether their deliberate indifference caused his injuries.
We have noted that “prison officials are presented with an arduous task when asked to
discern legitimate from illegitimate requests for protective custody.” Young v. Quinlan,
960 F.2d 351, 363 n.23 (3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000). In a “realistic world, prisoners may
feign their fear of physical harm simply to manipulate a transfer,” for reasons such as a
desire to “dorm with a friend” or “obtain better living quarters.” Id. (citation omitted).
“Prison officials . . . are not required to provide protective custody to every inmate who
asserts he was assaulted or threatened,” but they are required to investigate and determine
the credibility of the inmate’s fear. Id.After learning of the heated conflict between Tate and his cellmate, the defendants os-
tensibly determined there was at least some credibility to Tate’s fear because they offered
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to take remedial action in the form of moving both prisoners to different cells. However,
when Tate’s cellmate refused to move to another cell—a decision wholly out of Tate’s
control—the defendants withdrew the offer of remedial action as to Tate, thus forcing him
to remain trapped in an ongoing, and apparently escalating, volatile situation, which ulti-
mately proved dangerous. We conclude that these allegations sufficiently pled that the
defendants disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to Tate and that their deliberate
indifference caused his injuries.
The District Court concluded that Tate’s injuries were not more than de minimis and
thus could not be used to establish that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to an
excessive risk to his health or safety. However, in so concluding, the Court reduced Tate’s
injuries to merely a “busted lip,” proclaiming, “That’s it.” (ECF No. 5 at 10). As noted,
Tate alleged that his cellmate choked him until he lost consciousness, and then tied his
hands and feet behind his back, which is how he remained until a guard found him. His lip
was injured during the attack. Clearly, these were more than de minimis injuries.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Tate’s allegations were sufficient to state
a failure-to-protect claim against the defendants, and we therefore will vacate the judgment
of the District Court and remand for further proceedings.
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