Hilton Mincy v. DeParlos , 497 F. App'x 234 ( 2012 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-2121
___________
HILTON KARRIEM MINCY,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN DEPARLOS; DEPUTY WARDEN BLANK; LIEUTENANT HARTLY;
LYCOMING COUNTY PRISON; LYCOMING COUNTY PRISON BOARD;
SERGEANT MCKISSICK; JUDGE NANCY BUTTS; SHERIFF CHARLES T.
BREWER; COMMISSIONER REBECCA BURKE; COMMISSIONER RICHARD
NASSBERG; COMMISSIONER ERNEST LARSON; CONTROLLER KRISTA
ROGERS; MICHAEL DINGES, LYCOMING COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:08-cv-00507)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 4, 2012
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 21, 2012)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
1
Hilton Karriem Mincy appeals from the summary judgment entered by the District
Court in favor of the defendants. We will affirm.
I.
Mincy commenced this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on March
20, 2008, alleging (1) a failure to accommodate his religious beliefs; (2) retaliation for
exercising his religious beliefs; (3) a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; (4) a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1; and (5) various state law claims. Mincy is
a state inmate whose claims arise from his temporary housing at the Lycoming County
Prison, located in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. He was housed at the prison on four
occasions, from September 21, 2007, until October 8, 2007; from March 19, 2008, until
April 11, 2008; from June 10, 2008, until June 17, 2009; and from August 6, 2008, until
August 18, 2008. The defendants include the Lycoming County Prison, the Lycoming
County Prison Board and its members,1 Warden Deparlos, Deputy Warden Blank,
Lieutenant Hartley, and Sergeant McKissick.
Mincy is a practicing member of the Muslim faith. Mincy alleged that the
defendants interfered with his observance of the Muslim holiday of Ramadan in 2007.
According to Mincy, the defendants did not provide him with hot meals at the end of his
daily fast; provided morning and evening meals with insufficient caloric content to
1
The board members are: Judge Nancy Butts, Sheriff Charles T. Brewer, Commissioner
Rebecca Burke, Commissioner Richard Nassberg, Commissioner Ernest Larson,
Controller Krista Rogers, and Lycoming County District Attorney Michael Dinges.
2
compensate for the absence of a daytime meal; refused to provide medication in
accordance with his fasting obligations; refused to accommodate his seasonal obligation
to make charitable donations;2 and failed to provide a holiday feast at the end of the
Ramadan season.
Food Service Supervisor Robert Pulizzi was responsible for food preparation,
handling, and storage. Pulizzi submitted proposed menus to Susan Browning, a
registered dietitian not employed by the prison, for approval based on their caloric
composition and nutritional balance. Regarding the timing of meals for those fasting
during Ramadan, Pulizzi received guidance from prison administration as counseled by
Imam Abdul Pathan, a local Muslim leader who consulted with the prison administration
regarding Muslim customs and led Friday religious services at the prison.
For those inmates fasting, Pulizzi provided fifty percent larger meal portions for
the morning and evening meals in order to compensate for the absence of a daytime meal.
Thus, despite the absence of a daytime meal, fasting inmates still received between 1,800
and 2,000 calories per day. Pulizzi believed that food prepared for the evening meal was
kept sufficiently warm to insure that those fasting would receive a proper evening meal.
Nevertheless, at some time following the 2007 Ramadan season, the prison upgraded
from Styrofoam storage containers to Cambro insulated food storage containers.
2
The act of making charitable donations is known as “Zakat.” It is encouraged by the
Muslim faith, particularly during Ramadan.
3
Upon his arrival at Lycoming County Prison in September 2007, Mincy was
screened by medical personnel. Mincy informed the medical personnel that he suffered
from seasonal allergies. Mincy indicated that he was prescribed medication while housed
at the state correctional facility but chose to purchase over-the-counter (OTC) medication
from the commissary in order to avoid waiting in the medication line. Mincy was told by
medical personnel that prescription medication was distributed at certain times and that
this schedule would not be altered. However, Mincy was not prescribed medication in
September 2007.
Per the official inmate handbook, inmates at Lycoming County Prison are
permitted to purchase certain OTC medications, including medication for congestion, and
self-medicate. Those inmates deemed indigent may purchase OTC medication despite
the unavailability of funds in their prison account. Debt to the prison is maintained and
repaid as funds are deposited into an inmate’s account.
Per the official inmate handbook, inmates are not generally permitted to release
funds to other persons. This policy reduces prison administrative costs and prevents
inmates from sending money to former inmates to compensate them for acts while
incarcerated. Inmates are permitted to pay prison costs or post bail using money from
their account. Otherwise, the only exception to the policy is that inmates may once send a
limited amount of money home to the inmate’s family, subject to approval by the deputy
warden. Upon arrival at Lycoming, Mincy was indigent. Therefore, notwithstanding the
4
prison policy regarding release of funds, Mincy would not have been able to make a
charitable donation.
Mincy also alleged that the defendants denied him access to Friday religious
services on March 21, 2008. Attendance at religious services is dependent upon the
security and operational needs of the prison. Lycoming County Prison policy requires
that inmates request to attend religious services a week in advance. Chaplain Andy
France coordinates attendance at all religious services.
Mincy arrived at the prison on Wednesday, March 19, 2008, and was held in
administrative lock down until Thursday, March 20, 2008. Though he was previously
registered with the prison as a practicing Muslim, because he did not sent a timely request
to Chaplain France, he was not permitted to attend. Mincy was permitted to attend
religious services on March 26, 2008, and March 28, 2008. According to Mincy, the
defendants do not enforce the official policy against those attending Christian services.
Rather, according to Mincy, Christian inmates need only sign a sheet of paper posted in
the cell block at any time prior to their Sunday services. Thus, Mincy claimed that had
the defendants permitted Muslim inmates to sign up for religious services in the same
manner as Christian inmates, he would not have been denied access to services on March
21, 2008.3
3
Mincy’s amended complaint contained other allegations as well. For example, Mincy
made a series of allegations in support of his retaliation claim. However, Mincy did not
address his claim for retaliation in his motion for summary judgment or in his briefs to
this Court. Accordingly, we conclude that Mincy has abandoned the claim. Mincy also
5
Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The
District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Mincy timely appealed.4
II.
We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s grant of the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment. DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 2004). Summary
judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine
issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable
jury could find for the non-moving party, and a factual dispute is material only if it might
affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Kaucher, 455 F.3d at 423 (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
III.
alleged, in more general terms, disparate treatment of Muslim inmates incarcerated at
Lycoming County Prison. According to Mincy, the defendants encourage the observance
and celebration of Christian holidays, but discourage the observance of Muslim holidays.
Mincy claims the defendants refused to provide the same access to Qurans as to Bibles.
Mincy adduced no evidence to demonstrate that his rights were infringed as a result of
these allegations. Rather, it appears that Mincy brings these claims on behalf of all
Muslim inmates incarcerated at Lycoming County Prison. This he may not do, as it is
well settled that pro se inmates are not permitted to represent a class of litigants. Hagan
v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 159 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d
1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975)); Fymbo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321
(10th Cir. 2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1654.
4
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
6
A.
In the first five issues briefed to this Court, Mincy argues that the District Court
abused its discretion by repeatedly failing to adhere to its local rules of procedure. We
have reviewed the record and conclude that Mincy’s arguments are without merit. The
record clearly documents both the contentious nature of the discovery period and the
District Court’s generous efforts to accommodate both sides in this matter, liberally
granting requests for extensions when possible, but imposing strict filing deadlines when
necessary to ensure that the case proceeded to an evaluation of the substantive merits of
Mincy’s claims. Any violation of local rules was minor and no party incurred prejudice.
United States v. Rivas, 493 F.3d 131, 141 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Prof’l Programs Grp. v.
Dep’t of Commerce, 29 F.3d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a violation of local
rules can be excused where it is “so slight and unimportant that the sensible treatment is
to overlook it”)).
In his sixth and seventh issues, Mincy suggests that the District Court applied an
incorrect standard of review in deciding the cross-motions for summary judgment. We
disagree. We have examined the record and the analysis of the District Court and discern
no error in this regard.
B.
In his eighth issue, Mincy challenges the substantive analysis of the District Court.
Mincy also reiterates his previous arguments in further detail. In its effort to provide a
comprehensive analysis of Mincy’s claims, the District Court properly examined the
7
evidence pursuant to constitutional principles and established precedent. In our view, the
District Court relied on several appropriate grounds, but as we may affirm on any
grounds supported by the record, see Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir.
2001), we will limit our discussion to the following.5
Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress…
42 U.S.C. § 1983. “A[n individual government] defendant in a civil rights action must
have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot be predicated
solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353
(3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). A
plaintiff must allege “personal direction” or “actual knowledge and acquiescence.”
5
The District Court appropriately concluded that the Lycoming County Prison is not a
person within the meaning of Section 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973). The court found
that the Lycoming County Prison Board and its members were persons, see Monell v.
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), but the evidence of record
indicated that they had delegated all administrative and policy-making authority to the
prison administrators, which included Warden Deparlos, Deputy Warden Blank, and
Deputy Warden Mahoney. Accordingly, the court determined that the board and its
members could not be found liable. The court also declined to exercise jurisdiction over
Mincy’s state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. Mincy does not
challenge these rulings on appeal.
8
Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 72 (3d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).
Where an inmate challenges a prison regulation on the ground that it violates his
constitutional rights, we will conclude that “the regulation is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.” DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 268 (3d Cir.
2004) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).6 Nevertheless, this Court
maintains “a longstanding practice of avoiding constitutional questions in cases where we
can reach a decision upon other grounds.” Egolf v. Witmer, 526 F.3d 104, 109 (3d Cir.
2008) (citing United States v. Otero, 502 F.3d 331, 334 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Regarding Mincy’s allegation that the defendants failed to accommodate his
religious beliefs by providing him inadequate food service during Ramadan in 2007, we
conclude that a constitutional analysis is unnecessary. Egolf, 526 F.3d at 109. Mincy
identified no official policy promulgated by the prison administration which violated his
constitutional rights. Moreover, the record is clear that Supervisor Robert Pulizzi was
6
This Court will rely on a four-factor test to determine whether a regulation is reasonably
related to a legitimate penological interest. We will consider:
(1) whether a rational connection exists between the regulation and a
neutral, legitimate government interest; (2) whether alternative means exist
for inmates to exercise the constitutional right at issue; (3) what impact the
accommodation of the right would have on inmates, prison personnel, and
allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether obvious, easy alternatives
exist.
DeHart, 390 F.3d at 268 (quoting Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213 n.6 (3d Cir.
1999) (explaining the Turner analysis)).
9
solely responsible for food service preparation, handling, and storage. Pulizzi is not a
defendant in this case. There is no evidence to suggest that any named defendant played
a direct role or had any personal involvement in the preparation or storage of food.
Accordingly, the defendants may not be held liable. Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353.
To the extent Mincy claims that the prison administrators failed to properly
address his complaints regarding the size or temperature of meals, we conclude that their
administrative role does not establish personal involvement in the alleged underlying
wrongdoing, absent evidence that they engaged in retaliation. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Horn,
318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). There is no such evidence here.7
Mincy’s allegation that the defendants refused to provide medication in
accordance with his fasting obligations also requires no constitutional analysis. Egolf,
526 F.3d at 109. As with Mincy’s food-related allegations, there is no evidence that the
named defendants had any personal involvement in the distribution or the refusal to
distribute medicine. Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353. Further, there is simply no evidence to
support his allegation that he was denied appropriate access to medication. Mincy was
not prescribed any medication for his allergies in September 2007. Therefore, regardless
of whether the medical staff refused to alter its standard distribution schedule in order to
accommodate those fasting for Ramadan, Mincy suffered no harm at their hands.
7
We note further that Mincy’s claim that the defendants interfered with his observance
of Ramadan in 2007 by refusing to provide a celebratory feast at the end of Ramadan is
without merit. Mincy was not incarcerated at Lycoming County Prison at the end of
Ramadan in 2007.
10
Further, the official prison policy permits inmates to purchase OTC medicine and self-
medicate. If Mincy required medicine to treat his seasonal allergies, he could have
purchased OTC medicine from the commissary and taken this medicine in a manner that
comported with his fasting obligations. Moreover, his documented indigence upon
arrival at Lycoming County Prison in September 2007 would not have hindered his
access to OTC medicine, as the official prison policy permitted indigent inmates to
purchase medicine despite an inability to pay.8
In his equal protection claim, Mincy alleged that the defendants favored Christian
inmates’ attendance at religious services. To prevail on an equal protection claim, a
plaintiff must present evidence that he has been treated differently from persons who are
similarly situated. Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).
Mincy acknowledges that the official prison policy contemplates no disparate
treatment. However, Mincy argues that in practice, this policy is not followed and claims
there is evidence of record suggesting unequal treatment. We have found no such
evidence. In response to an unspecified request for production of documents, the
defendants responded, “There exists no form [sic] sign-up sheet. Instead, a piece of tablet
8
Mincy’s documented indigence in September 2007 also undermines his claim that the
defendants interfered with his First Amendment rights by refusing to permit him to make
charitable donations.
11
paper is normally posted in the block for weekly sign-up for Church Services.”9 Despite
Mincy’s efforts to suggest otherwise, this is not evidence sufficient to establish a genuine
issue of fact. Kaucher, 455 F.3d at 423.
Further, we again conclude that Mincy has failed to indentify an appropriate
defendant against whom to pursue this claim. The record established that the prison
chaplain was responsible for implementing prison policy and for coordinating inmate
attendance at religious services, but Chaplain France is not named as a defendant.
Conversely, there is no evidence that the named defendants had any personal
involvement in the alleged disparate treatment. Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353.
Finally, Mincy challenges the District Court’s conclusion that the defendants did
not a impose a substantial burden on Mincy’s religious expression in violation of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). See Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005). In support of his assertion, Mincy directs the
Court’s attention to the defendants’ alleged refusal to provide an alternative time for him
to take medication. Mincy argues that this demonstrates that the defendants forced him
“to choose between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting the benefits
otherwise generally available to other inmates versus abandoning one of the precepts of
his religion in order to receive a benefit.” Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d
9
Mincy does not specify what document he was seeking. Thus, it is impossible to place
the defendants’ response in any context. Any attempt by this Court to do so would be
mere speculation.
12
Cir. 2007). We disagree. As discussed previously, the defendants did not limit Mincy’s
access to medication. Accordingly, the record does not support Mincy’s argument.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
13