Qusai Mahasin v. Brian Bledsoe , 505 F. App'x 85 ( 2012 )


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  • GLD-003
    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 12-2603
    ___________
    QUSAI MAHASIN,
    Appellant
    v.
    WARDEN BRIAN BLEDSOE
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-00107)
    District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)
    or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    October 4, 2012
    Before: FUENTES, FISHER and ROTH , Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: November 20, 2012 )
    _________
    OPINION
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Pro se appellant Qusai Mahasin appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his habeas
    petition filed pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
    . Mahasin, a federal prisoner, is currently
    serving a sentence imposed in 2002 by the United States District Court for the Eastern
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    District of Missouri for possession of heroin with intent to distribute, possession of a
    firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, attempted murder of a federal
    witness, and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence. The Eighth Circuit
    Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. See United States v. Mahasin,
    
    362 F.3d 1071
     (8th Cir. 2004). Mahasin’s motions for rehearing and rehearing en banc
    were denied on June 4, 2004. On May 26, 2005, Mahasin filed a motion for leave to file
    a § 2255 motion out of time; the District Court denied the motion, and Mahasin did not
    seek review.
    In 2006, Mahasin filed a motion pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     on the grounds that
    he was “actually innocent” of his weapons convictions and asserting claims for
    ineffective assistance of counsel. The District Court dismissed the motion as time-barred
    because it was filed outside of the one year statute of limitations under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    (f)(1), and the Court determined that equitable tolling did not apply. The Eighth
    Circuit denied a certificate of appealability.
    Mahasin filed the instant § 2241 petition in the United States District Court for the
    Middle District of Pennsylvania, the jurisdiction in which he is confined. Mahasin again
    seeks to challenge his weapons convictions. The District Court dismissed the petition,
    and this appeal ensued.
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We exercise plenary review
    over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its
    findings of fact. See Vega v. United States, 
    493 F.3d 310
    , 314 (3d Cir. 2007).
    Generally, the execution or carrying out of an initially valid confinement is the
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    purview of a § 2241 proceeding, as attacks on the validity of a conviction or sentence
    must be asserted under § 2255. See United States v. Hayman, 
    342 U.S. 205
     (1952).
    Despite his arguments to the contrary, Mahasin clearly seeks to attack the validity of his
    sentence, not its execution. See United States v. Flores, 
    616 F.2d 840
    , 842 (5th Cir. 1980)
    (petitioner’s appropriate remedy is under § 2255 and not § 2241 where alleged errors
    occurred at or prior to sentencing). He fails to assert claims that fall within the grounds
    permitted for second or successive § 2255 motions, as he neither relies on a new rule of
    constitutional law, nor any newly discovered evidence. Mahasin may not pursue a
    collateral attack on his sentence by way of § 2241, however, unless he can show that “the
    remedy by § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    . It is clear that, under this “safety valve” provision, a prior
    unsuccessful § 2255 motion or the inability to meet the statute’s stringent gatekeeping
    requirements does not render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective. In re Dorsainvil, 
    119 F.3d 245
    , 251 (3d Cir. 1997).
    Mahasin reasons that he should be allowed to seek relief under § 2241 because he
    has been convicted of a “nonexistent crime.” In support of this contention, Mahasin relies
    on the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey v. United States, which held that the “use” of a
    gun in 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) requires proof of actual employment of the fire arm, not merely
    possession. Bailey v. United States, 
    516 U.S. 137
    , 148 (1995). While we have
    recognized that § 2241 may be available to present claims where the conduct is no longer
    deemed criminal, the exception is narrow, limited to a defendant “who had no earlier
    opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime.” Dorsainvil, 
    119 F.3d at
    251
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    (emphasis added). Unlike the petitioner in Dorsainvil, Mahasin was convicted after
    Bailey was decided, and therefore had an opportunity to present his claims during his
    criminal proceedings and on direct appeal. Mahasin also had the opportunity to present
    his claims in a § 2255 motion. He waited almost two years after his conviction to file the
    first § 2255 motion, and thus it was deemed untimely. Therefore, the District Court
    properly dismissed the § 2241 petition as it did not come within § 2241’s safety valve
    provision. See Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 
    290 F.3d 536
    , 539 (3d Cir. 2002)
    (citing Dorsainvil, 
    119 F.3d at 251-252
    ) (§ 2255’s savings clause “exists to ensure that
    petitioners have a fair opportunity to seek collateral relief, not to enable them to evade
    procedural requirements”).
    Accordingly, because no “substantial question” is presented as to the dismissal of
    the § 2241 petition, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court entered
    April 24, 2012. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
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