Hill v. True , 142 F. App'x 129 ( 2005 )

Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
8-2-2005
Hill v. True
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 04-4742
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Recommended Citation
"Hill v. True" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 749.
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CPS-250 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 04-4742
________________
ERIC CHRISTOPHER HILL
v.
WARDEN WILLIAM TRUE;
MR. BLANCHARD;
LIEUTENANT JOHNSON;
J. FISHER, Officer;
J. CANDALORA, Officer;
W. MILLER;
DON EMONY 1
Eric Hill,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 98-cv-00747)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 26, 2005
Before: ALITO, MCKEE AND AMBRO, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed August 2, 2005)
1
The proper spelling of this party’s name appears to be Emory.
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Eric Hill, pro se, appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.
Hill arrived at the United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania in
December 1997. Upon arrival, Hill stated that he did not have any issue with being
assigned to general population. Shortly thereafter, however, he informed the warden by
letter that he feared for his life because there were other inmates at Lewisburg that would
kill him.2 Hill, therefore, requested protective custody. When the Special Housing Unit
(“SHU”) interviewed Hill, however, he stated that he had already discussed the issue with
prison personnel and would not repeat the information. A review of Hill’s intake
interview revealed that Hill claimed to have had a knife fight with an inmate at
Lewisburg, but Hill would not identify the inmate. Prison officials were, therefore,
unable to verify Hill’s claim or ascertain whether the other inmate(s) in question were still
housed at Lewisburg. After additional fruitless interviewing, the SHU officials classified
Hill as an unverified protection case and ordered him to go into the general population.
2
This factual background is based on Appellees’ statement of facts. Because Hill
failed to submit a contrary statement of facts, for purposes of summary judgment, he has
admitted these. See M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1.
2
Hill refused and was given a misconduct for “refusing to program.” At the hearing for his
misconduct, Hill declined to call witnesses on his behalf. He was sanctioned with the loss
of five days good conduct time and ninety days privileges at the commissary.
Based on the above, in May 1998, Hill filed the instant civil rights complaint
pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), against various individuals employed at Lewisburg.3 Hill claims
that Appellees conspired to file false misconducts against him in retaliation for his filing a
lawsuit against them about two months earlier. He sought monetary damages but did not
request expungement of the misconducts or reinstatement of his lost good conduct time.
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.
The District Court granted the motion for several reasons. First, the District Court
concluded that Hill’s response to Appellees’ summary judgment motion failed to address
the substance of the motion. Hill merely argued that the summary judgment motion was
untimely and that Appellees had waived all defenses when they jointly moved for
summary reversal on Hill’s appeal from the District Court’s earlier order dismissing for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.4 The District Court concluded that both of
these procedural challenges were meritless.
3
Hill’s complaint was not served on Appellees until October 22, 2003.
4
In C.A. No. 98-7593, we summarily reversed the District Court’s order dismissing
Hill’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In that order, we
instructed Appellees that they could not avail themselves of the defense of failure to
exhaust. We did not limit the availability of other defenses.
3
In addition, the District Court reasoned that Hill’s claim was barred under Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Because the favorable termination of this action would
necessarily imply the invalidity of Hill’s loss of good conduct time, the District Court
found that such a remedy could only arise through habeas corpus proceedings. See Heck,
512 U.S. at 487.
With respect to Hill’s allegation of a conspiracy among Appellees, the District
Court concluded that Hill failed to show that the Appellees acted in concert with one
another. The court further noted that, at most, the facts sustained that there was a series
of events leading to Hill’s misconduct charge.
Finally, regarding Hill’s claim of retaliation, the District Court concluded that Hill
failed to show that the Appellees’ actions deterred him in any way from engaging in the
protected activity of litigation. Moreover, the District Court found that even if Hill could
show that he had been deterred from pursuing litigation, he could not show the existence
of a causal nexus between his alleged deterrence from constitutionally protected activity
and the misconduct charge.
Hill appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is
plenary. See Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Goduti-Moore, 229 F.3d 212, 213 (3d Cir.
2000).
We agree with the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Appellees for the reasons discussed in the District Court’s memorandum and summarized
4
above.
Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question on appeal. See
Third Circuit LAR 27.4. For essentially the reasons set forth by the District Court, we
will summarily affirm the District Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of
Appellees. See Third Circuit I.O.P. 10.6.
5