Eisenstein v. Ebsworth , 148 F. App'x 75 ( 2005 )

Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
7-13-2005
Eisenstein v. Ebsworth
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 04-2549
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Recommended Citation
"Eisenstein v. Ebsworth" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 859.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 04-2549
________________
IRWIN R. EISENSTEIN,
Appellant,
v.
MIRIAM EBSWORTH; MAUREEN SOGLUIZZO;
SHERRY L. SILVER, et al, JOHN DOE(S); JANE DOES(S)
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-05867)
District Judge: Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
__________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 12, 2005
Before: VAN ANTWERPEN, GREENBERG, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Filed July 13, 2005)
_________________
OPINION
_________________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Irwin Eisenstein and Miriam Ebsworth, a defendant in the action below,
were divorced in November 1992. Eisenstein has vigorously contested the terms of the
divorce for over 10 years, including previously filing suit in federal district court, as set
forth in some detail in the opinions of the District Court. As a result, final equitable
distribution of the marital property still has not taken place. Eisenstein was subject to a
child support order issued by the Superior Court of New Jersey in Essex County. The
matrimonial matter eventually had to be transferred to Hudson County because Eisenstein
sued several Essex County judges. In October 2003, the Honorable Maureen Sogluizzo
of the Superior Court in Hudson County reinstated the child support order. Eisenstein
countered by filing suit once again in United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, naming as defendants his ex-wife, the judge, and Sherry L. Silver, his ex-wife’s
attorney. Eisenstein asked for an order preventing the state court from collecting child
support.1
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. In an order entered on April 26,
2004, the District Court granted Ebsworth’s motion to dismiss on the basis that
Eisenstein’s complaint was inadequate under Rule 8. The court also ordered Eisenstein to
show cause why he should not be sanctioned under Rule 11. In an order entered on May
21, 2004, the District Court granted Silver’s and Judge Sogluizzo’s motions to dismiss,
Silver’s on the basis of Rule 8 and Judge Sogluizzo’s on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman
1
The matrimonial matter, Ebsworth v. Eisenstein, Superior Court of New Jersey,
Hudson County, Docket No. FM-09-121-04, is pending in state court.
2
doctrine.2 In an order entered on May 27, 2004, the District Court sanctioned Eisenstein
under Rule 11, and ordered him to pay $1,396.25 in attorneys fees and costs. Eisenstein
filed a notice of appeal from the orders entered on April 26, May 21, and May 27, and
paid the appellate docketing fees, resulting in the instant appeal.3 He also filed a motion
for reconsideration. The defendants filed additional requests for money sanctions. In
orders entered on June 8, 2004 and June 16, 2004, the District Court ordered Eisenstein to
pay an additional $532.25 and $750.00, respectively. In an order entered on June 28,
2004, the District Court denied the motion for reconsideration. Eisenstein filed no further
notices of appeal, amended or new.
We will affirm. We review the dismissal of a case pursuant to Rule 8 for abuse of
discretion. In re: Westinghouse Securities Litigation, 90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d Cir. 1996).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.
8(a), and that each averment be “simple, concise, and direct,” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(e)(1).
Eisenstein’s complaint was incomprehensible and failed to succinctly set forth the factual
basis for the claims and the legal cause of action on which the claims were based. The
2
See District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
3
The notice of appeal references an April 26 order and two orders from May 20. The
order entered on May 21 is dated May 20. There is no other order dated or entered on
May 20, but the order entered on May 27 is dated May 26, and we are confidant that
Eisenstein sought to appeal this order as well.
3
District Court was not required to grant Eienstein leave to amend his complaint against
Ebsworth and Silver, see generally Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at 703, because he has
persisted in violating Rule 8 and he has previously been advised about the deficiencies in
his complaints.
With respect to the complaint against Judge Sogluizzo, Eienstein plainly stated that
he sought to prevent the state court from collecting child support monies pursuant to an
order he believes was terminated by a different state court judge. He was asking the
District Court to review Judge Sogluizzo’s order, or orders, and to find that these orders
were in error. This is equivalent to using the federal courts as a forum to appeal a state
court judgment and falls squarely within the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which applies to
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district
court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521-22 (U.S. 2005).
As to the award of money sanctions, Rule 11 provides: "A sanction imposed for
violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such
conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. [T]he sanction may consist
of, or include, ... if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order
directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other
expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 11(c)(2). We
4
review for abuse of discretion the initial decision to impose sanctions as well as the
specifics of fee awards. See Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857
F.2d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 1988).
Before it imposed the sanctions, the District Court made the requisite finding that
Eisenstein’s complaint violated Rule 11, because he ignored the dismissal of his other
civil action, and the reason for that dismissal. Our review of the record under the abuse
of discretion standard leads us to affirm this finding. There simply was no legal or factual
basis for this additional lawsuit for the reasons set forth in the District Court’s thorough
opinions. With respect to the amount of the sanction, we have cautioned district courts
that a particularly relevant equitable factor to consider in sanctioning an individual is his
ability to pay. Moreover, courts must be careful not to impose money sanctions so great
that they are punitive. Id. at 196. The amount of money awarded in the order entered on
May 27 is not insignificant, but Eisenstein’s brief on appeal offers no reason to reverse or
modify the sanctions ordered by the District Court.
We do not have jurisdiction over the orders entered on June 8, 2004 and June 16,
2004, directing Eienstein to pay additional sanctions in the amount of $532.25 and
$750.00. Because Eienstein filed his notice of appeal prior to the quantification of these
sanctions, see Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Federal Agents, 855 F.2d 1080,
1089 (3d Cir. 1988), he had to file an amended notice of appeal after the sanctions were
5
quantified, id. at 1089-90, and he did not do so.4 We also do not have jurisdiction over
the order denying the motion for reconsideration. Fed. R. App. Pro. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).
Finally, Eisenstein has filed on appeal a motion “to remand and renew,” in which
he has argued that the defendants supplied false information to the District Court that
resulted in fraud. This is the same argument Eisenstein made in his motion for
reconsideration. The District Court did not find it persuasive, and neither do we. We
agree with the District Court that there is no merit whatever to Eisenstein’s allegations of
fraud, misconduct and deception.
We will affirm the orders of the District Court entered on April 26, May 21, and
May 27, 2004 over which we have jurisdiction. Eisenstein’s “Rule 28(j) motion,” which
we construe as a motion to expand the record on appeal, his motion to certify questions of
state law to the state supreme court, and his motion to remand and renew, all are denied.
4
Even if Eisenstein had filed a timely amended notice of appeal of the order
quantifying further sanctions, his brief offers no reason to reverse or modify the sanctions
ordered by the District Court.
6