Harris v. Nash ( 2005 )

Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
5-17-2005
Harris v. Nash
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 04-4416
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Recommended Citation
"Harris v. Nash" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 1170.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/1170
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APS-225 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 04-4416
________________
ROY WILLIAM HARRIS,
Appellant
v.
JOHN NASH, Warden
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D. NJ. 04-cv-03279)
District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
APRIL 28, 2005
Before: SLOVITER, NYGAARD AND FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: May 17, 2005)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Roy William Harris appeals pro se from an order of the District Court dismissing
his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Appellee has filed a motion for summary
affirmance, which will be granted.
Harris is currently serving a 188-month sentence at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Fort Dix, New Jersey. Harris filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the
District Court challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) interpretation of 18 U.S.C. §
3624(b)(1), which governs the award of good time credits to prisoners. The District
Court rejected his arguments and dismissed his petition. We have appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is plenary. See Bakhtriger v. Elwood, 360
F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2004).
Section 3624(b)(1) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
[A] prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1
year other than a term of imprisonment for the duration of the
prisoner’s life, may receive credit towards the service of the
prisoner’s sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the
end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, beginning
at the end of the first year of the term . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). The BOP interprets this statute to allow fifty-four days of “good
time” credit for each year served by the prisoner. 28 C.F.R. § 523.20. The BOP’s
formula for calculating good time credit accounts for the fact that the prisoner’s sentence
is incrementally shortened as good time credit is awarded each year. See White v.
Scibana, 390 F.3d 997 at 1000-1001 (7 th Cir. 2004) (explaining the BOP’s formula).
Harris contends that the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP’s) interpretation of 18 U.S.C. §
3624(b) is contrary to Congressional intent because the phrase “term of imprisonment” in
the statute unambiguously refers to the term imposed rather than time served. As a result
of the BOP’s incorrect interpretation of this statute, Harris argues, he is being deprived of
good time credit to which he is entitled.
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We have recently held that the phrase “term of imprisonment” in this statute is
ambiguous and that the BOP’s interpretation is reasonable. See O’Donald v. Johns, 402
F.3d 172, 174 (3d Cir. 2005). Therefore, we defer to the BOP’s interpretation, as
required under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984).
For the foregoing reasons, Harris’s arguments are foreclosed by our decision in
O’Donald. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. See Third Circuit
LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. Harris’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.
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