United States v. Bobb ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2006 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    12-28-2006
    USA v. Bobb
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 05-5121
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 05-5121
    _____________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    SHERMAN BOBB,
    Appellant
    _________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Criminal No. 03-0333-02)
    District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley
    _______________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    November 28, 2006
    Before: RENDELL and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
    PRATTER,* District Judge
    (Filed: December 28, 2006 )
    ___________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    __________________
    *   Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter, United States District Judge for the Eastern District
    of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
    PRATTER, District Judge
    The federal government prosecuted Sherman Bobb, contending that he was a
    kingpin in a drug trafficking operation in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. Following a
    seven-day trial, the jury convicted him of (1) conspiracy to distribute in excess of
    5 kilograms of cocaine, in excess of 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base (crack) and ecstasy;
    (2) possession or use of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking felony; and
    (3) possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. Mr. Bobb challenged the
    sufficiency of the Government’s evidence at the close of the prosecution’s case and
    renewed his motion at the close of all of the evidence. The District Court denied these
    defense motions, as well as Mr. Bobb’s subsequent Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of
    Acquittal.
    Mr. Bobb now raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient
    to support a conviction on each of the three counts; (2) whether the District Court abused
    its discretion in admitting evidence of an assault by Mr. Bobb that had not been charged
    in the indictment; (3) whether the District Court abused its discretion or violated the
    Confrontation Clause by admitting certain out-of-court statements; and, finally,
    (4) whether the District Court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Bobb’s requested jury
    instructions concerning testimony by accomplices and individuals who had entered into
    plea agreements. For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the decision of the
    District Court.
    DISCUSSION
    2
    A Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal obliges a district court to “‘review the
    record in the light more favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational
    trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the
    available evidence.’” United States v. Smith, 
    294 F.3d 473
    , 476 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting
    United States v. Wolfe, 
    245 F.3d 257
    , 262 (3d Cir. 2001)). This Court reviews grants or
    denials of Rule 29 motions de novo and independently applies the same standard as the
    District Court.
    I.          Sufficiency of the Evidence
    When sufficiency of the evidence at trial is challenged, the Court must affirm if a
    rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and
    if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. United States v. Coyle, 
    63 F.3d 1239
    ,
    1243 (3d Cir. 1995). The prosecution may bear this burden entirely through
    circumstantial evidence. United States v. Wexler, 
    838 F.2d 88
    , 90 (3d Cir. 1988).
    A.     Conspiracy to Distribute in Excess of 1.5 Kilograms of Crack Cocaine
    and in Excess of 5 Kilograms of Cocaine
    Mr. Bobb was charged with conspiracy to distribute in excess of 1.5 kilograms of
    crack cocaine, in excess of 5 kilograms of cocaine, heroin1 and ecstasy in violation of
    21 U.S.C. § 846. The essential elements of conspiracy are “(1) a shared ‘unity of
    purpose,’ (2) an intent to achieve a common goal, and (3) an agreement to work together
    toward the goal.” United States v. Mastrangelo, 
    172 F.3d 288
    , 292 (3d Cir. 1999).
    1
    The jury did not convict Mr. Bobb on the heroin objective of the conspiracy.
    3
    Mr. Bobb argues that the evidence demonstrates, at most, various separate conspiracies
    rather than a single conspiracy with multiple objectives as alleged in Count 1 of the
    indictment.
    The issue of whether a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies exist is a fact
    question to be decided by a jury. United States v. Perez, 
    280 F.3d 318
    , 344 (3d Cir.
    2002); United States v. Curran, 
    20 F.3d 560
    , 572 (3d Cir. 1994). Where a single
    conspiracy is alleged in the indictment, there is a variance if the evidence at trial proves
    only the existence of multiple conspiracies. 
    Id. Although its
    objectives may be numerous and diverse, a single conspiracy exists if
    there is one overall agreement among the parties to carry out those objectives. Braverman
    v. United States, 
    317 U.S. 49
    , 53-54 (1942). Thus, a single conspiracy is proved when
    there is “evidence of a large general scheme, and of aid given by some conspirators to
    others in aid of that scheme.” United States v. Reyes, 
    930 F.2d 310
    , 312-13 (3d Cir.
    1991). A single drug conspiracy “may involve numerous suppliers and distributors
    operating under the aegis of a common core group.” United States v. Quintero, 
    38 F.3d 1317
    , 1337 (3d Cir. 1994). To establish a single conspiracy, the Government must
    demonstrate that the defendant “knew that he was part of a larger drug operation.” 
    Id. For example,
    in Blumenthal v. United States, 
    332 U.S. 539
    (1947), four defendants
    convicted of conspiring to sell whiskey at above-regulation prices argued on appeal that
    there was a variance between the single conspiracy charged in the indictment and the
    evidence presented. 
    Id. at 541.
    Even though “each salesman aided in selling only his
    4
    part,” the Supreme Court nonetheless held that the evidence established a single
    conspiracy, because each salesman “knew the lot to be sold was larger and thus that he
    was aiding in a larger plan.” 
    Id. By virtue
    of their separate agreements, the individual
    defendants “became parties to the larger common plan, joined together by their
    knowledge of its essential features and broad scope, though not of its exact limits, and by
    their common single goal.” 
    Id. at 558.
    Similarly, in Quintero, we held that a
    co-conspirator’s testimony about his discussions with the defendant concerning the
    treatment of cocaine located in a different city demonstrated the defendant’s awareness of
    the larger drug operation and, therefore, was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of a
    single conspiracy. 
    Quintero, 38 F.3d at 1337
    .
    In the instant case, the Government presented evidence which, construed in its
    favor, demonstrated numerous purchases of controlled substances from Mr. Bobb by
    various individuals, and the distribution of drugs to various individuals for future sales.
    The evidence also included testimony by individuals who conspired with Mr. Bobb to
    distribute drugs. In particular, testimonial evidence indicated that Mr. Bobb provided
    drugs to his co-conspirators on credit over an extended period of time; that he relied on
    his co-conspirators to make trips to New York with him to replenish his supply of drugs;
    and that he trusted his co-conspirators to store drugs for him and to travel abroad to
    smuggle drugs.
    Mr. Bobb has failed to demonstrate a variance between the single conspiracy
    charged in the indictment and the evidence presented at trial. Contrary to Mr. Bobb’s
    5
    assertions, this is not a case where various individuals separately conspired with a
    common conspirator. Cf. Kotteakos v. United States, 
    328 U.S. 750
    , 771-74 (1946)
    (where various defendants separately conspired with a common conspirator, there was
    more than one conspiracy since there was no overall goal or common purpose). Even a
    cursory review of the testimony and evidence presented here indicates that a rational trier
    of fact could have found the existence of a single conspiracy that was pursued by various
    people undertaking various acts all to the same end. The evidence demonstrates that, like
    the salesmen in Blumenthal, each of the various individuals with whom Mr. Bobb
    arranged the sale and purchase of drugs knew “the lot to be sold was larger” and thus
    knew he or she was “aiding in a larger plan.” The existence of an overall common
    purpose and the conspirators’ knowledge of the larger operation suffice to prove that the
    various agreements and arrangements between Mr. Bobb and other individuals were part
    of a single conspiracy with multiple objectives, as charged in the indictment.
    As to the amount of drugs, several witnesses testified as to the quantities of crack
    cocaine that Mr. Bobb possessed and distributed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Other
    circumstantial evidence presented by a number of witnesses supports an inference that
    Mr. Bobb indeed was aware of the approximately 7 kilograms of cocaine smuggled by his
    co-conspirators. Moreover, the jury specifically found that the conspiracy involved more
    than 5 kilograms of cocaine and 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine.
    B.     Possession or Use of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking
    6
    Felony
    The essential elements of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) of which Mr. Bobb also
    was convicted are (1) the defendant committed either the crime of conspiracy to distribute
    and possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance or the crime of possession
    with intent to distribute; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) the
    defendant knowingly possessed the firearm in furtherance of the crime of conspiracy to
    distribute or in furtherance of the crime of possession with intent to distribute.
    To support a conviction under this statute, the Government must show that the
    firearm was possessed by the defendant to advance or promote criminal activity. United
    States v. Lawrence, 
    308 F.3d 623
    , 630 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Merely determining that the
    defendant was in possession of a sidearm is not enough to support the conviction; we
    must also consider whether the weapon was possessed ‘in furtherance of . . . a drug
    trafficking crime.’”). In making this determination, the following nonexclusive factors
    are relevant:
    the type of drug activity that is being conducted, accessibility of
    the firearm, the type of the weapon, whether the weapon is
    stolen, the status of the possession (legitimate or illegal),
    whether the gun is loaded, proximity to drugs or drug profits,
    and the time and circumstances under which the gun is found.
    United States v. Sparrow, 
    371 F.3d 851
    , 853 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v.
    Ceballos-Torres, 
    218 F.3d 409
    , 414-15 (5th Cir. 2000)).
    Mr. Bobb claims the trial evidence is insufficient to convict him of 18 U.S.C.
    7
    § 924(c) because he argues that the evidence established that he did not actively solicit
    the barter of the sawed-off shotgun in question. In this Circuit, bartering crack cocaine
    for a gun is not a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) if the defendant did not actively
    solicit the barter of drugs for a gun. United States v. Sumler, 
    294 F.3d 579
    , 583 (3d Cir.
    2002). At Mr. Bobb’s trial, Melissa Rodriguez testified that she traded the shotgun for
    drugs after actively soliciting Mr. Bobb. According to Mr. Bobb, there was no testimony
    that Mr. Bobb solicited Ms. Rodriguez. In addition, argues Mr. Bobb, there was no
    evidence linking the gun to Mr. Bobb’s drug trafficking crimes.
    The evidence, however, is sufficient to find a nexus between the possession of the
    gun and the drug trafficking, and to satisfy many of the Ceballos-Torres factors. The jury
    specifically found that Mr. Bobb possessed and controlled the gun that was found loaded
    in an easily accessible location at the residence where Mr. Bobb stayed. The testimony
    also establishes that, during the time period when Mr. Bobb possessed the gun, he was
    involved in drug trafficking activities that generated thousands of dollars in proceeds and
    provoked at least one assault. In addition, at least three of Mr. Bobb’s co-conspirators
    had been robbed of drugs and/or money, and at least one co-conspirator admitted that
    while distributing drugs with Mr. Bobb, he possessed several firearms to protect himself.
    Finally, the gun in question was an illegal, sawed-off shotgun, obtained in exchange for
    crack cocaine. Thus, a rational trier of fact could reasonably find that Mr. Bobb’s
    possession of the firearm furthered, advanced or facilitated his drug trafficking activities.
    C.     Possession with Intent to Distribute Controlled Substances
    8
    The essential elements of the substantive offense of possession of a controlled
    substance with intent to distribute are that the defendant (1) knowingly possessed a
    controlled substance with (2) the intent to distribute it. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Possession
    can be actual or constructive, and may be proven through either direct or circumstantial
    evidence. United States v. Martorano, 
    709 F.2d 863
    , 866 (3d Cir. 1983). Constructive
    possession may be found if the defendant was knowingly in a position, or had the right, to
    exercise “dominion and control” over the drug. 
    Id. In the
    instant case, the police seized drugs from the residence of James Ford.
    Mr. Ford testified that Mr. Bobb had recruited him to store the drugs, that the drugs in the
    residence belonged to Mr. Bobb, and that Mr. Bobb distributed drugs from Mr. Ford’s
    residence. Mr. Bobb now claims that there is no evidence of his ability to control what
    was inside Mr. Ford’s residence. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government,
    however, Mr. Ford’s testimony is sufficient to support a finding of Mr. Bobb’s guilt
    beyond a reasonable doubt on each of the elements, including his constructive possession
    of the drugs.
    II.    Admitting Evidence of an Assault Not Charged in the Indictment
    The Court reviews the District Court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for
    abuse of discretion. United States v. Retos, 
    25 F.3d 1220
    , 1227 (3d Cir. 1994). However,
    to the extent the District Court’s admission of evidence was based on an interpretation of
    the Federal Rules of Evidence, the standard of review is plenary. Mr. Bobb appeals the
    District Court’s admission of evidence of Mr. Bobb’s assault of one Nicholas Williams,
    9
    an act that was not charged in the indictment.
    “Rule 404(b), which proscribes the admission of evidence of other crimes when
    offered to prove bad character, does not apply to evidence of uncharged offenses
    committed by a defendant when those acts are intrinsic to the proof of the charged
    offense.” United States v. Gibbs, 
    190 F.3d 188
    , 217 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that
    defendant’s participation in uncharged acts of violence was admissible as direct proof of
    the conspiracy with which he was charged). Even if such proof is “extremely prejudicial
    to the defendant,” the trial court “would have no discretion to exclude it because it is
    proof of the ultimate issue in the case.” 
    Id. at 217-18
    (quoting 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT &
    KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5239, at 450-451
    (1978)).
    In the instant case, the indictment specifically alleged that Mr. Bobb was an
    “organizer and leader” of the conspiracy charged in Count 1 of the indictment. The
    Government contends that evidence of the assault on Mr. Williams, a drug user who was
    an admitted participant in the conspiracy, was probative of this allegation. At trial,
    Mr. Bobb objected to this evidence as being uncharged misconduct “totally unrelated to
    what Mr. Bobb is on trial for.” Mr. Bobb now argues on appeal that the District Court
    admitted the evidence of the assault without engaging in the balancing of probative value
    and prejudice required under Rules 403 and 404.
    Under either objection, we conclude that the District Court properly admitted
    evidence of the assault. Mr. Bobb was charged with conspiring to distribute crack and
    10
    cocaine. The assault and circumstances surrounding the assault (which was supposedly
    prompted by missing crack that Mr. Bobb believed Mr. Williams had taken) are direct
    evidence of Mr. Bobb’s participation in and enforcement of the conspiracy in a leadership
    role, and, as such, this evidence was properly admitted.
    III.   Admitting Evidence of Hearsay Statements
    The same standards apply to the Court’s consideration of Mr. Bobb’s challenge to
    the District Court’s admission of co-conspirators’ statements.
    A.     Application of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E)
    Under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the out-of-court statements of a defendant’s
    co-conspirators are not excluded as hearsay. Before any such statement may be admitted,
    however, the proponent must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the
    conspiracy existed; (2) both the defendant and the declarant were members of the
    conspiracy; and (3) the statement was made in the course of the conspiracy and in
    furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. McGlory, 
    968 F.2d 309
    , 333 (3d Cir.
    1996). In determining whether the statement is admissible as a statement of a
    co-conspirator, the court may consider the statement itself. Bourjaily v. United States,
    
    483 U.S. 171
    , 181 (1987). While a casual conversation between co-conspirators does not
    meet the “in furtherance” requirement, “statements between co-conspirators which
    provide reassurance, serve to maintain trust and cohesiveness among them, or inform
    each other of the current status of the conspiracy further the ends of the conspiracy and
    are admissible so long as the other requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are met.” United
    11
    States v. Ammar, 
    714 F.2d 238
    , 252 (3d Cir. 1983).
    Mr. Bobb specifically objects to statements admitted during the trial testimony of
    Julie Gyle, Melissa Rodriguez, Amy Sims and Danielle Lee. The declarants included
    Mr. Bobb, co-conspirators and non-conspirators, whose statements ostensibly were
    offered to give context and not for their truth. Mr. Bobb contends that the Government
    failed to satisfy the foundation requirements for the co-conspirator statements.
    The co-conspirator statements presented during the testimony of Julie Gyle,
    Melissa Rodriguez and Danielle Lee concerned, respectively, the amount of money
    Ms. Gyle was told she would receive for her drug sales, the quantity of crack members of
    the conspiracy had available for distribution, and the quantity of crack cocaine in
    Ms. Lee’s false bottom suitcase. These statements were all made by undisputed
    co-conspirators in the course of the conspiracy and in furtherance of the conspiracy and
    thus are admissible under FRE 801(d)(2)(E).
    Mr. Bobb also objected to the admission of certain surreptitiously recorded
    conversations played during the testimony of Amy Sims on the ground that there was
    insufficient evidence to establish that Ms. Sims, Mr. Bobb and the declarant were
    members of the conspiracy. The District Court, however, found the evidence sufficient to
    meet the foundational requirements, and we agree that the evidence amply supports this
    conclusion.
    B.     The Confrontation Clause
    Mr. Bobb further contends that the recorded statements, even if not offered for
    12
    their truth, violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause.
    During the pendency of Mr. Bobb’s trial, this Court held in United States v.
    Hendricks, 
    395 F.3d 173
    (3d Cir. 2005), that surreptitiously monitored conversations and
    statements are not “testimonial” for purposes of Crawford v. Washington. 
    Id. at 181.
    Specifically, with regard to recorded statements of co-conspirators, we held that “party
    admissions and co-conspirator portions” of disputed tape recordings are “nontestimonial
    and thus, assuming compliance with the Federal Rules of Evidence, are admissible.” 
    Id. at 183-84.
    We further noted that the Confrontation Clause “‘does not bar the use of
    testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter
    asserted.’” 
    Id. at 183
    (citing United States v. Crawford, 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 59 n.9 (2004)); see
    also United States v. Trala, 
    386 F.3d 536
    , 544-45 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding no
    Confrontation Clause violation where reliability of out-of-court statements was not at
    issue and where the statements were not introduced for their truth).
    Mr. Bobb urges that Hendricks be confined to its specific facts and also attempts to
    distinguish Hendricks because the declarant in Hendricks was a confidential informant.
    However, the holding in Hendricks did not turn on its own unique facts and did not rest
    on the status of the declarant; rather, its focus was on the non-testimonial nature of
    surreptitiously recorded conversations and the purpose for which they are offered. Here,
    the out-of-court statements were surreptitiously recorded and either were made by
    co-conspirators or, if made by non-conspirators, were offered for the purpose of
    establishing context, not for their truth. Thus, under Hendricks, the admission of the
    13
    recorded statements in Mr. Bobb’s trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
    In sum, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the disputed
    hearsay statements.
    IV.    Jury Instructions
    With regard to issues of both phrasing and omissions, the Court reviews a trial
    court’s jury instructions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Zehrbach, 
    47 F.3d 1252
    ,
    1260 (3d Cir. 1995). In reviewing a refusal to give a requested jury instruction, the Court
    evaluates “whether the preferred instruction was legally correct, whether or not it was
    substantially covered by other instructions, and whether its omission prejudiced the
    defendant.” United States v. Pitt, 
    193 F.3d 751
    , 755-56 (3d Cir. 1999). A trial court is
    not obligated to instruct the jury using the precise words suggested by counsel. United
    States v. Turley, 
    891 F.2d 57
    , 62 (3d Cir. 1989).
    A.     Requested Jury Instruction Number 5
    With regard to requested jury instruction No. 5, Mr. Bobb contends he was
    prejudiced by the District Court’s refusal to instruct the jury that “accomplices are corrupt
    and polluted sources.” Mr. Bobb argues that the language actually used by the District
    Court did not convey the “true nature” of the sources used by the Government. However,
    Mr. Bobb failed to object to the trial court’s accomplice testimony instruction at trial, and
    thus he waived this claim. Therefore, it is now subject to review for plain error. United
    States v. Guadalupe, 
    402 F.3d 409
    , 410 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005). Under the plain error
    standard, “‘before an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be
    14
    (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights. If all three conditions
    are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but
    only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
    judicial proceedings.’” United States v. Vazquez, 
    271 F.3d 93
    , 99 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting
    Johnson v. United States, 
    520 U.S. 461
    , 467 (1997)).
    The District Court’s instruction advised the jury that the accomplice testimony
    “must be scrutinized with great care and viewed with particular caution.” In particular,
    the District Court advised the jury: “You should ask yourselves whether or not the so-
    called accomplices would benefit more by lying or telling the truth. Was their testimony
    made-up in any way because they believed or hoped that they would somehow receive
    favorable treatment by testifying falsely?”
    We have specifically long held that there is “[n]o mandatory requirement that
    accomplice testimony be described as emanating from a corrupt or polluted source.”
    United States v. DeLarosa, 
    450 F.2d 1057
    , 1061 (3d Cir. 1971). Accordingly, the District
    Court did not plainly err in omitting the specific language requested by Mr. Bobb, and the
    instruction adequately expressed the nature of accomplice testimony.
    B.      Requested Jury Instruction Number 8
    With regard to requested jury instruction No. 8, Mr. Bobb contends that he was
    prejudiced by the District Court’s refusal to include, concerning the credibility of
    cooperating witnesses who had entered into plea agreements, an instruction that even a
    mandatory minimum sentence may be reduced upon motion by the Government. The
    15
    Government responds that (1) none of the witnesses who entered into cooperation plea
    agreements pleaded guilty to a charge carrying a mandatory minimum sentence; and
    (2) the trial evidence, including the cross-examination of the witnesses, made clear to the
    jury that the cooperating witnesses had the possibility of receiving sentencing departure
    motions and what that meant. In addition, the plea agreement of each cooperating witness
    was admitted in evidence at trial, thus providing the jury with the complete terms of the
    various agreements. The District Court’s instructions also included general instructions
    on the credibility of witnesses who might have something to gain from their testimony.
    The jury had ample evidence of the witnesses’ plea agreements and the possible
    significance of those agreements. The jury was instructed to take the witnesses’ interests,
    motivation and credibility into consideration. We find that Mr. Bobb was not prejudiced
    and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in omitting the requested instruction.
    CONCLUSION
    The evidence presented at Mr. Bobb’s trial was sufficient to support a conviction
    of (1) conspiracy to distribute in excess of 5 kilograms of cocaine, in excess of 1.5
    kilograms of cocaine base (crack) and ecstasy; (2) possession or use of a firearm in
    furtherance of a drug trafficking felony; and (3) possession with intent to distribute
    controlled substances. The District Court properly admitted evidence of the assault not
    charged in the indictment, as well as the statements of co-conspirators and
    non-conspirators. And, finally, the District Court did not err by denying Mr. Bobb’s
    requested jury instructions. Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of conviction on each
    16
    of the three counts.
    _________________
    17
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-5121

Filed Date: 12/28/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021

Authorities (24)

Braverman v. United States , 63 S. Ct. 99 ( 1942 )

Kotteakos v. United States , 66 S. Ct. 1239 ( 1946 )

United States v. Adrian Mastrangelo, Jr. Adrian Mastrangelo , 172 F.3d 288 ( 1999 )

united-states-v-ghassan-l-ammar-neil-roger-mcfayden-judith-ammar , 714 F.2d 238 ( 1983 )

United States v. James J. Curran, Jr. , 20 F.3d 560 ( 1994 )

United States v. Allen Lawrence, Jr. , 308 F.3d 623 ( 2002 )

united-states-v-terrence-gibbs-aka-terry-aka-t-terrence-gibbs-in-no , 190 F.3d 188 ( 1999 )

United States v. Alex Vazquez , 271 F.3d 93 ( 2001 )

United States v. Richard Lynn Pitt, in No. 98-7383 United ... , 193 F.3d 751 ( 1999 )

United States v. Linette Perez, United States of America v. ... , 280 F.3d 318 ( 2002 )

united-states-v-melba-quintero-in-93-1377-maria-rodriguez-in-93-1386 , 38 F.3d 1317 ( 1994 )

united-states-v-craig-m-hendricks-russell-robinson-elroy-dowe-daniel , 395 F.3d 173 ( 2005 )

United States v. Robert Craig Wexler , 838 F.2d 88 ( 1988 )

United States v. Richard Allen Wolfe , 245 F.3d 257 ( 2001 )

United States v. Carlos Julio Reyes , 930 F.2d 310 ( 1991 )

Johnson v. United States , 117 S. Ct. 1544 ( 1997 )

Bourjaily v. United States , 107 S. Ct. 2775 ( 1987 )

United States v. Michael C. Coyle , 63 F.3d 1239 ( 1995 )

united-states-v-octabio-gerard-de-larosa-appeal-of-walter-lance-noel-in , 450 F.2d 1057 ( 1971 )

United States v. John Walter Trala A/K/A Sonny A/K/A Walter ... , 386 F.3d 536 ( 2004 )

View All Authorities »