United States v. Kyle Ishmael , 469 F. App'x 86 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    __________
    No. 11-1994
    __________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    KYLE MICHAEL ISHMAEL,
    Appellant
    __________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Criminal No. 1-09-cr-00388-006 )
    District Judge: The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
    Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    January 10, 2012
    BEFORE: FUENTES, JORDAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: March 20, 2012 )
    __________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    __________
    NYGAARD, Circuit Judge
    Kyle Michael Ishmael appeals the sentence imposed by the District Court after he
    pleaded guilty to distributing five or more grams of cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1). Ishmael contends that the District Court erred by denying him a
    safety valve reduction.
    1.
    As we write only for the parties, we briefly relate the facts underlying this appeal.
    On December 2, 2009, a grand jury issued a two-count indictment charging Ishmael and
    eight other individuals with distribution and conspiracy to distribute 50 grams of cocaine
    base in York County, Pennsylvania. Ishmael pleaded guilty to a superseding information
    that charged him with distribution of five grams or more of cocaine base.
    Ishmael asked the District Court to sentence him without regard for the five-year
    statutory minimum sentence pursuant to the “safety valve” provisions of 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (f). The District Court declined, finding Ishmael ineligible for relief because he
    failed to provide completely truthful information. Ishmael has appealed the District
    Court’s refusal to apply the safety valve reductions. We will affirm.
    2.
    The safety valve provision “establish[es] that a defendant shall be sentenced
    pursuant to the sentencing guidelines without regard to any statutory minimum sentence
    in certain drug offense cases in the event that . . . five conditions are met.” United States
    v. Sabir, 
    117 F.3d 750
    , 751 (3d Cir. 1997). These conditions are:
    1.     the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal
    history point, as determined under the Guidelines;
    2.     the defendant did not use violence or credible threats
    of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous
    2
    weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in
    connection with the offense;
    3.       the offense did not result in death or serious bodily
    injury to any person;
    4.       the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager,
    or supervisor of others in the offense, as determined
    under the Sentencing Guidelines and was not engaged
    in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in [
    21 U.S.C. § 848
    ]; and,
    5.       not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the
    defendant has truthfully provided to the Government
    all information and evidence the defendant has
    concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the
    same course of conduct or of a common scheme or
    place, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or
    useful other information to provide or that the
    Government is already aware of the information shall
    not preclude a determination by the court that the
    defendant has complied with this request.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (f).
    This provision provides relief to individuals who played minor roles in drug
    trafficking conspiracies, and who lacked the detailed knowledge to qualify for
    “substantial assistance” sentence reductions under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (e). Such defendants
    bear the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the safety
    valve provisions are applicable in his or her case. Sabir, 
    117 F.3d at 754
    . The
    application of these provisions “not only requires a defendant to admit the conduct
    charged, but [] also imposes an affirmative obligation on the defendant to volunteer any
    information aside from the conduct comprising the elements of the offense.” United
    States v. O’Dell, 
    247 F.3d 655
    , 675 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted). The safety valve provision, unlike others in the Guidelines, requires the
    defendants to reveal a broad scope of information about the relevant criminal conduct to
    3
    the authorities. See Sabir, 
    117 F.3d at 753
    . “These stringent requirements reflect the fact
    that the safety valve was intended to benefit only those defendants who truly cooperate.”
    O’Dell, 
    247 F.3d at 675
     (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s refusal to apply the safety
    valve provision. United States v. Wilson, 
    106 F.3d 1140
    , 1143 (3d Cir. 1997). We can
    reject the District Court’s factual finding that Ishmael did not provide the required
    information and evidence only if we conclude that those findings were clearly erroneous.
    Sabir, 
    117 F.3d at 752
    .
    3.
    Here, there is no dispute that Ishmael met the first four factors. At issue in this
    appeal is whether he satisfied the fifth factor by truthfully providing the Government with
    all the evidence he possessed “concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the
    same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (f)(5). The
    Government maintains that the District Court correctly determined that Ishmael did not
    fulfill his affirmative obligation and burden to demonstrate that he was completely candid
    in disclosing all information regarding his role or the role of his co-conspirators in the
    drug trafficking offense. Ishmael maintains he did disclose all relevant information at
    sentencing.
    The record reveals more than sufficient evidence to support the District Court’s
    conclusion that Ishmael failed to completely disclose all his knowledge of the offense.
    Indeed, Ishmael’s own testimony thwarted his request for a safety valve reduction. His
    4
    failure to provide candid, verifiable information precluded the District Court’s
    application of the reduction. As the District Court noted:
    Notably, [Ishmael] claimed in his proffer and in his testimony
    that he sold crack cocaine to approximately fifteen
    individuals. These individuals would contact Defendant via
    telephone when they wanted a delivery of crack cocaine.
    Defendant testified that he knew these individuals because he
    previously sold marijuana to them. When questioned about
    their identities, Defendant could only recall three first names
    and an apparent nickname. Defendant was unable to provide
    any other identification or information regarding these
    individuals. Defendant was not aware whether these
    individuals were identified with any particular group or gang.
    Defendant had no recollection as to where these sales would
    occur, stating only that they would occur wherever [his
    customers] would call him to.
    The court finds it incredible that [Ishmael] could not recall
    any further information regarding these individuals and is
    somewhat confounded by his explanation or his inability to
    do so . . . . That [Ishmael] cannot remember any other
    information about these individuals and is unable to recall any
    location where he met them strikes the court as disingenuous
    and supports a finding the Defendant has not met his burden
    of showing full and complete truthfulness of the sort
    contemplated by 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (f). Thus, on this point
    alone, the court would deny the application of the safety
    valve.
    We can see no error in the District Court’s determination that Ishmael’s testimony
    was not credible. Ishmael bore the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the
    evidence that he had been candid with investigators and had volunteered “all
    information” he had relating to his trafficking activities. See Sabir, 
    117 F.3d at 754
    . The
    District Court’s determination that he did not meet this burden because he withheld
    5
    information he would reasonably be expected to know was not an erroneous finding.
    This was not an erroneous finding.
    4.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court's judgment of
    sentence.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-1994

Citation Numbers: 469 F. App'x 86

Judges: Fuentes, Jordan, Nygaard

Filed Date: 3/20/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/5/2023