United States v. Brandon Chandler ( 2010 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 09-3617
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
BRANDON LEE CHANDLER,
Appellant
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On Appeal From the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(Criminal No. 08-179)
District Judge: Honorable Gustave Diamond
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 23, 2010
Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed September 27, 2010)
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OPINION
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Brandon Chandler appeals the judgment of sentence entered against him by the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania which imposed a
mandatory ten-year minimum sentence for conspiracy to possess with the intent to
distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine. For the reasons set forth below, we will
affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I.
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly
summarize the essential facts. On June 12, 2003, during a routine traffic stop, police
found nineteen-year-old Chandler in possession of crack cocaine and marijuana.
Chandler subsequently entered a guilty plea and received one year of probation. In the
same month, a confidential informant made one purchase of marijuana and three
purchases of cocaine from Chandler. Following these transactions, Chandler was arrested
and found to have in his possession $610 in cash, eight knotted baggie corners of
marijuana and two baggie corners of crack cocaine. Chandler pled guilty and received a
sentence of six to twelve months.
Over a year later, on November 5, 2005, a confidential informant purchased 3.94
grams of crack cocaine from Chandler. Three weeks later, the informant purchased
another 6.44 grams of crack cocaine from Chandler. Based on these exchanges, the
police were able to secure an arrest warrant for Chandler and his associate Brandon
Singleton. On December 10, 2004, police went to the joint home of Chandler and
Singleton, arrested both individuals without incident and obtained written consent to
conduct a search of the residence. In Chandler’s bedroom, police found: forty-seven
grams of crack cocaine; one digital scale; one box of sandwich bags; one gun magazine
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loaded with 9mm rounds; two Nextel cellular telephones; and various papers containing
Chandler’s name. In Singleton’s bedroom, police found: a corner baggie of marijuana; a
loaded 9mm pistol with ten live rounds; a knotted baggie containing 2.7 grams of crack
cocaine; and a Nextel cellular phone.
On April 29, 2008, a grand jury indicted Chandler on four counts: (1) conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine from July 2004 to
December 2004; (2) possession with intent to distribute less than five grams of crack
cocaine on November 5, 2004; (3) possession with intent to distribute less than five grams
of crack cocaine on November 24, 2004; and (4) possession with intent to distribute five
grams or more of crack cocaine on December 10, 2004. Chandler entered an open plea to
each count.
At sentencing, the District Court determined Chandler’s offense level to be 27
placing him in the Guideline’s Range of eighty-seven to 108 months of incarceration.
Chandler, however, faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months for count one
and sixty months for counts three and four. The District Court sentenced Chandler to the
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years for count one, with concurrent five-year
sentences for count two, three, and four.
On September 3, 2009, Chandler filed a notice of appeal of his judgment of
sentence.
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II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We apply a plenary
standard of review to issues of statutory interpretation, questions regarding a statute’s
constitutionality and alleged constitutional errors. See United States v. Randolph, 364
F.3d 118, 121 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 94 (3d Cir. 2002).
III.
Chandler argues that the mandatory ten-year minimum sentence pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 841, based on the 100-to-1 crack-to-powder cocaine ratio in the Sentencing
Guidelines, discriminates against African Americans and violates equal protection, due
process and the Eighth Amendment. Additionally, Chandler maintains that requiring the
District Court to abide by mandatory minimum sentences conflicts with 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) which instructs the court to impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary.”
We have consistently held, as Chandler concedes, that neither the mandatory
minimum sentences for crack offenses pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) nor the 100:1
crack-to-powder ratio violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments. See United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
Additionally, we have also held that the mandatory minimum sentences and the 100:1
ratio do not violate a defendant’s right to due process and equal protection. See United
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States v. Alton, 60 F.3d 1065, 1068-70 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that there is a rational
basis for differentiating between crack and cocaine); Frazier, 981 F.2d at 95 (“We join
several other courts in agreeing that there is no evidence whatsoever that suggests that the
distinction drawn between cocaine base and cocaine was motivated by any racial animus
or discriminatory intent on the part of either Congress or the Sentencing Commission.”).
The arguments presented by Chandler urging this Court to reconsider these
holdings are unavailing. First, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), which held that courts can consider the disparity between the
Guideline’s treatment of crack and cocaine in determining a sentence, does not support
the notion that the Guideline’s ratio and the mandatory minimum sentence are
unconstitutional. Further, the holding in Kimbrough does not relieve the sentencing court
from following the statutory mandatory minimum sentences in such offenses. See, e.g.,
United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 314 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting post-Kimbrough that
“[t]he Guidelines are no longer mandatory, but that does not render optional statutory
directives”). Similarly, Congress’s recent passing of a bill to reduce the crack-to-cocaine
ratio and eliminate the minimum mandatory sentence is not determinative of the
unconstitutionality of the 100:1 ratio and mandatory minimum sentence. Likewise,
Chandler’s claims that Congress’s inaction in response to the alleged discriminatory
impact warrants strict scrutiny, are equally unpersuasive. See Frazier, 981 F.2d at 95(“Even conscious awareness on the part of the legislature that the law will have a racially
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disparate impact does not invalidate on otherwise valid law, so long as that awareness
played no casual role in the passage of the statute.”).
Chandler also contends that the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence violates the
proportionality principle of the Eighth Amendment because his sentence was grossly out
of proportion as compared to (1) his co-perpetrator who only received a thirty-day
sentence with probation in state court, (2) unknown drug dealers of cocaine, and (3)
future drug dealers of crack cocaine who potentially could be sentenced under a revised
statutory minimum. Despite these examples, Chandler has failed to meet the standard in
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-292 (1983), and to overcome the “substantial
deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the
types and limits of punishments for crimes.” See also Frazier, 981 F.2d at 95 (rejecting
similar arguments about proportionality and finding that there are reasonable grounds for
imposing greater punishment for crack offenses). Further, Chandler has failed to show
how these defendants are similarly situated to him in terms of the extent of the crime,
charges, prior history, and jurisdiction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (“The court, in
determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider the need to avoid the
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct[.]”).
Chandler finally argues that because the District Court was required to follow the
mandatory ten-year minimum sentence, and the prosecution did not advocate for a higher
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sentence, the District Court lacked any “real discretion” to administer a “sufficient, but
not greater than necessary” sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). As such, Chandler
argues that the mandatory minimum sentence usurps the power of the judiciary and
violates his constitutional rights. We have previously rejected these same arguments in
challenges to mandatory minimum sentences and found no conflict between § 3553 and a
mandatory minimum sentence provision. See United States v. Walker, 473 F.3d 71, 85
(3d Cir. 2007) (held that there was no conflict between § 3553 and a mandatory minimum
sentence provision because “§ 3553(a) must be read in conjunction with § 3553(e), which
prohibits the court from sentencing a defendant below the statutory mandatory minimum
sentence unless the Government files a motion permitting such departure”); United States
v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 251-52 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting the argument that mandatory
minimum sentences violate the balance of power: “Congress has the power to define
criminal punishments without giving the courts any sentencing discretion.”).
Therefore, given this Court’s clear precedent, we hold that Chandler’s sentence of
the mandatory ten-year minimum term of imprisonment based on his conspiracy to
possess with the intent to distribute over fifty grams of crack cocaine did not violate the
Constitution.
IV.
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the sentence.
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