Kacee Chandler v. Commissioner Social Security , 667 F.3d 356 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 11-2220
    ____________
    KACEE LEE CHANDLER
    v.
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Appellant
    ____________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 10-cv-01047)
    District Judge: Honorable Malcolm Muir
    ____________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    December 6, 2011
    Before: HARDIMAN, BARRY and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: December 7, 2011)
    ____________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ____________
    HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
    The Commissioner of Social Security appeals the District Court’s order remanding
    this case after an administrative law judge (ALJ) denied Kacee Chandler’s claims for
    Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income
    (SSI). We will reverse the judgment of the District Court.
    I
    Because we write for the parties, we recount only the essential facts and procedural
    history.
    Kacee Chandler is a mother of two with a GED and two years of business school
    education. In 2006, she developed reflexive sympathetic dystrophy (RSD) after she fell.
    At the time, she was a bookkeeper and part-time receptionist for a law firm, as well as a
    housecleaner. Chandler worked full-time until January 2007, but by October 2007 she
    had reduced her hours to three per day, five days per week. She stopped working
    altogether in April 2008.
    Chandler filed for DIB and SSI in October 2007, but her application was denied in
    June 2008. In June 2009, Chandler received a hearing before the ALJ, who denied her
    applications at Steps Four and Five, finding that she was not disabled because she had the
    residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform sedentary work with certain limitations and
    that jobs meeting those criteria were available. See 
    20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520
    , 404.1545(a),
    416.920; see also Hartranft v. Apfel, 
    181 F.3d 358
    , 359 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining
    RFC as ―that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or
    her impairment(s)‖ (citing 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1545
    (a))). Eight months later, the Appeals
    Council denied Chandler’s request for review of the ALJ determination, making it the
    Commissioner’s final decision. In May 2010, Chandler sought review in the District
    2
    Court. The District Court held that the ALJ’s RFC determination was not supported by
    substantial evidence, and the Commissioner appealed.
    II
    The District Court had jurisdiction under 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 405
    (g) and 1383(c)(3), and
    we have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We exercise plenary review over legal
    conclusions reached by the Commissioner. See Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    474 F.3d 88
    , 91 (3d Cir. 2007). We review the Commissioner’s factual findings for ―substantial
    evidence,‖ 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g), which is ―such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
    might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.‖ Reefer v. Barnhart, 
    326 F.3d 376
    , 379
    (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 
    402 U.S. 389
    , 401 (1971)) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). Courts are not permitted to re-weigh the evidence or impose
    their own factual determinations. See Richardson, 
    402 U.S. at 401
    .
    III
    Consistent with her burden to produce evidence supporting her disability claim,
    see 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1512
    ; Rutherford v. Barnhart, 
    399 F.3d 546
    , 551 (3d Cir. 2005),
    Chandler presented numerous medical records describing treatments and evaluations
    between January 2006 and May 2009. The records detailed her RSD diagnosis and the
    placement and revision of a spinal cord stimulator to help control her pain. Chandler’s
    records also indicated a dependency on prescription painkillers for years after her injury.
    Finally, the record contained several opinions and notations by medical professionals
    3
    regarding Chandler’s disability.
    In September 2007, nurse practitioner Lisa DeWees wrote that Chandler was
    ―permanently disabled‖ but that she could still work at a ―very low physical stress job‖
    twenty to twenty-five hours per week. In April 2009, DeWees also noted that Chandler
    ―cannot work and earn money in any capacity due to her . . . [RSD] . . . and cannot sit,
    stand, or walk for greater than 30 minutes at a time.‖
    State agency psychologist Dr. Karen Weitzner opined on June 25, 2008, that
    Chandler had an ―adjustment disorder‖ but that it did not satisfy the regulations’
    diagnostic criteria and was not a severe impairment; it only mildly limited her social
    functioning and concentration and did not impede her daily activities.
    On July 1, 2008, State agency medical consultant Dr. Vrajlal Popat issued a
    Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment after reviewing Chandler’s medical
    records through June 2008. He acknowledged, among other things, that Chandler had
    ―pain which [was a] sharp, stabbing ice pick sensation,‖ and confirmed that ―the medical
    evidence establishe[d] a medically determinable impairment of [RSD].‖ Ultimately, Dr.
    Popat concluded that Chandler retained the ability to occasionally lift or carry ten pounds,
    climb stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, and that she had no manipulative,
    visual, communicative, or environmental limitations.
    After the ALJ’s decision, Chandler submitted to the Appeals Council two
    additional opinions: one from DeWees’s colleague, Dr. Christopher Echterling, and one
    4
    from her former supervisor at the law firm, N. Christopher Menges. Dr. Echterling
    simply ―concur[red]‖ with DeWees’s April 2009 diagnosis. Menges explained
    Chandler’s poor concentration and accuracy in the workplace after her injury.
    IV
    The District Court rejected the ALJ’s decision because ―there was no timely and
    relevant opinion by a medical expert which support[ed] the [RFC] determination.‖
    Chandler v. Astrue, No. 4:10-cv-01047, slip op. at 19 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2011). Essential
    to this holding was the District Court’s rejection of Dr. Popat’s report as no longer useful
    to the ALJ determination because Dr. Popat had only reviewed the medical records
    through June 2008. As we shall explain, the District Court committed legal error in
    disregarding Dr. Popat’s report.1
    Preliminarily, we must distinguish between the new records and DeWees’s April
    2009 notes, which arose after Dr. Popat’s report but before the ALJ’s decision, and the
    opinions of Dr. Echterling and Menges, which were never before the ALJ. As to the
    latter, remand cannot be justified based on the ALJ’s failure to consider those documents.
    ―[A]lthough evidence considered by the Appeals Council is part of the administrative
    1
    The District Court also noted that Dr. Weitzner ―only reviewed the medical
    records through June 25, 2008.‖ Chandler, No. 4:10-cv-01047, slip op. at 16. Although
    Chandler has not focused her appeal on the ALJ’s Step Two determination that her
    depression was not severe, for the reasons explained herein, this was no basis for
    discrediting Dr. Weitzner’s report, which provided substantial evidence for the ALJ’s
    determination.
    5
    record on appeal, it cannot be considered by the District Court in making its substantial
    evidence review . . . .‖ Matthews v. Apfel, 
    239 F.3d 589
    , 593 (3d Cir. 2001). Moreover,
    remand based on new evidence is only appropriate where the claimant shows good cause
    why that evidence was not procured or presented before the ALJ’s decision, 
    id. at 594
    ,
    and Chandler has failed to do so here because she has not explained ―why she did not
    attempt to obtain [the] evaluation[s] at a time when [they] could be considered by the
    ALJ,‖ 
    id. at 595
    .
    With respect to the records arising after Dr. Popat’s review but before the ALJ’s
    decision, a few salient points emerge. First, the records presented to the ALJ in this case
    were, at most, a few years old. They tracked Chandler’s injury and deterioration during
    the time periods surrounding her disability onset date.2 We have permitted reliance on
    records much older than those presenting in this case. See, e.g., Morales v. Apfel, 
    225 F.3d 310
    , 312–13 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding a 1997 ALJ decision based on records from
    1989 through 1994); Hartranft, 
    181 F.3d at
    360–61 (finding substantial evidence where
    the ALJ relied on six-year-old medical records).
    Second, because state agency review precedes ALJ review, there is always some
    time lapse between the consultant’s report and the ALJ hearing and decision. The Social
    2
    Chandler revised her disability onset date several times. In her original disability
    application, Chandler alleged an onset date of January 2006. In proceedings before the
    ALJ, she amended it to January 2007. Finally, in her request to the Appeals Council, she
    revised her onset date to January 2008.
    6
    Security regulations impose no limit on how much time may pass between a report and
    the ALJ’s decision in reliance on it. Only where ―additional medical evidence is received
    that in the opinion of the [ALJ] . . . may change the State agency medical . . . consultant’s
    finding that the impairment(s) is not equivalent in severity to any impairment in the
    Listing,‖ is an update to the report required. SSR 96-6p (July 2, 1996) (emphasis added).
    The ALJ reached no such conclusion in this case.3
    Contrary to the District Court’s view, the ALJ was entitled to rely on Dr. Popat’s
    opinion. The ALJ—not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants—
    must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations. See 
    20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527
    (e)(1), 404.1546(c). Although treating and examining physician opinions
    often deserve more weight than the opinions of doctors who review records, see, e.g., 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
    (d)(1)–(2), ―[t]he law is clear . . . that the opinion of a treating
    physician does not bind the ALJ on the issue of functional capacity,‖ Brown v. Astrue,
    3
    Although the District Court found that the ALJ’s explanation for its Step Three
    determination that Chandler’s impairments did not match or equal a listing was
    ―inadequate,‖ Chandler, No. 4:10-cv-01047, slip op. at 17, it clearly stated that its remand
    was based primarily on the ―lack of substantial evidence supporting the [ALJ’s] [RFC]
    assessment,‖ Memorandum Pursuant to Local Appellate Rule 3.1 at 4, Chandler, No.
    4:10-cv-01047 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2011).
    Moreover, Chandler does not argue that her new records or DeWees’s additional
    notes would have altered the ALJ’s or Dr. Popat’s decisions at Step Three. She contends
    that ―it is likely, if not expected that the opinions proffered by Dr. Echterling would have
    a substantial effect on the outcome of the disability determination,‖ but, as explained
    above, neither the District Court nor this Court may consider Dr. Echterling’s opinion
    with respect to whether the ALJ had substantial evidence to deny Chandler’s application.
    7
    
    649 F.3d 193
    , 197 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011). State agent opinions merit significant consideration
    as well. See SSR 96-6p (―Because State agency medical and psychological consultants
    . . . are experts in the Social Security disability programs, . . . 
    20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527
    (f)
    and 416.927(f) require [ALJs] . . . to consider their findings of fact about the nature and
    severity of an individual’s impairment(s) . . . .‖).
    We also note that the ALJ did not merely rubber stamp Dr. Popat’s RFC
    conclusion. Cf. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
    (f)(1)(i) (clarifying that the RFC findings of non-
    examining State agency consultants are ―based on the evidence . . . but are not in
    themselves evidence‖). Instead, the ALJ found persuasive and incorporated DeWees’s
    opinion that Chandler cannot sit for more than thirty minutes at a time, even though the
    ALJ was not required to consider DeWees’s opinion at all because, as a nurse
    practitioner, she is not an ―acceptable medical source[].‖ See 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1513
    (a).
    The ALJ also added restrictions Dr. Popat did not deem necessary.4
    4
    The ALJ’s complete RFC finding was:
    [T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary
    work . . . except that the claimant is limited to standing and walking for 15
    minutes at a time and no more tha[n] 2 hours per day. The claimant is able to
    sit for 6 hours in an 8 hour day. The claimant needs to be able to
    sit/stand/walk at will. She is limited to lifting and carrying 5 pounds
    frequently and 10 pounds occasionally. She has no limitation on pushing and
    pulling up to 10 pounds. She is precluded from using foot controls with her
    right foot. She has no limitation on foot controls with her left foot. She has no
    limitation on overhead reaching, bending or manipulation. The claimant is
    precluded from climbing, balancing, crawling, using vibrating tools,
    unprotected heights and hazardous conditions. She is limited to occasional
    8
    The District Court also suggested that the ALJ’s explanation in support of its
    decision was insufficient for meaningful review. We disagree that the ALJ failed in this
    respect. An ALJ must explain the weight given to physician opinions and the degree to
    which a claimant’s testimony is credited. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
    (f)(2)(ii); Rutherford,
    
    399 F.3d at 557
    . The ALJ’s six-page ―Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law‖ detailed
    Chandler’s medical history and the state agency opinions. The ALJ explained that he
    gave ―significant weight‖ to Dr. Popat’s opinion and that, other than DeWees’s opinion,
    ―there [we]re no other treating or examining medical source statements which addressed
    the claimant’s physical capabilities.‖ The ALJ explained that he ―considered and
    evaluated‖ DeWees’s opinion even though it purported to make the ultimate disability
    determination, which is reserved to the Commissioner.5 The ALJ also explained why he
    discredited some of Chandler’s testimony.
    Chandler argues that ―error occurred when the ALJ reviewed or, more properly
    stated, ignored, the intervening developments in the record and, applying his own lay
    opinion, extrapolated from the medical opinion he obtained one year previous, from Dr.
    Popat, and determined that Chandler continued to have a virtually identical RFC.‖ The
    stooping, kneeling and crouching. Due to her use of pain medication, she is
    limited to simple 1-2 step repetitive tasks without a high pace or production
    quotas.
    5
    Although the ALJ’s findings only noted DeWees’s September 2007 opinion that
    Chandler was ―permanently disabled‖ but could still work twenty to twenty-five hours per
    9
    District Court likewise concluded that the ALJ had reached its decision based on its own
    improper lay opinion regarding medical evidence. But the ALJ is not precluded from
    reaching RFC determinations without outside medical expert review of each fact
    incorporated into the decision. Although reliance on State consultants’ and treating
    physicians’ opinions is common and ALJs are required to consider any existing State
    consultant reports, see 
    20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519
    , 404.1527(f), the regulations do not require
    ALJs to seek outside expert assistance, see 
    20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546
    (c), 404.1527(e); SSR
    96-5p (July 2, 1996). Therefore, the ALJ did not err in this regard.
    V
    Having found that Dr. Popat’s report was properly considered by the ALJ, we
    readily conclude that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence for the
    reasons we have stated. The new medical evidence generated after Dr. Popat’s review did
    not undermine his conclusion. Chandler’s September 2008 Progress Note says: ―[H]er
    foot pain has improved. They gave her a new antenna for her spinal cord stimulator and
    things have improved. . . . She really feels comfortable with her medications at this time
    and does not want to change anything. . . . She has stopped smoking marijuana.‖ Just
    before the ALJ hearing, in May 2009, Chandler’s fentanyl patch was ―tak[ing] the edge
    off,‖ and ―she [was] able to do her activities of daily living.‖ Chandler was experiencing
    some new hand pain but was able to ―use a computer frequently.‖
    week at a ―very low physical stress job,‖ the sit/stand limitation in the RFC demonstrates
    10
    Nor did Chandler’s own subjective complaints of pain and limitations cast doubt
    on Dr. Popat’s report. Although ―any statements of the individual concerning his or her
    symptoms must be carefully considered,‖ SSR 96-7p (July 2, 1996), the ALJ is not
    required to credit them, see 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1529
    (a). Chandler had reported extreme pain
    to doctors and claimed that she had to lie down most of the day, but she also testified that
    she managed to shop several times per week, cook dinner, care for her two children, and
    visit with friends. The ALJ thus had substantial evidence to conclude Chandler was not
    ―credible regarding the intensity and extent of her limitations, especially her need to lie
    down most of the day due to pain,‖ and was entitled to rely instead on Dr. Popat’s
    opinion.
    VI
    For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District Court’s judgment and affirm
    the decision of the ALJ.
    that the ALJ factored in DeWees’s April 2009 opinion as well.
    11