DeGrange v. West , 196 F. App'x 91 ( 2006 )

Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
7-27-2006
DeGrange v. West
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-3050
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Recommended Citation
"DeGrange v. West" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 688.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/688
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-3050
________________
CHRISTOPHER TODD DEGRANGE,
Appellant
v.
J. P. WEST
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-05753)
District Judge: Honorable Jan E. Dubois
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 1, 2006
Before: McKee, Fuentes and Nygaard, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 27, 2006)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Christopher Todd DeGrange appeals from the order of the United States District
1
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment in favor of the
defendant, J.P. West. We will affirm.
In late 2003, DeGrange filed a civil rights complaint against West, former director
of the Star program, a sex offender treatment program run by Care Link, Inc. (“Care
Link”), at Norristown State Hospital, Pennsylvania. DeGrange alleged that he was
confined to Care Link while he was a state prisoner in the custody of the Montgomery
County Court, and that he received treatment from 1993 until 2002.1 DeGrange asserted
that West violated his constitutional rights during that time. Among other things, he
alleged that West deprived him of assistance of counsel and legal resources, forced him to
incriminate himself during the course of his therapy, conducted illegal searches and
seizures, and inflicted cruel and unusual punishment. DeGrange sought declaratory and
injunctive relief. The matter proceeded to discovery. West filed a motion for summary
judgment, to which DeGrange filed a response. The District Court granted the motion for
summary judgment, concluding that DeGrange’s claims for injunctive and declaratory
relief were moot. DeGrange’s motion for reconsideration was denied.2
DeGrange appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
1
In his brief, DeGrange states that his commitment to the Star program was
voluntary.
2
DeGrange’s statement of the case in his brief suggests that improprieties
occurred in the proceedings in District Court. For example, he contends that the District
Court and West “entered into an agreement for a summary judgment.” We note that the
record does not support his version of the procedural history of the case.
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plenary review over a District Court’s grant of summary judgment and apply the same
test applied by the District Court. Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir.
2001). Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 232; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). If the
moving party meets the initial burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue, the
burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidence of a genuine issue for trial.
Specifically, the party opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the . . . pleading”; the party’s response, “by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)).
Upon review of the record, we agree with the District Court that DeGrange’s
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were moot when he filed his complaint.
During discovery, DeGrange confirmed that his claims were against West as the sole
defendant, for events that occurred during the time of her employment as the Star
program director. He admitted that West ended her employment with Care Link on
November 9, 2001, and that he since has resisted her efforts to include him in the program
she currently runs. In his complaint, DeGrange stated that he was no longer at Care Link
and was living in Philadelphia. There was no showing that it was reasonably likely that
he ever would be returned to the Star program, or to West’s treatment care at any
3
location. Accordingly, as discussed by the District Court, it appears that DeGrange’s
complaint falls short of showing a live case or controversy. After West’s and his own
departures from the Star program, he no longer had standing to bring an action for
prospective relief, as he was no longer subject to the alleged constitutionally-violative
conditions. See Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1993); Weaver v.
Wilcox, 650 F.2d 22, 27 (3d Cir. 1981).
We have considered DeGrange’s arguments in his brief, and we conclude that they
are without merit. We will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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