United States v. Christopher Lawrence ( 2012 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-4562
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAWRENCE,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-11-cr-00091-001)
District Judge: Honorable Gustave Diamond
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 23, 2012
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: November 6, 2012 )
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Christopher Lawrence appeals the District Court’s judgment of sentence following
his conviction for illegal reentry. We will affirm.
I
Because we write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, we recite
only the facts and procedural history essential to its disposition. After Lawrence pleaded
guilty to unlawfully reentering the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, he was
sentenced to thirteen months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.
In 1998, Lawrence was denied entry at the border. In 2006, he was subject to expedited
removal. When sentencing Lawrence, the District Court noted that “[n]ormally we don’t
place [illegal reentry defendants] on supervised release, but since this Defendant seems to
have a proclivity to be returning and maybe has reasons for wanting to return, we will
place him on supervised release in this case.” Lawrence now appeals the supervised
release component of his sentence.
II
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have
jurisdiction over Lawrence’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 We review the District
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The Government has argued that this case is moot or, alternatively, that this
Court should decline jurisdiction on prudential ripeness grounds. This case is not moot
because the supervised release forms a part of Lawrence’s sentence. See United States v.
Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 2008) (upholding jurisdiction over a challenge to a
sentence of supervised release and noting that “because a live case or controversy that a
court can remedy arises when a defendant challenges the sentence he is currently serving,
issues of mootness do not arise”). Furthermore, because we can easily decide this case on
the merits based on the current record, we will not decline jurisdiction on prudential
ripeness grounds. See Oklevueha Native American Church of Hawaii, Inc. v. Holder, 676
F.3d 829, 838 (9th Cir. 2012) (reversing a lower court’s dismissal on prudential ripeness
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Court’s sentence for abuse of discretion, under which we will overturn the sentence only
if it was based on an erroneous legal conclusion, a clearly erroneous factual conclusion,
or was substantively unreasonable such that “no reasonable sentencing court would have
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court
provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567–68 (3d Cir. 2009).
A
The District Court did not base its sentence on an erroneous legal conclusion
because it accurately interpreted the applicable law. The United States Sentencing
Guidelines (USSG) provide that “the court ordinarily should not impose a term of
supervised release in a case in which supervised release is not required by statute and the
defendant is a deportable alien who likely will be deported after imprisonment.” USSG §
5D1.1(c). Nevertheless, supervised release should be considered if “the court determines
it would provide an added measure of deterrence and protection based on the facts and
circumstances of a particular case.” USSG § 5D1.1, cmt n.5 (2011). Here, the District
Court neither suggested that a term of supervised release was mandatory nor that it was
generally appropriate for deportable aliens. Instead, it accurately stated that “[n]ormally
we don’t place these people on supervised release,” but went on to explain why
grounds when the case involved “the application of well-developed law … to an existing
case and controversy” and refusing to consider the hardship or lack thereof to the parties
“[b]ecause we can identify no interest in delaying review of Plaintiffs’ claims”).
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Lawrence’s case was not ordinary and why extra deterrence was necessary in this
particular case. Therefore, the legal basis for the District Court’s sentence was not
erroneous.
B
Nor was Lawrence’s sentence based on a clearly erroneous factual conclusion.
The District Court’s rationale for imposing supervised release was that “this Defendant
has a proclivity to be returning and maybe has reasons for wanting to return . . . .”
Lawrence had tried to enter illegally in 1998 and had been removed in 2006.
Furthermore, Lawrence’s significant family ties in the United States provided a possible
motive for returning. In fact, Lawrence illegally entered the United States in 2002 to see
his children and illegally entered the United States in this case to raise his son. These
facts support the District Court’s conclusion that Lawrence posed a risk of illegal reentry.
Therefore, the District Court’s factual basis for Lawrence’s sentence was not clearly
erroneous. See United States v. Cruz, 2012 WL 3062178, at *2 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding
that it was reasonable for a district court to consider an illegal reentry defendant’s
recidivism and ongoing motive in sentencing when that defendant had previously been
removed from the United States twice and had family in the United States that he might
attempt to return to in the future).
C
Finally, the District Court’s sentence of supervised release was not substantively
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unreasonable. “A sentencing judge is given wide discretion in imposing a term of
supervised release” as long as it is “exercised within the parameters of 18 U.S.C. § 3583.”
United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 183 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Voelker,
489 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2007)). Under § 3583, a sentencing judge should consider,
inter alia, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of
the defendant, general and specific deterrence, and the need to protect the public from
future crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (citing portions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553). The
sentencing judge is not required to address each § 3553 factor, as long as “the record
makes clear the court took the factors into account.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (finding that
the sentencing judge did not abuse his discretion because the “record makes clear that the
sentencing judge listened to each argument”) (citations omitted). Here, the District Court
listened to all of Lawrence’s mitigating evidence and imposed a below-Guidelines
sentence based on that evidence. Because of Lawrence’s proclivity for reentering the
United States, however, the District Court concluded that a term of supervised release
would create an added layer of deterrence and protect the public from future illegal
reentries. Lawrence has pointed to no case in which a sentence of supervised release has
been held unreasonable under similar facts, and we cannot say the District Court’s
conclusion was unreasonable in this case. Cf. United States v. Joline, 662 F.3d 657, 659
(3d Cir. 2011) (noting that a “high risk of recidivism” can justify a long term of
supervised release).
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III
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of
sentence.
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