Thomas Thompson v. David Pitkins ( 2013 )

ALD-115 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-4046
___________
THOMAS W. THOMPSON,
Appellant
v.
DAVID W. PITKINS; DANIEL P. BURNS; JOHN S. PAUL;
TIMOTHY PLEACHER; ELIZABETH NIGHTINGALE;
JACK LOUGHRY; DORINA VARNER
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3:12-cv-00166)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 7, 2013
Before: SLOVITER, VANASKIE and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion file: February 22, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Thomas W. Thompson, an inmate currently incarcerated at SCI Laurel Highlands
in Somerset, Pennsylvania and proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing his complaint
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim. For the reasons discussed
below, we will summarily affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further
proceedings. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary
for our discussion. In 2009, Thompson was transferred from SCI Somerset, a Level
Three prison, to SCI Laurel Highlands, a Level Two prison. In April 2010, he requested
an incentive-based transfer to another Department of Corrections (“DOC”) facility.
Thompson’s request was denied based upon the finding that he had only been housed at a
Level Two facility for five months. He submitted a grievance challenging the denial and
was subsequently placed into a high-intensity violence prevention program. Thompson’s
grievance was denied based upon his refusal to participate in the high-intensity violence
prevention program. He appealed the denial; however, his appeal was returned to him by
the mailroom and ultimately denied as untimely.
In August 2010, Thompson filed his civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 with the District Court. In his complaint, he alleges that Appellees retaliated
against him by denying his transfer request because of his use of the inmate grievance
system. He also asserts that Appellees violated his due process rights by not providing a
fair process under DOC policy to apply for an incentive-based transfer and receive fair
grievance proceedings. On September 5, 2012, a Magistrate Judge recommended
dismissal of Thompson’s suit for failure to state a claim. On September 24, 2012, the
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District Court adopted the recommendation and dismissed Thompson’s complaint
without leave to amend. Thompson timely filed this appeal.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal order. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The complaint “must not be ‘so undeveloped that it does not
provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by [Fed. R. Civ. P.
8].’” Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)).
As an initial matter, the District Court correctly dismissed Thompson’s due
process claims. First, Thompson alleged that officials violated his due process rights by
denying him the opportunity to receive an incentive-based transfer. However, prisoners
have no liberty interest arising from the Due Process Clause in a particular place of
confinement. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1983). Thompson has
alleged nothing that might make the denial of his request actionable under the
circumstances presented.
Second, Thompson alleged that officials violated his due process rights by denying
him a fair process in the adjudication of his various grievances. However, Thompson has
not demonstrated that the process used amounted to an “atypical and significant hardship
. . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,
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484 (1995); see also Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that
prisoners do not have a constitutional right to prison grievance procedures); Hoover v.
Watson, 886 F. Supp. 410, 418 (D. Del. 1995), aff’d, 74 F.3d 1226 (3d Cir. 1995) (same);
Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (same). Accordingly,
Appellees’ alleged misapplication of these procedures is not independently actionable.
However, we cannot agree with the District Court that Thompson’s complaint
failed to state “sufficient factual matter” to support the plausibility of his retaliation
claim. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. In Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003),
we explained that “[a] prisoner alleging retaliation must show (1) constitutionally
protected conduct, (2) an adverse action by prison officials sufficient to deter a person of
ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link between
the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him.”
Thompson’s allegation that prison officials violated his First Amendment right to present
grievances by denying his petition requesting an incentive-based transfer might state a
claim for retaliation. See Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866-67 (7th Cir. 2012)
(determining that the plaintiff’s complaint was prematurely dismissed because he had
properly asserted a claim for retaliation for alleged violations of his right to use the prison
grievance system).
Furthermore, while the District Court did not mention the statute of limitations, the
Magistrate Judge noted that Thompson’s retaliation claim was untimely under the
applicable limitations period. Thompson’s claim is governed by 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 5524(2), Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for tort actions. See Ahmed v.
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Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2002). Because exhaustion of prison
administrative remedies is mandatory under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the statute
of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions may be tolled while a prisoner exhausts. See
Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 942-43 (9th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519,
522 (7th Cir. 2001); Brown v. Morgan, 209 F.3d 595, 596 (6th Cir. 2000). Ordinarily,
the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and which is
subject to waiver. See Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2008). Furthermore,
a district court “may not sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s § 1983 action on the basis of the
statute of limitations unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that there are no
meritorious tolling issues, or the court has provided the plaintiff notice and an
opportunity to be heard.” Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citing Abbas v. Lt. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2007)).
It appears that Thompson had the opportunity to respond to the limitations issue
because he addressed it in his objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation. However, we note that it is unclear from the face of the complaint
whether the limitations period would bar Thompson’s retaliation claim. Under federal
law, a § 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of
action.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (citations omitted). Thompson’s
complaint alleges that he completed the grievance process in September 2010.
Furthermore, as noted above, the limitations period may be tolled while Thompson was
exhausting his administrative remedies. See Brown, 422 F.3d at 942-43; Johnson, 272
F.3d at 522; Brown, 209 F.3d at 596. We express no view as to whether Thompson will
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eventually plead a meritorious retaliation claim or whether defenses, such as the statute of
limitations, will prove to be dispositive.
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm in part and vacate in part the
District Court’s order dismissing Thompson’s complaint and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
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