Gary Rhines v. B. Bledsoe ( 2010 )

BLD-176 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-1067
___________
GARY RHINES,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN B. A. BLEDSOE;
PHYSICIAN ASST. LOUIS RAMIREZ;
STEVE BROWN, Health Services Administrator;
TROY WILLIAMSON, Former Warden
____________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-00643)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Nealon
_______________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 22, 2010
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, RENDELL and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Filed July 27, 2010)
_________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________
PER CURIAM
Gary Rhines, a federal prisoner formerly confined in the United States
Penitentiary, Lewisburg (“USP-Lewisburg”), Pennsylvania, appeals pro se from the
District Court’s entry of judgment in favor of defendants. Because we conclude that this
appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm. See 3d Cir. L.A.R.
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6
I.
Rhines filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in the District Court against
the Warden and other prison officials. He claims that they were deliberately indifferent in
their medical treatment and care of a knee injury he sustained while incarcerated at USP-
Lewisburg. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages and declaratory relief.
Rhines reported to sick call in May 2007 after injuring his knee while playing
basketball. Defendant Louis Ramirez examined his knee, provided treatment, and
ordered an x-ray. After filing an administrative remedy, Rhines received the x-ray in
early July 2007. He saw Ramirez again in late July 2007, complaining that his knee pain
and swelling continued. Ramirez found no swelling and found normal movement and
continued Rhines on medication for his strain. Thereafter, defendant Warden Williamson
responded to the administrative remedy, noting that Rhines had received the x-ray and
was continuing to receive medical treatment, and declined to intervene.
In early August 2007, Rhines filed an administrative appeal, complaining that his
x-ray had been delayed one month and requesting an MRI. The regional director noted
2
that Rhines had been treated and that an MRI was not indicated, and denied the appeal.
In October 2007, Rhines filed an appeal to the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) central office,
complaining of the care he had received and requesting an MRI. While his appeal was
pending, Rhines was examined in October 2007 and the need for an MRI was noted. The
central office denied his appeal in late November 2007. Rhines received an MRI in
March 2008, and underwent surgery in August 2008 to repair a torn medial meniscus. He
was returned to USP-Lewisburg with a thirty-day convalescent status and was authorized
to use the gym for self-therapy for six months.
Rhines filed the complaint in April 2009, arguing that defendants are liable to him
for delaying the proper diagnostic test, emotional distress, negligence, reckless disregard
or deliberate indifference to his welfare, malfeasance, malice, racial discrimination,
inadequate medical care, and cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The District Court granted the
motion and entered judgment in favor of defendants. Rhines filed a timely notice of
appeal.
II.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In reviewing a
District Court’s grant of summary judgment, we apply the same test the District Court
applied. Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2001). Summary judgment
is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
3
and drawing all inferences in that party’s favor, there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 232; Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). The party opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of the . . . pleading,” but “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)).
III.
Rhines argues that defendants’ acts and omissions during the course of treatment
for his injury constituted deliberate indifference, from which he suffered pain and
emotional distress. In order to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment for denial of
medical care, Rhines must show that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1994). Deliberate indifference can be shown by a prison official
“intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with
the treatment once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. A claim that a doctor or
medical department was negligent does not state a claim for medical mistreatment under
the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 106. A medical need is serious if it “has been diagnosed
by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth County Corr. Inst.
Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).
4
Rhines’ claims against defendants are based on his belief that he should have been
treated in a more timely manner and through the immediate use of an MRI. The record
shows that Rhines was afforded continual medical care for his knee injury, and that prison
staff treated and evaluated him on each visit. Therefore, we agree with the District Court
that Rhines cannot show defendants possessed the requisite mental state necessary to
prove an Eighth Amendment violation.
Moreover, Rhines’ disagreement about his course of treatment, namely, that an
MRI should have been immediately ordered, does not demonstrate the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Mere disagreement as to the proper medical
treatment will not support a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Spruill v. Gillis, 372
F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Courts will “disavow any attempt to second-guess the
propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment . . . (which) remains a question
of sound professional judgment.” Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d
754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). Accordingly, summary judgment was
properly entered in favor of defendants.
In addition, the District Court properly denied the claims against defendants
Warden Bledsoe and former Warden Williamson, because they are premised on a theory
of respondeat superior. Neither defendant–aside from Williamson’s denial of Rhines’
administrative remedy in 2007–was personally involved in his medical care or treatment,
and thus neither can be liable for an alleged civil rights violation. See Rode v.
5
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
Finally, to the extent Rhines challenges the District Court’s denial of his motion
for counsel, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion. An indigent
plaintiff seeking the appointment of counsel must present a claim having “some merit in
fact and law.” Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 457 (3d Cir. 1997); Tabron v. Grace, 6
F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993). Rhines’ claims lack merit for the reasons already
discussed.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial
question. See I.O.P. 10.6. Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s
order.
6