Tomoko Funayama v. Nichia America Corp , 582 F. App'x 100 ( 2014 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 14-1923
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TOMOKO FUNAYAMA,
Appellant
v.
NICHIA AMERICA CORPORATION
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5-12-cv-05406)
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 12, 2014
Before: JORDAN, COWEN and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 18, 2014 )
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Tomoko Funayama, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order
granting Defendant/Appellee Nichia America Corporation’s (“Nichia”) motion to dismiss
Funayama’s most recent employment discrimination lawsuit. We will affirm the District
Court’s order.
Funayama was employed by Nichia from 1995 through 2008. On August 28,
2008, she filed a Second Amended Complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, raising several
allegations of employment discrimination, including a claim that she had been paid less
than Tim Ujike, a male counterpart, based on her gender. In December 2008, after the
administrative proceedings concluded, Funayama filed an employment discrimination
complaint before the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
(See E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 5:08-cv-05599.) In her amended complaint, she raised claims
under several discrimination statutes, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
She claimed that, throughout their employment relationship, Nichia had discriminated
against her based on her gender, age, and national origin. Her federal complaint did not
include a claim under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
In November 2010, Funayama sought leave to amend her 2008 complaint so that
she could add, among others, a count under the Equal Pay Act, asserting that she was
compensated less because of her gender. As in her administrative complaint, Funayama
claimed that Tim Ujike was paid more for doing equal work. The District Court denied
Funayama’s motion in an order entered in December 2010. Then, in its April 2011
decision granting Nichia’s summary judgment motion, the District Court detailed its
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reasons for denying Funayama’s request to amend her complaint. The District Court
concluded that amendment would have been prejudicial to Nichia, as well as futile. It
explained that, although Ujike was paid more, he had been identified several times as
Funayama’s direct supervisor, and there was no evidence that he and Funayama
performed the same functions with the same level of responsibility. We affirmed the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment on May 17, 2012.
On October 2, 2012, Funayama filed her current complaint, which raises the same
Equal Pay Act claim that she unsuccessfully sought to add to her 2008 complaint. She
asserts that she “suffered from pay disparity stemming from her hidden employment
status,” which she discovered during discovery in the 2008 case when she found out that
Nichia allegedly had classified her as an “expatriate” employee but paid her the lower
wages and provided her with the inferior benefits package of a locally-hired employee
because she is a woman.1
On March 17, 2014, the District Court entered an order granting Nichia’s motion
to dismiss Funayama’s complaint, determining that it was barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. The District Court’s alternative bases for dismissal were that Funayama’s claim
was barred by the statute of limitations and that she had failed to set forth a prima facie
case.
1
Funayama states that “expatriate” employees are Japanese employees sent to the United States to work for Nichia
America by its Japanese parent corporation. “Locally-hired” employees are hired by Nichia America in the United
States.
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Funayama now appeals.2
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s decision granting a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See DiGiacomo v. Teamsters Pension
Trust Fund, 420 F.3d 220, 222 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005).
The District Court concluded that Funayama’s Equal Pay Act claim was barred by
the doctrine of res judicata. We agree. Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion,
requires: “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving, (2) the same parties
or their privies, and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.” Duhaney v.
Att’y Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010). Moreover, this doctrine bars not only
claims that have been litigated, but also those claims that could have been asserted in the
prior action. See id.
Funayama filed an employment action against Nichia in 2008, and in her
Amended Complaint she asserted that she had been discriminated against based on her
gender, race, age, and national origin. The District Court disposed of Funayama’s
employment discrimination claims on the merits when it granted Nichia’s motion for
summary judgment. Scrutiny of the two complaints leaves no doubt that this action
arises from the same events as the earlier case. See Davis v. United States Steel Supply,
2
The District Court denied Funayama’s motion for reconsideration of its March 17, 2014 order on April 17, 2014.
Because Funayama did not file an amended notice of appeal, we do not have authority to review the District Court’s
decision denying her motion for reconsideration. See United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 668 (3d Cir. 2000).
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688 F.2d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating that whether res judicata applies depends on the
“essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various claims” rather than
the “specific legal theory invoked”); Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 169,
173 (3d Cir. 2009). As the District Court explained, Funayama’s current allegation that
Nichia willfully and wantonly “set her apart from other male employees by
discriminating against her in terms of compensation,” is “indisputably connected to the
2008 action in that it arises out of the identical employment relationship and involves the
same type of discrimination.” Moreover, there is no doubt that Funayama could have
brought the Equal Pay Act claim in her 2008 complaint, as her inclusion of a nearly
identical pay disparity claim in her 2008 administrative complaint belies her contention
that she was not aware of the claim until 2010. That she may have learned additional
information supporting an Equal Pay Act claim in 2010 has no bearing on whether she
could have brought the claim in her original complaint. See Elkadrawy, 584 F.3d at 173-
74. Thus, for essentially the reasons relied upon by the District Court, we agree that
Funayama’s 2012 cause of action is barred as res judicata, and will affirm the District
Court’s order dismissing Funayama’s complaint.3
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Because we affirm on this basis, we need not reach the District Court’s alternate bases for its decision.
Additionally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Funayama’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000).
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