Macia v. Williamson ( 2007 )

Opinions of the United
2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
3-13-2007
Macia v. Williamson
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 06-4417
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-4417
________________
JOSE I. MACIA,
Appellant
v.
TROY WILLIAMSON, Warden
______________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(M.D. PA. No. 05-CV-02046)
District Judge: The Honorable William W. Caldwell
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 27, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, MCKEE AND AMBRO, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
(Filed: March 13, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Jose I. Macia, a federal inmate presently confined at FCI-Allenwood,
Pennsylvania, appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his § 2241 petition in which he
challenged the disciplinary proceeding and sanctions imposed following his escape from a
federal open prison facility in Florida in June 2004.
The facts are well known to the parties and will not be repeated at length here. At
his disciplinary hearing on June 29, 2004, Macia waived staff representation and admitted
that he escaped from the open prison. The disciplinary hearing officer found Macia guilty
of escape and sanctioned him with twenty-seven days loss of good-time, fourteen days of
disciplinary segregation and a disciplinary transfer. On July 19, 2004, Macia learned that
the Deputy Marshal was investigating his escape for possible criminal prosecution.
Macia was charged with escape for which he pled guilty, and was sentenced to fifteen
months’ imprisonment to run consecutively to the sentence he was then serving.
Macia filed a § 2241 petition in 2005, claiming that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
violated his Constitutional rights and its own policy when it did not suspend disciplinary
action pending the criminal investigation of his escape and subsequent prosecution.
Macia also contends that the disciplinary hearing officer violated his due process rights
and BOP policy when he failed to advise Macia of his due process rights at the
disciplinary hearing. He asserts that the hearing officer wrongfully induced Macia to
waive his right to be represented by a staff representative and to plead guilty to the
disciplinary charge on the false promise that Macia would not be criminally prosecuted.
Macia complains that his disciplinary transfer to a medium high security facility was
vindictive and excessive. He seeks expungement of the incident report and sanctions
from his prison record and an order reprimanding the disciplinary hearing officer for
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disregarding the intent of the BOP regulations.
After reviewing the petition and responsive pleadings, the District Court denied §
2241 relief.1 The District Court held that the BOP did not violate its own regulations and
that, even if it did, Macia failed to show that he was prejudiced. The District Court also
held that Macia failed to present any evidence supporting his claim that his waiver of his
right to representation was based on the false promise of non-prosecution. The District
Court ruled that the BOP did not violate due process in denying Macia representation in
any event because Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), provides a right to staff
representation at a prison disciplinary hearing only when the inmate is illiterate or the
issue to be adjudicated is complex. The District Court decided that Macia’s case did not
meet the Wolff criteria. The District Court held that there was more than some evidence
to support the disciplinary hearing officer’s finding of guilt based on the undisputed fact
that Macia left the institution (FPC-Pensacola) on June 9, 2004. In addition, the District
Court determined that the sanctions imposed were not excessive because they fell well
within the BOP Guidelines for high level offenses set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 541.13, tables 3
and 4. The District Court also held that Macia’s claim challenging his current
institutional placement and custody classification was not properly brought in a habeas
corpus petition because it related to the conditions of prison confinement, rather than the
1
The District Court also denied Macia’s motion for appointment of counsel and
dismissed his summary judgment motion .
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fact or duration of his sentence. Macia timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction to review the dismissal of Macia’s petition pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal
conclusions as no evidentiary hearing was conducted by the District Court. See Ruggiano
v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2002).
First, we must address whether Macia may contest his disciplinary hearing and
sanctions by means of a habeas corpus petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Claims brought under § 2241 must challenge the execution of a sentence, rather than its
validity. See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001). The precise meaning
of the term “execution of a sentence” has not been determined. As we noted in Woodall
v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2005), the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004), and Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475 (1973), determined that § 1983 provides no remedy in “conditions of confinement”
cases where the claims asserted lie “at the core of habeas.” Id. (also citing Leamer v.
Fauver, 288 F.3d 532 (3d Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court, however, did not address when
a prisoner is precluded from filing a habeas petition. Woodall, 432 F.3d at 242. In
Coady, we cited United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893 (6th Cir. 1991), for the
proposition that a “challenge to [the] place of imprisonment” is “properly brought under
Section 2241.” 251 F.3d at 485. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated
that “[a] motion pursuant to § 2241 generally challenges the execution of a federal
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prisoner’s sentence . . . by prison officials, prison disciplinary actions, prison transfers,
type of detention and prison conditions.” Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir.
2001). We conclude that Macia’s challenges to the disciplinary hearing and the sanctions
imposed, including his disciplinary transfer, affect the manner in which his sentence is
executed and are properly brought under § 2241. Upon careful review of the arguments
on appeal, we will affirm.
Macia claims that the BOP violated his Constitutional rights and BOP policy by
failing to suspend the disciplinary action pending possible criminal prosecution. The
commencement of prison disciplinary proceedings before the criminal prosecution for
escape did not violate Macia’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Even
rights “basic to a fair hearing” are “necessarily circumscribed by the penological need to
provide swift discipline in individual cases.” Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 495 (1985).
The prison’s failure to follow its own procedures will not result in a due process violation
as long as the inmate is provided with the process he is due under Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).2
As for Macia’s challenges to the disciplinary hearing proceeding and the sanctions
imposed, Wolff provides a set of minimum procedural protections that must apply to
2
We note that there is nothing in this record to suggest that the prison violated 28
C.F.R. § 541.14(b)(1) and BOP Statement 5270.07, entitled “Inmate Discipline and
Special Housing Units,” because the U.S. Marshal released its incident report to the BOP
“for administrative action” on June 14, 2004, and, thus, there was no basis under BOP
policy for suspending the disciplinary action.
5
prison disciplinary proceedings where, as in Macia’s case, a prisoner’s good-time credit is
at stake : “(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when
consistent with safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary
evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence
relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst.,
Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67).
Turning to Macia’s claim that the disciplinary hearing officer failed to advise him
of his rights on the day of the hearing, the District Court correctly held that the prison and
disciplinary hearing officer afforded Macia the procedural protections he was due under
Wolff. See 418 U.S. at 555-57. The record indicates that Macia received written notice
of the charges against him and was advised of his disciplinary hearing rights in
accordance with Wolff before his hearing. Because Macia had already been advised of
his hearing rights, the hearing officer was not obligated under Wolff to reiterate those
rights at the hearing.
As for Macia’s challenge to re-classification and disciplinary transfer, we agree
with the District Court that these sanctions are well within the BOP guidelines for
punishment. Thus, they do not amount to a constitutional violation.
We turn to Macia’s last claim, that his admission of guilt at the disciplinary
hearing was not knowing and voluntary because the disciplinary hearing officer induced
him to waive his rights to staff representation and to a full hearing on a false promise of
6
non-prosecution. Inmates do not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in
prison disciplinary hearings. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570. Although BOP regulations provide
for staff assistance in certain cases, the lack of such representation in Macia’s case does
not constitute a due process violation. In any event, as the District Court correctly noted,
the BOP regulations were not violated because Macia was not illiterate and the issues in
his case were not complex.
As for Macia’s contention that the disciplinary hearing officer wrongfully induced
him to waive his right to a hearing, the District Court held that Macia failed to produce
any evidence to support his claim that the disciplinary hearing officer promised him non-
prosecution in exchange for a guilty plea on the disciplinary charge. Our review of the
record, however, reveals what appears to be admissible evidence in support of Macia’s
allegation. Macia submitted an affidavit stating under penalty of perjury that “the
statement of facts of the case in the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is true and
correct.” In his § 2241 petition, Macia states that the disciplinary hearing officer took
into consideration that Macia “was likely to face criminal prosecution after leaving the
[prison] camp to visit my grieving family after my brother’s suicide” and that Macia had
been offered a hardship furlough, as well as Macia’s past record, “to weigh whether I was
to be criminally prosecuted. I was told to waive my rights, not to call witnesses or to
demand representation to be assured of no criminal charges for a plea of guilty that day.”
See § 2241 Petition at ¶ 9-A. Macia’s own statement, even if uncorroborated, raises a
7
question of fact as to whether he voluntarily waived the right to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence in his defense. Normally, an evidentiary hearing would resolve the
factual issue. No evidentiary hearing is necessary in Macia’s case, however. Even
assuming that Macia’s waiver was wrongfully induced, we conclude that the error was
harmless.3 Putting Macia’s admission aside, there is substantial evidence of his guilt as to
the prison misconduct charge. Specific evidence relied on by the disciplinary hearing
officer in finding Macia guilty of the misconduct charge included the report of Officer
Michael that the 10:00 p.m. bed count on June 9, 2004, revealed that Macia was absent
from his bunk. See Appellant’s Brief, Exh. 4, § V. Lieutenant Lawson reported that the
bed counts in the rest of the prison that night were normal. Id. A search of the prison
compound and immediate surrounding area failed to locate Macia. Id. Officers inspected
Macia’s personal locker and bunker areas and found that all of his personal items were
gone. Id. The U.S. Marshal was notified. Id. It is undisputed that Macia was
apprehended the next day in Florida, at a location outside of the prison facility.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court judgment.
3
We note at the outset of our harmless error analysis that Macia did not provide to
the prison hearing officer, the District Court, or this Court on appeal, the names of the
witnesses he would have called or the documentation he would have presented had he not
waived his hearing rights.
8