United States v. Campos ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2007 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    2-15-2007
    USA v. Campos
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 06-2063
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    Recommended Citation
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    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/1615
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 06-2063
    ____________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    JOSEPH CAMPOS,
    Appellant
    ____________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. No. 05-cr-00617)
    District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson
    ____________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    February 12, 2007
    Before: SMITH and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and DIAMOND,* District Judge.
    (Filed: February 15, 2007)
    ____________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ____________
    FISHER, Circuit Judge
    *
    The Honorable Gustave Diamond, United States District Judge for the Western
    District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
    Joseph Campos was convicted and sentenced to 74 months imprisonment for
    illegal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1).
    The District Court determined by a preponderance of the evidence that he had possessed
    the firearm during an attempted robbery and applied a four-level enhancement under
    United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(5).1 Campos now challenges the District
    Court’s decision to resolve disputed facts regarding this enhancement using the
    preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than requiring proof beyond a reasonable
    doubt. He also argues that the sentencing enhancement was erroneously applied.
    Because the standard used by the District Court was proper and its factual determination
    is not clearly erroneous, we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court.
    I.
    As we write only for the parties, we will forgo a lengthy recitation of the factual
    and legal background to this case. On May 12, 2005, Officer Darrell Hall and other
    members of the Atlantic City Police Department were conducting surveillance of the
    Berkley Gardens Apartments, where drug dealing and robberies were common. Officer
    Hall watched as Campos and Lamont Mitchell entered the apartment complex and
    covered their faces with white t-shirts. Campos then removed a handgun from his
    1
    Section 2K2.1(b)(5) was renumbered in November 2006, and is now
    § 2K2.1(b)(6). See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1. Because this case is
    based on the Guidelines as they existed before November 2006, we use the numbering
    that existed prior to the change.
    2
    waistband and held it down alongside his leg. Mitchell also took out a handgun that he
    held with both hands in a low position. Officer Hall then saw Campos enter a stairwell
    while Mitchell stood watch. Campos left the stairwell shortly, and both men got into a
    blue minivan parked near the building and drove away.
    As this was taking place, Officer Hall radioed for backup. The van was stopped by
    police soon after it left the apartment complex, and a firearm was found on Campos’s
    person.
    Campos was brought to police headquarters, where he was interviewed by Officer
    Hall. He admitted to having the gun in his possession, and provided a written statement
    to that effect. Officer Hall testified that, upon further questioning, Campos told him that
    “he had received a phone call that there was a joker in there [the Berkley Gardens
    Apartments] with 5K [$5,000] on him, and he was going there to take it.” Campos
    refused to put this statement in writing, but it was included in Officer Hall’s incident
    report. The report was reviewed and approved by Sergeant Love, who was also present
    during the interview.
    On August 17, 2005, Campos was charged under a federal criminal indictment
    with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1).
    He pleaded guilty on November 3, 2005. The United States Probation Office submitted a
    Presentence Investigation Report recommending a Guidelines range of 77 to 96 months.
    Its calculation included a four-level enhancement because Campos had possessed the
    firearm in connection with another felony offense; in this case, attempted armed robbery.
    3
    At sentencing, Campos objected to the four-level enhancement. The District Court
    heard the testimony of Officer Hall about his surveillance of the apartment complex and
    his interview of Campos. The District Court found this testimony credible, and
    concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that Campos had possessed a firearm in
    conjunction with the commission of an attempted robbery. After considering the factors
    listed in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a), it sentenced him to 74 months imprisonment. This appeal
    followed.
    II.
    We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . Campos first argues that
    the District Court violated his due process rights when it concluded that the disputed facts
    at sentencing, which amounted to the finding of a separate criminal offense, did not need
    to be found beyond a reasonable doubt. Questions of law like this one are subject to de
    novo review. See, e.g., United States v. Pojilenko, 
    416 F.3d 243
    , 246 (3d Cir. 2005). We
    recently settled this question in United States v. Grier, -- F.3d --, 
    2007 WL 315102
     (3d
    Cir. Feb. 5, 2007), where the “primary issue” was “whether the Due Process Clause
    requires facts relevant to enhancements under the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
    particularly those that constitute a ‘separate offense’ under governing law, to be proved
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id. at *3
    . We concluded that it did not:
    [f]acts relevant to application of the Guidelines – whether or not they
    constitute a “separate offense” – do not [increase the statutory maximum
    punishment to which the defendant is exposed]. They inform the district
    court’s discretion without limiting its authority. They therefore do not
    4
    constitute “elements” of a “crime” under the rationale of Apprendi and do
    not implicate the rights to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
    
    Id.
     at *8 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 490 (2000)) (internal citations
    omitted). Thus, the District Court’s use of the preponderance of the evidence standard to
    determine whether or not the four-level enhancement was applicable did not violate
    Campos’s due process rights.
    Next, Campos argues that, even under a preponderance of the evidence standard,
    there was insufficient evidence to support the District Court’s finding that he was
    engaged in an attempted robbery while he possessed the firearm. We review the District
    Court’s factual findings for clear error. United States v. Loney, 
    219 F.3d 281
    , 288 (3d
    Cir. 2000).
    Under § 2K2.1(b)(5) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant’s
    offense level may be increased by four levels “[i]f the defendant used or possessed any
    firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” Application Note 7 to
    § 2K2.1 defines a “felony offense” as “any offense (federal, state, local) punishable by
    imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, whether or not a criminal charge was
    brought, or conviction obtained.”
    Here, the District Court heard Officer Hall’s testimony and determined by a
    preponderance of the evidence that Campos was engaged in attempted robbery when he
    was found in possession of the firearm. This finding is not clearly erroneous. Officer
    Hall testified that Campos told him during his post-arrest interview that “he had received
    5
    a phone call that there was a joker in there [the Berkley Gardens Apartments] with 5K
    [$5,000] on him, and he was going there to take it.”2 Officer Hall’s observations of
    Campos were consistent with this admission. Campos placed a white t-shirt over his face
    to disguise his identity, and quickly entered and exited the apartment complex with a gun
    drawn as Mitchell served as a lookout. The two men then fled in a van. Although
    Campos’s statement about the attempted robbery was not included in his written
    admission, Officer Hall’s credibility was buttressed by the fact that his testimony was
    consistent with dispatch records from that evening. Thus, we are unable to conclude that
    the District Court’s finding that Campos was engaged in attempted robbery while in
    possession of the firearm is clearly erroneous.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District
    Court.
    2
    Campos argues that this statement was hearsay and thus not properly considered
    by the District Court. However, it is not correct to characterize the pretrial statement of a
    defendant offered by the Government at a sentencing hearing as hearsay. See Fed. R.
    Evid. 801(d)(2). Even if it were, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in
    sentencing proceedings. See Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3).
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-2063

Judges: Smith, Fisher, Diamond

Filed Date: 2/15/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024