United States v. Jackson ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2007 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    2-7-2007
    USA v. Jackson
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 05-5147
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    Recommended Citation
    "USA v. Jackson" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 1658.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/1658
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    Case No.: 05-5147
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    KENDALL JACKSON,
    Appellant
    ____________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    District Court No.: 01-cr-00401-6
    District Judge: The Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
    ____________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    December 14, 2006
    Before: SMITH and ROTH, Circuit Judges,
    and YOHN, District Judge*
    (Filed:   February 7, 2007)
    ____________________
    OPINION
    ____________________
    _____________________
    *The Honorable William H. Yohn Jr., Senior District Judge for the Eastern District
    of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
    YOHN, District Judge.
    On February 10, 2003, a jury found Kendall Jackson guilty of four counts of
    distribution and possession with the intent to distribute crack cocaine in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1). The amount of crack cocaine involved in these counts totaled 0.94
    grams. Three days prior to his conviction, the District Court granted Jackson’s motion for
    judgment of acquittal, filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 (“Rule
    29”), with respect to the count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
    distribute in excess of fifty grams of crack cocaine in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846.1
    Jackson’s presentence report and its addendum concluded that Jackson was
    accountable for at least 150 but less than 500 grams of crack cocaine associated with the
    conspiracy. At Jackson’s sentencing hearing, FBI Agent Kevin Wevodau testified that
    Jackson admitted to him in a February 27, 2002 interview that he bought and sold at least
    168 grams of crack cocaine.2 Jackson denies making this statement. The District Court
    credited the testimony of Agent Wevodau and found under the preponderance of the
    evidence standard that the government had established that Jackson was responsible for
    168 grams of crack cocaine as relevant conduct. The District Court sentenced Jackson to
    235 months of imprisonment. Jackson appealed.
    1
    Jackson’s co-defendants, Kevin Dowdy, Bernard Jones, and Sherrod Young, were charged and
    convicted of the conspiracy count. A jury found that, with respect to the conspiracy, fifty grams
    or more of crack cocaine were attributable to each co-defendant.
    2
    This statement was not used by the government at Jackson’s trial due to the constitutional
    principles established by Bruton v. United States, 
    391 U.S. 123
     (1968).
    2
    We affirmed his conviction, but vacated his sentence and remanded for
    resentencing in accordance with the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in United
    States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005). See United States v. Jackson, 
    149 Fed. Appx. 69
    (3d Cir. 2005) (unpublished). On remand, the District Court imposed a sentence of 155
    months of imprisonment. This timely appeal followed.
    The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3231
    . We exercise
    jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a). See
    United States v. Cooper, 
    437 F.3d 324
    , 327-28 (3d Cir. 2006).3
    Jackson contends that his sentence is unreasonable for two reasons. First, he
    asserts that the District Court improperly considered as relevant conduct the drug
    quantities involved in the conspiracy, even though it had granted a motion for acquittal on
    the conspiracy count. Jackson believes that, under Booker, he should be sentenced based
    on the 0.94 grams of crack cocaine found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury, rather than
    the 168 grams found by the District Court under a preponderance of the evidence
    standard.4 In addition, Jackson argues that the District Court failed to impose a sentence
    3
    In its brief which predates our decision in Cooper, the government argues Jackson’s appeal is
    not properly before this court under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a). We decided otherwise in Cooper. 
    437 F.3d at 327-28
    .
    4
    Jackson’s position is that if the District Court had considered only 0.94 grams as relevant
    conduct, the amount for which he was convicted, his base offense level would have been 16
    which would have yielded an advisory sentence range of 41 to 51 months, rather than the range
    of 235 to 293 months recommended by the presentence report and adhered to by the District
    Court. We note, however, that Jackson’s current sentence of 155 months represents a significant
    downward departure from the latter range.
    Further, to the extent that Jackson is arguing that the determination of the amount of
    3
    in parity with his co-defendants in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(6). Jackson urges
    that because the District Court reduced the sentences of co-defendants Bernard Jones,
    Sherrod Young and Kevin Dowdy by nine-and-a-half to ten years,5 he is entitled to the
    same reduction. He argues that the District Court unreasonably subtracted only 6.6 years
    from his original sentence.
    Jackson’s argument that the District Court erred in considering the 168 grams of
    crack cocaine as relevant conduct is contrary to legal and statutory authority and to the
    sentencing guidelines. In United States v. Watts, 
    519 U.S. 148
     (1997), the Supreme Court
    held that an acquittal on a charge does not prevent the District Court from considering at
    sentencing the underlying conduct, so long as it has been proven by a preponderance of
    the evidence. 
    519 U.S. at 157
    . The majority opinion of Justice Stevens in Booker, after
    discussing Watts,6 declared that “none of our prior cases is inconsistent with today’s
    decision.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 241. Thus, Watts remains good law after Booker. While
    crack cocaine must be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, he is foreclosed by our
    decision in Cooper. 
    437 F.3d at 330
     (“As before Booker, the standard of proof under the
    guidelines for sentencing facts continues to be preponderance of the evidence.”); see also United
    States v. Gibbs, 
    190 F.3d 188
    , 203 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that a preponderance of the evidence
    must support the District Court’s determination of drug quantity (citing United States v. Miele,
    
    989 F.2d 659
    , 663 (3d Cir. 1993)).
    5
    The District Court reduced Jones’ sentence by ten years (from 360 months to 240 months),
    Young’s sentence by nine-and-a-half years (from 324 to 210 months); and Dowdy’s sentence by
    nine-and-a-half years (from 324 months to 210 months).
    6
    The majority opinion of Justice Stevens also discussed United States v. Dunnigan, 
    507 U.S. 87
    (1993), Witte v. United States, 
    515 U.S. 389
     (1995), and Edwards v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 511
    (1998).
    4
    Jackson seeks to distinguish Watts because he was acquitted by a judge rather than by a
    jury, he offers no authority for this proposition. Indeed, pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3661
    ,
    which was not invalidated by Booker,7 “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information
    concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense
    which a Court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing
    an appropriate sentence.” § 3661. The sentencing guidelines also do not limit the
    information a sentencing court may consider in imposing a sentence. See U.S. Sentencing
    Guidelines Manual § 1B1.4 (2006). Moreover, they clearly permit the District Court to
    consider all other related conduct. See id. at § 1B1.3. The commentary to § 1B1.3 states:
    “Conduct that is not formally charged or is not an element of the offense of conviction
    may enter into the determination of the applicable guideline sentencing range.” § 1B1.3
    cmt. background (emphasis added). Thus, we find no error by the District Court in
    considering the 168 grams as relevant conduct.
    Jackson’s second argument that his sentence is unreasonable because the District
    Court failed to achieve parity among his co-defendants is also not persuasive. Section
    3553(a)(6) provides that the District Court shall consider “the need to avoid unwarranted
    sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
    similar conduct.” § 3553(a)(6). Congress’ intent in passing § 3553(a)(6) was to promote
    national uniformity in sentencing rather than uniformity among defendants in the same
    7
    See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259 (stating that “[w]ith [
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3553
    (b)(1) and 3742(e)] excised,
    . . . the remainder of the Act satisfies the Court’s constitutional requirements”).
    5
    case. United States v. Seligsohn, 
    981 F.2d 1418
    , 1428 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing United
    States v. Higgins, 
    967 F.2d 841
    , 845 (3d Cir. 1992)). After Booker, we concluded that a
    defendant cannot rely upon § 3553(a)(6) to argue for a reduced sentence to create parity
    among his or her co-defendants. United States v. Parker, 
    462 F.3d 273
    , 277 (3d Cir.
    2006). However, “although § 3553(a) does not require district courts to consider
    sentencing disparities among co-defendants, it also does not prohibit them from doing
    so.” Parker, 
    462 F.3d at 277
    . Such a consideration is certainly within the court’s “broad
    discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Booker, 543
    U.S. at 233). In this case, the District Judge made a discretionary reduction of Jackson’s
    sentence by roughly the same percentage (one-third) that he reduced the sentences of
    Jackson’s co-defendants, establishing what he considered “appropriate parity.” Jackson’s
    proposition that “parity by percentage” is unreasonable not only lacks legal support, but
    his proposed alternative of subtracting the same number of years for all defendants defies
    all logic. As the government illustrates, this would mean that if one defendant were
    facing a twenty-year sentence and another a ten-year sentence, and the first defendant’s
    sentence were reduced by ten years, the second would receive no jail time–an untenable
    result even in the post-Booker discretionary regime. Accordingly, we will affirm the
    District Court’s judgment of sentence.
    6