John Thorpe v. Borough of Jim Thorpe , 770 F.3d 255 ( 2014 )


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  •                                  PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 13-2446
    _____________
    JOHN THORPE;
    SAC AND FOX NATION OF OKLAHOMA;
    WILLIAM THORPE; RICHARD THORPE
    v.
    BOROUGH OF JIM THORPE; MICHAEL SOFRANKO;
    RONALD CONFER; JOHN MCGUIRE; JOSEPH
    MARZEN;
    W. TODD MASON; JEREMY MELBER; JUSTIN YAICH;
    JOSEPH KREBS; GREG STRUBINGER; KYLE
    SHECKLER;
    JOANNE KLITSCH
    Borough of Jim Thorpe,
    Appellant
    _____________
    No. 13-2451
    _____________
    JOHN THORPE; SAC AND FOX NATION OF
    OKLAHOMA;
    WILLIAM THORPE; RICHARD THORPE
    v.
    BOROUGH OF JIM THORPE; MICHAEL SOFRANKO;
    RONALD CONFER; JOHN MCGUIRE; JOSEPH
    MARZEN;
    W. TODD MASON; JEREMY MELBER; JUSTIN YAICH;
    JOSEPH KREBS; GREG STRUBINGER; KYLE
    SHECKLER;
    JOANNE KLITSCH
    Sac and Fox Nation of Oklahoma, William Thorpe,
    Richard Thorpe,
    Appellants
    ________________
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
    COURT
    FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    (D.C. No. 3-10-cv-01317)
    District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
    ________________
    Argued: February 14, 2014
    ____________
    Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, CHAGARES and
    SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: October 23, 2014)
    ______________
    William G. Schwab, Esq. (ARGUED)
    Vincent R. Garvey, Esq.
    William G. Schwab & Associates
    811 Blakeslee Boulevard Drive East
    P.O. Box 56
    Lehighton, PA 18235
    Counsel for Appellants
    Christopher G. Fusco, Esq. (ARGUED)
    Callahan & Fusco
    103 Eisenhower Parkway, Suite 400
    Roseland, NJ 07068
    Attorney for Cross-Appellees
    2
    Charles L. Riddle, Esq.
    Riddle Patent Law, LLC
    434 Lackawanna Avenue, Suite 200
    Scranton, PA 18503
    Stephen R. Ward, Esq. (ARGUED)
    Daniel E. Gomez, Esq.
    Conner & Winters, LLP
    One Williams Center
    Suite 4000
    Tulsa, OK 74172
    Attorneys for Appellees
    Daniel H. Wheeler, Esq. (ARGUED)
    610 Montgomery School Lane
    Wynnewood, PA 19096
    Attorney for Amicus Curiae
    Michael Koehler and John Thorpe
    Michael Campbell, Esq.
    Native American Rights Fund
    1506 Broadway
    Boulder, CO 80302
    Attorney for Amicus Curiae
    The National Congress of the American Indians
    ______________
    OPINION
    ______________
    McKEE, Chief Judge
    I. INTRODUCTION
    Jim Thorpe, multi-sport Olympic gold medalist
    (“Thorpe”), died in California in 1953 without a will.1 His
    1
    Some commentators still regard Thorpe as “the greatest
    Olympian of all time.” See Sally Jenkins, Greatest Olympic
    athlete? Jim Thorpe, not Usain Bolt, WASHINGTON POST,
    Aug. 10, 2012,
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/olympics/greatest-
    3
    estate was assigned to his third wife, Patricia (“Patsy”),2 who
    eventually buried him in what is now Jim Thorpe,
    Pennsylvania (“the Borough”). Jim Thorpe, Pennsylvania
    was a newly-formed borough that had been created from the
    merger of the boroughs of Mauch Chunk and East Mauch
    Chunk. Thorpe was buried in this new borough over the
    objections of several children from his previous marriages.
    Thorpe was a Native American of Sauk heritage and a
    member of the Sac and Fox Nation of Oklahoma. Over the
    years, some of Thorpe’s eight children have spoken out in
    protest of their father’s burial, advocating that he be reburied
    on Sac and Fox tribal land in Oklahoma.
    In 1990, years after Thorpe’s death and burial,
    Congress enacted the Native American Graves Protection and
    Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”). NAGPRA was intended to
    ameliorate and correct past abuses inflicted upon Native
    Americans and their culture and to protect Native American
    human remains and cultural artifacts. NAGPRA requires
    museums and Federal agencies possessing or controlling
    holdings or collections of Native American human remains to
    inventory those remains, notify the affected tribe, and, upon
    the request of a known lineal descendent of the deceased
    Native American or of the tribe, return such remains. 25
    U.S.C. §§ 3003, 3005.
    In 2010, John Thorpe, the son of Thorpe and his
    second wife Freeda, sued the Borough for failing to comply
    with NAGPRA.3 The District Court concluded that the
    Borough was a “museum” within the meaning of NAGPRA
    and provisions of that law required the Borough to disinter
    Thorpe’s remains and turn them over to the Sac and Fox tribe
    as requested by John Thorpe. This appeal followed.
    olympic-athlete-jim-thorpe-not-usain-
    bolt/2012/08/10/f9114872-e33c-11e1-ae7f-
    d2a13e249eb2_story.html.
    2
    Patsy Thorpe is deceased. She and Jim Thorpe did not have
    children together.
    3
    John Thorpe was often called Jack Thorpe, both in his life
    and in this litigation. For clarity, we will refer to him only as
    John Thorpe.
    4
    We conclude that Congress could not have intended
    the kind of patently absurd result that would follow from a
    court resolving a family dispute by applying NAGPRA to
    Thorpe’s burial in the Borough under the circumstances here.
    We therefore hold that the District Court erred in overturning
    the clearly expressed wishes of Thorpe’s wife by ordering his
    body to be exhumed and his remains delivered to John
    Thorpe.4
    II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Thorpe died in California in 1953. Thereafter, Patsy,
    in cooperation with the Oklahoma legislature, made initial
    plans for him to be buried in Oklahoma.5 According to
    Plaintiffs, Thorpe had told family members that he wanted to
    be buried in Oklahoma. However, the parties agree that Patsy
    Thorpe had legal authority over the disposition of Thorpe’s
    body and his estate. In any event, at some point following
    Thorpe’s death, a bill was drafted by the Oklahoma
    legislature that would have provided funding for a permanent
    memorial near the contemplated site for Thorpe’s grave.
    However, in what was a harbinger of difficulties to come, the
    bill was vetoed by the Governor of Oklahoma. This sad and
    regrettable posthumous saga took an even more ominous turn
    when Patsy, assisted by state law enforcement officers,
    intervened in Thorpe’s ritual burial ceremony in Oklahoma,
    and caused Thorpe’s casket to be removed and stored. After
    considering various sites for Thorpe’s burial,6 Patsy arranged
    4
    Because we conclude that the Borough is not a “museum”
    because NAGPRA does not apply here, we do not consider
    the Borough’s argument that the doctrine of laches bars this
    action.
    5
    As we explained at the outset, Patsy is Thorpe’s third wife.
    6
    Patsy had also considered burying Thorpe in Carlisle,
    Pennsylvania, where Thorpe played football as a teenager
    under legendary coach Pop Warner at Carlisle Indian
    Industrial School. John Luciew, Town of Jim Thorpe is
    Ready to Fight for Identity it Adopted 56 Years Ago,
    PENNLIVE, Aug. 2, 2010,
    5
    to have Thorpe buried at a location in Jim Thorpe,
    Pennsylvania. That municipality was to be formed by the
    merger of Mauch Chunk and East Mauch Chunk, and the
    resulting borough was to be named Jim Thorpe. This
    agreement was reached despite the objection of several of
    Thorpe’s children.7 The agreement provided in part that
    Mauch Chunk and East Mauch Chunk would consolidate
    under the name “Jim Thorpe” “as a fitting tribute and
    memorial to the person and memory of the husband of [Patsy
    Thorpe] and that appropriately correlated to such designation
    of the name ‘Jim Thorpe’ the remains of [him] be laid to rest
    in the community so bearing his name.” Appendix (“App.”)
    486. Patsy Thorpe intended that the Borough would be “the
    final and permanent resting place” for her husband. 
    Id. After the
    arrangements were made for the burial site in
    the Borough, Thorpe was first buried at the Evergreen
    Cemetery in the Borough while a mausoleum was being
    constructed for his remains. In 1957, he was interred in what
    was believed to be his final resting place.8 The agreement
    Patsy had reached with the Borough provides that the
    Borough is responsible for the maintenance at the burial site.
    However, family members have visited the site over the years
    and have worked with the Borough to conduct tribal
    http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2010/08/town_of
    _jim_thorpe_is_ready_to.html.
    7
    Thorpe’s descendents never reached a unanimous agreement
    about where he should be buried. Charlotte Thorpe, Jim
    Thorpe’s daughter by his first wife Iva, helped Patsy decide
    on his final burial site in the newly formed borough of Jim
    Thorpe, Pennsylvania. Appendix (“App.”) 413.
    8
    At least Patsy and the leaders of the Borough thought this
    was his final resting place. The Mayor of the Borough
    testified that he was aware of newspaper articles and speeches
    in which John Thorpe, one of Thorpe’s sons from his second
    marriage, expressed a desire to move the body, but the
    Borough was never formally informed of that desire. App.
    361-62.
    6
    ceremonies. The Jim Thorpe Hall of Fame has also worked to
    improve the site.
    John Thorpe filed the instant Complaint in 2010,
    alleging that the Borough had failed to comply with
    NAGPRA.9 The Borough immediately moved to dismiss the
    complaint. The District Court dismissed John Thorpe’s §
    1983 claim but allowed him to proceed under NAGPRA.10
    John Thorpe was also ordered to join all necessary parties in
    an amended complaint or submit evidence and briefing
    showing that joinder of any or all of the necessary parties was
    not feasible and that the action could proceed in “equity and
    good conscience” under Rule 19(b). App. 171. John Thorpe
    died the following year and the proceedings were stayed until
    his attorney filed an amended complaint naming as new
    plaintiffs John’s brothers Richard and William Thorpe, the
    sons of Jim Thorpe and his second wife Freeda (“Plaintiffs”).
    Thereafter, the District Court granted Plaintiffs’
    motion for summary judgment based on its conclusion that
    “[t]he Borough of Jim Thorpe is a ‘museum’ under
    [NAGPRA] and subject to the requirements of the Act,
    including those provisions governing repatriation requests.”
    9
    Over fifty years passed between Jim Thorpe’s death and this
    challenge to his burial. The Plaintiffs waited for their sister,
    Grace Thorpe, to die before instituting this action because she
    did not agree that Thorpe’s remains should be removed from
    the Borough. App. 414. In addition, Plaintiffs did not
    challenge the disposition of Thorpe’s estate in California
    immediately after his death. App. 390.
    10
    42 U.S.C. § 1983 states: “Every person who, under color of
    any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
    State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
    causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
    other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
    of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
    Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
    action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
    redress.”
    
    7 Ohio App. 80
    . The Borough appealed that finding and Plaintiffs
    appealed the District Court’s dismissal of their §1983 claim.11
    III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The District Court had federal question jurisdiction
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. NAGPRA’s jurisdictional
    provision vests federal courts with jurisdiction over “any
    action brought by any person alleging a violation of”
    NAGPRA. 25 U.S.C. § 3013.12 This Court exercises plenary
    review over the District Court’s finding of law that NAGPRA
    applies to Thorpe’s burial. Pell v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
    Co., 
    539 F.3d 292
    , 305 (3d Cir. 2008).
    11
    Plaintiffs also sued several individual defendants, who are
    participating only in the cross-appeal as cross-appellees. Also
    participating in this appeal as amici are the National Congress
    of the American Indians, who favor moving Thorpe’s remains
    to Oklahoma, as well as two of Jim Thorpe’s grandsons,
    Michael Koehler and John Thorpe, who oppose repatriation
    because they believe their grandfather should rest in peace
    and that their family’s burial decision should be respected.
    They are also concerned that the burial decisions of every
    Native American family will be jeopardized if the District
    Court’s decision stands. Michael Koehler and John Thorpe
    are Charlotte Thorpe’s children. Charlotte was the daughter
    of Jim and Iva Thorpe, Thorpe’s first wife.
    12
    We must also ensure that we have jurisdiction to hear this
    case, because the “jurisdiction conferred by the Judiciary Act
    of 1789 . . . did not extend to probate matters.” Markham v.
    Allen, 
    326 U.S. 490
    , 494 (1946). There are three
    circumstances in which the probate exception to jurisdiction
    applies: when the court is working to probate or annul a will,
    administer a decedent’s estate, or assume in rem jurisdiction
    over property that is in the custody of the probate court.
    Marshall v. Marshall, 
    547 U.S. 293
    , 311-12 (2006). “[I]t
    does not bar federal courts from adjudicating matters outside
    those confines and otherwise within federal jurisdiction.” 
    Id. at 312.
    This case involves the status of Thorpe’s remains,
    not his estate or will, and therefore does not touch upon
    anything that could be considered a “probate matter.”
    8
    IV. HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF NAGPRA
    NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013, was first enacted
    in 1990 “as a way to correct past abuses to, and guarantee
    protection for, the human remains and cultural objects of
    Native American tribal culture.” 173 A.L.R. Fed. 585. It was
    passed with two main objectives: “first, to protect Native
    American burial sites and to require excavation of such sites
    only by permit, and second, to set up a process by which
    federal agencies and museums holding Native American
    remains and cultural artifacts will inventory those items and
    work with tribes to repatriate them.” Kickapoo Traditional
    Tribe of Tex. v. Chacon, 
    46 F. Supp. 2d 644
    , 649 (W.D. Tex.
    1999)(citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-877 (1990), reprinted in 1990
    U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4367-68 (“H.R. Rep.”)); United States v.
    Corrow, 
    119 F.3d 796
    , 799-800 (10th Cir. 1997).
    The Act was an attempt to respond to the looting and
    plundering of Native American burial grounds and the theft of
    cultural artifacts from Native American tribes that continued
    to pour salt into the many wounds that have been inflicted on
    Native Americans throughout the history of the United States.
    As stated in the House Report:
    Digging and removing the contents of
    Native American graves for reasons of profit or
    curiosity has been common practice. These
    activities were at their peak during the last
    century and the early part of this century.
    In 1868, the Surgeon General issued an
    order to all Army field officers to send him
    Indian skeletons. This was done so that studies
    could be performed to determine whether the
    Indian was inferior to the white man due to the
    size of the Indian’s cranium. This action, along
    with an attitude that accepted the desecration of
    countless Native American burial sites, resulted
    in hundreds of thousands Native American
    human remains and funerary objects being sold
    or housed in museums and educational
    institutions around the county.
    9
    For many years, Indian tribes have
    attempted to have the remains and funerary
    objects of their ancestors returned to them. This
    effort has touched off an often heated debate on
    the rights of the Indian versus the importance to
    museums of the retention of their collections
    and the scientific value of the items.
    H. R. Rep. The scope of the cultural plundering is
    breathtaking. “National estimates are that between 100,000
    and two million deceased Native people have been dug up
    from their graves for storage or display by government
    agencies, museums, universities and tourist attractions.” Jack
    F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American
    Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: Background and
    Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 39 (1992).
    The movement to pass a law protecting Native
    American human remains, funerary objects, cultural
    patrimony and sacred objects originated in a hearing held by
    the Select Committee on Indian Affairs in 1987. That hearing
    was for a bill that would provide for the repatriation of Indian
    artifacts.    S. Rep. No. 101-473 (1990) (“S. Rep.”).
    Smithsonian Secretary Robert McCormick Adams testified
    that of the 34,000 remains in the Institution’s collection,
    approximately 42.5% of the specimens were the remains of
    North American Indians. “Tribal reaction to Secretary
    Adams’ testimony was swift, and in the months which
    followed, Indian tribes around the country called for the
    repatriation of those human remains that could be identified
    as associated with a specific tribe or region for their
    permanent disposition in accordance with tribal customs and
    traditions, and for the proper burial elsewhere of”
    nonidentifiable remains. 
    Id. The proposed
    bill led to
    additional hearings, which resulted in establishing a year-long
    Panel for a National Dialogue on Museum/Native American
    Relations between museum professionals and Native
    Americans, designed to develop recommendations to address
    the necessity of responding to tribal demands for repatriation.
    The National Museum of the American Indian Act, enacted in
    1989, was the precursor to NAGPRA and established such a
    museum in the Smithsonian. It also included provisions for
    the treatment and disposition of human remains and sacred
    10
    objects, including an inventory process. Pub. L. No. 101-185
    (1989).
    Legislative efforts to protect Native American remains
    continued throughout 1989 and 1990. During a hearing of the
    Select Committee on Indian Affairs, tribal representatives
    testified that:
    in cases where Native Americans have
    attempted to regain items that were
    inappropriately alienated from their tribes, they
    have met with resistance from museums and
    have lacked the legal ability of [sic] financial
    resources to pursue the return of the items.
    Several witnesses testified that in many
    instances Indian tribes do not know what types
    of remains or objects are in the possession of
    museums and have been unsuccessful in their
    attempts to obtain access to this information.
    S. Rep.
    Native American leaders also spoke about the need to
    provide additional protections to Native American burial
    sites. They testified that:
    Indian tribes have had many difficulties in
    preventing the illegal excavation of graves on
    tribal and Federal lands. Several witnesses
    testified that there is a flourishing trade in
    funerary and sacred objects that have been
    obtained from burials located on tribal and
    Federal lands.       Additional testimony was
    received from witnesses who indicated that
    tribal and Federal officials have been unable to
    prevent the continued looting of Native
    American graves and the sale of these objects
    by unscrupulous collectors.
    
    Id. The repatriation
    procedure proposed was modeled
    after the National Museum of the American Indian Act,
    which authorizes the repatriation of human remains and
    funerary objects from the collections of the Smithsonian
    Institution. S. Rep. New procedural requirements were a
    11
    response to testimony by tribal witnesses about “vast
    numbers of Native American human remains contained in the
    Smithsonian collections which, according to tribal religious
    practices, must be given appropriate burials.” 
    Id. The first
    draft of the Native American Repatriation of
    Cultural Patrimony Act —which eventually became
    NAGPRA — was modeled after the provisions contained in
    the National Museum of the American Indian Act. It
    attempted to “extend the inventory, identification and
    repatriation provisions [in the National Museum of the
    American Indian Act] to all Federal agencies and any
    institution which receives Federal funding.” 
    Id. This bill,
    along with a bill introduced by Senator McCain, the Native
    American Grave and Burial Protection Act, formed the basis
    of NAGPRA. NAGPRA extended the Museum of the
    American Indian Act to “Federal agencies and museums
    receiving Federal funds.” 
    Id. “NAGPRA’s reach
    in
    protecting against further desecration of burial sites and
    restoring countless ancestral remains and cultural and sacred
    items to their tribal homes warrants its aspirational
    characterization as ‘human rights legislation.’” United States
    v. Corrow, 
    119 F.3d 796
    , 800 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Trope
    & 
    Echo-Hawk, supra, at 37
    ).
    NAGPRA has two parallel procedures, depending on
    whether the item in question is held by a federal agency or
    museum or is discovered on federal lands after November 16,
    1990, NAGPRA’s effective date. Pueblo of San Ildefonso v.
    Ridlon, 
    103 F.3d 936
    , 938 (10th Cir. 1996). “First, the Act
    addresses items excavated on federal lands after November
    16, 1990 and enables Native American groups affiliated with
    those items to claim ownership. See 43 C.F.R. § 10.1 (1995);
    H.R. Rep. No. 101-877. . . . Second, NAGPRA provides for
    repatriation of cultural items currently held by federal
    agencies, including federally-funded museums.” 
    Id. The procedure
    for repatriation of human remains under
    NAGPRA is as follows: “Each Federal agency and each
    museum which has possession or control over holdings or
    collections of Native American human remains . . . shall
    compile an inventory [defined as “a simple itemized list”] of
    such [holdings or collections of Native American human
    12
    remains] and, to the extent possible based on information
    possessed by such museum or Federal agency, identify the
    geographical and cultural affiliation of such item.” 25 U.S.C.
    § 3003(a). These are required to be completed in consultation
    with tribal governments no later than five years after
    November 16, 1990, and made available to a review
    committee established under the statute. 25 U.S.C. §
    3003(b)(1).
    If the cultural affiliation of Native American human
    remains is established, then “the Federal agency or museum,
    upon the request of a known lineal descendant of the Native
    American or of the tribe or organization,” shall return the
    remains. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(1). Where there are multiple
    requests for repatriation of any cultural item (which includes
    human remains), and the museum cannot clearly determine
    which requesting party is the most appropriate claimant, the
    museum may retain such item until the requesting parties
    agree upon its disposition or the dispute is otherwise resolved
    pursuant to the provisions of this chapter or by a court of
    competent jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(e). Any “museum”
    that fails to comply with these requirements may be assessed
    a civil penalty by the Secretary of the Interior. 25 U.S.C. §
    3007.
    V. THE BOROUGH IS NOT A “MUSEUM” UNDER
    NAGPRA13
    NAGPRA defines the word “museum” very broadly,
    as:
    any institution or State or local government
    agency (including any institution of higher
    learning) that receives Federal funds and has
    possession of, or control over, Native American
    cultural items.
    25 U.S.C. § 3001(8).14 The Borough is a local government
    entity that maintains Jim Thorpe’s burial site. The parties
    13
    Because we find that the statute does not apply to the
    Borough, we will not consider the Borough’s constitutional
    arguments regarding NAGPRA.
    13
    agree that the Borough has “possession of, or control over,”
    Jim Thorpe’s remains, and that he is of Native American
    descent. Thus, the main question before the District Court
    was whether the Borough “receives federal funds.” The
    District Court found that the Borough was a museum because
    the record showed that the Borough received federal funds
    after the enactment of NAGPRA. However, for the following
    reasons, we find that the Borough is not a “museum” as
    intended by NAGPRA. It is therefore not required to comply
    with NAGPRA’s procedural requirement of providing an
    inventory of Thorpe’s remains. Similarly, it is not subject to
    the statute’s requirement that his remains be “returned” to
    Thorpe’s descendants for “repatriation” at their request.15
    Ordinarily, we look to the text of the statute, rather
    than the legislative history, to interpret a statute or determine
    legislative intent as an aid to interpretation. See Conn. Nat’l
    Bank v. Germain, 
    503 U.S. 249
    , 253-54 (1992) (“[C]ourts
    must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means
    and means in a statute what it says there.”); In re Visteon
    Corp., 
    612 F.3d 210
    , 220 (3d Cir. 2010) (“It is for Congress,
    not the courts, to enact legislation. When courts disregard the
    language Congress has used in an unambiguous statute, they
    amend or repeal that which Congress enacted into law.”);
    First Merchs. Acceptance Corp. v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 
    198 F.3d 394
    , 402 (3d Cir. 1999).        However, this rule of
    statutory construction is not an inviolable commandment that
    14
    “‘[C]ultural items means human remains and [associated
    funerary objects, unassociated funerary objects, sacred
    objects, and cultural patrimony].” 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3).
    “Human remains” is not defined in the statute, but is defined
    in the regulations that correspond to the statute to mean “the
    physical remains of the body of a person of Native American
    ancestry.” 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d)(1).
    15
    Despite Plaintiffs’ characterization of Thorpe’s move from
    the Borough to Oklahoma as a “repatriation” or a “return,”
    the parties all agree that Thorpe was never actually buried in
    Oklahoma. As we have explained, a ritual burial started
    there, but was never actually completed. Rather, his wife
    interrupted the burial and caused his remains to be transferred
    to Pennsylvania for burial in the Borough.
    14
    we must blindly enforce regardless of surrounding
    circumstances or the practical results of rigidly applying the
    text to a given situation. Thus, we have made exceptions in
    rare cases in which “the literal application of a statute will
    produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of
    its drafters.” First 
    Merchs., 198 F.3d at 402
    (quoting Griffin
    v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 
    458 U.S. 564
    , 571 (1982)). “In
    such situations, ‘those intentions must be controlling.’” 
    Id. As the
    Supreme Court has explained,                “[s]tatutory
    interpretations ‘which would produce absurd results are to be
    avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the
    legislative purpose are available.” 
    Id. (quoting Griffin,
    458
    U.S. at 575). “But only absurd results and ‘the most
    extraordinary showing of contrary intentions’ justify a
    limitation on the ‘plain meaning’ of the statutory language.”
    
    Id. (quoting Garcia,
    469 U.S. 70
    , 75 (1984)); see also United
    States v. Terlingo, 
    327 F.3d 216
    , 221 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting
    that courts may look behind a statute only when the plain
    meaning produces “a result that is not just unwise but is
    clearly absurd”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Furthermore, “a reviewing court should not confine
    itself to examining a particular statutory provision in
    isolation. Rather, [t]he meaning—or ambiguity—of certain
    words or phrases may only become evident when placed in
    context.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of
    Wildlife, 
    551 U.S. 644
    , 666 (2007) (internal citation and
    quotation marks omitted). “A court must . . . interpret the
    statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, and
    fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole.” FDA v.
    Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
    529 U.S. 120
    , 133
    (2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    Accordingly, the Supreme Court has concluded that “[a]n
    inference drawn from congressional silence certainly cannot
    be credited when it is contrary to all other textual and
    contextual evidence of congressional intent.” Burns v. United
    States, 
    501 U.S. 129
    , 136 (1991), abrogated on other grounds
    by Booker v. United States, 
    543 U.S. 220
    (2005).
    We conclude that we are confronted with the unusual
    situation in which literal application of NAGPRA “will
    produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of
    its drafters.” 
    Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571
    . We must therefore
    15
    look beyond the text of NAGPRA to identify the intentions of
    the drafters of the statute, and that intent “must . . . control[]
    [our analysis.]” 
    Id. As we
    have explained, NAGPRA requires
    “repatriation” of human remains from “museums,” where
    those remains have been collected and studied for
    archeological or historical purposes. 25 U.S.C. § 3005. It is
    clear from the legislative history we have recounted above
    that Congress was also concerned with returning to Native
    American tribes the human remains and artifacts that had
    been taken for profit, gain, exploitation, or rank curiosity
    without regard to the concerns of the Native American tribe
    whose legitimate and paramount interest should have been
    recognized. However, the definition of “museum” in the text
    of NAGPRA sweeps much wider than that. If interpreted
    literally, it would include any state or local governmental
    entity that “has possession of, or control over, Native
    American cultural items[]” regardless of the circumstances
    surrounding the possession. This could include any items
    given freely by a member of the tribe. Here, it would include
    human remains buried in accordance with the wishes of the
    decedent’s next-of-kin. Literal application would even reach
    situations where the remains of a Native American were
    disposed of in a manner consistent with the deceased’s wishes
    as appropriately memorialized in a testamentary instrument or
    communicated to his or her family. There is therefore no
    limitation that would preserve the final wishes of a given
    Native American or exempt determination of his or her final
    resting place from the procedural requirements of
    NAGPRA.16
    16
    NAGPRA defines a museum’s legitimate right of
    possession to include human remains that were freely given
    by the decedent’s next-of-kin. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(13) (“The
    original acquisition of Native American human remains and
    associated funerary objects which were excavated, exhumed,
    or otherwise obtained with full knowledge and consent of the
    next of kin . . . is deemed to give right of possession to those
    remains.”).
    The statute does not explain the legal effect of this
    definition. NAGPRA provides that a museum may keep
    certain items requested by a descendent or tribe if the
    16
    “We have reserved some scope for adopting a
    restricted rather than a literal or usual meaning of [a statute’s]
    words where acceptance of that meaning would thwart the
    obvious purpose of the statute.” 
    Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571
    (internal quotations, ellipsis and citation omitted). Here, it is
    clear that the congressional intent to regulate institutions such
    as museums and to remedy the historical atrocities inflicted
    on Native Americans, including plundering of their graves, is
    not advanced by interpreting “museum” to include a gravesite
    that Thorpe’s widow intended as Thorpe’s final resting place.
    As we stated earlier, Plaintiffs do not maintain that Patsy was
    without authority to determine where Thorpe was to be
    buried. Moreover, as also explained above, the record is clear
    that Plaintiffs delayed bringing this suit until certain of
    Thorpe’s survivors who favored his burial in the Borough
    died.
    As stated in the House Report, “[t]he purpose of
    [NAGPRA] is to protect Native American burial sites and the
    removal of human remains.” H. R. Rep. (emphasis added).
    NAGPRA was intended as a shield against further injustices
    to Native Americans. It was not intended to be wielded as a
    sword to settle familial disputes within Native American
    families. Yet, that is what we would allow if we were to
    enforce NAGPRA’s repatriation provisions as written here.
    Aside from the unusual arrangements between Patsy
    Thorpe and the Borough, and Plaintiffs’ understandable
    desire to move Thorpe’s remains to where they prefer for him
    to be buried,17 his burial in the Borough is no different than
    museum “prove[s] that it has a right of possession to the
    objects.” 25 U.S.C. § 3005(c). However, this section by its
    terms does not apply to human remains, and instead only
    applies to “unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects or
    objects of cultural patrimony[.]” 
    Id. Even if
    this section was
    interpreted to apply to human remains, however, it is not clear
    that a museum with a right of possession over those remains
    would be exempt from the procedural and inventory
    requirements of NAGPRA.
    17
    Nothing we have said prevents Plaintiffs from seeking
    reinterment via an action in Pennsylvania state court.
    17
    any other burial, except that he is a legendary figure of Native
    American descent. If we were to find that NAGPRA applies
    to Thorpe’s burial, we would also have to conclude that it
    applies to any grave located in “any institution or State or
    local government agency . . . that receives federal funds and
    has possession of, or control over, Native American cultural
    items.” This could call into question any “institution” or
    “State or local government agency” that controls a cemetery
    or grave site where Native Americans are buried, and would
    give rights to any lineal descendant or tribe that has a claim to
    a person buried in such a cemetery. The Amicus brief on
    behalf of Thorpe’s grandsons, Michael Koehler and John
    Thorpe, makes this clear:
    Imagine a scenario where a deceased person is
    buried by his widow at the site of her choosing.
    But after the widow dies, the next generation –
    or even complete strangers in the case of a tribe
    – decides to dig up the body with court approval
    and move it somewhere else for any reason they
    desire. They aren’t even required to bury the
    remains. This is not a “parade of horribles”
    conjured up by the Thorpe grandsons. That is
    their reality. If the district court’s decision is
    allowed to stand, this scenario can repeat for
    funerals past and future as long as the deceased
    has any Native American ancestry.
    Amicus Br. for Koehler and Thorpe, at 5. Accordingly,
    “based solely on the language and context of the most
    relevant statutory provisions, the court cannot say that
    Congress’s intent is so clear and unambiguous that it
    However, “once a body is interred there is great reluctance in
    permitting same to be moved, absent clear and compelling
    reasons for such a move.” Novelli v. Carroll, 
    420 A.2d 469
    ,
    476 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (Watkins, J., dissenting) (citing
    Stevens v. Ganz, 
    49 Pa. D. & C.2d 283
    , 286 (1970)); see also
    Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 
    56 A. 878
    , 880 (Pa. 1904) (“With
    regard to a reinterment in a different place, the same rules
    should apply, but with a presumption against removal
    growing stronger with the remoteness of connection with the
    decedent, and reserving always the right of the court to
    require reasonable cause to be shown for it.”).
    18
    ‘foreclose[s] any other interpretation.’” King v. Burwell, 
    759 F.3d 358
    , 369 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Grapevine Imports,
    Ltd. v. United States, 
    636 F.3d 1367
    , 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
    There are numerous indications that Congress did not
    intend for NAGPRA to apply to this situation. The Senate
    Report explains that the statute was designed to “provide
    additional protections to Native American burial sites. Indian
    tribes have had many difficulties in preventing the illegal
    excavation of graves on tribal and Federal lands [, and] tribal
    and Federal officials have been unable to prevent the
    continued looting of Native American graves and the sale of
    these objects by unscrupulous collectors.” S. Rep. The
    Amicus brief submitted by the National Congress of the
    American Indians in support of Plaintiffs summarized the
    Antiquities Act of 1906. That Act defined Native American
    remains on federal lands as “archeological resources[.]”
    Amicus Br. of Nat’l Cong. of the Am. Indians, at 6. The
    collateral consequence was the disinterment of many remains
    for preservation in museums. The amici also refer to the
    Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979. That
    statute also deemed Native American remains on federal
    lands “archaeological resources” and permitted those remains
    to be disinterred. 
    Id. at 6-7.
    This was in “sharp contrast to the
    legal treatment of non-Indian burials and remains, which were
    generally protected from looting and disturbance. NAGPRA
    was needed to ensure equal treatment of Native American
    remains.” 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    With this objective,
    “Congress sought to repatriate human remains and other
    objects by ensuring human remains . . . are returned.” 
    Id. at 10.
    Our conclusion that Congress did not intend the result
    required by a literal application of the text of NAGPRA is
    reinforced by examining multiple sections of the statute. For
    example, as noted earlier, § 3001(13) defines “right of
    possession” to include human remains freely given by the
    deceased or the deceased’s next of kin. This definition is
    further evidence of Congress’s intent to exclude situations
    such as Thorpe’s burial in the Borough. Our conclusion is
    also consistent with the inventory requirement. Section 3003
    applies to a “museum which has possession or control over
    holdings or collections of Native American human
    19
    remains[.]” This implies that the statute assumes that a
    museum is holding or collecting the remains for the purposes
    of display or study, as opposed to serving as an original burial
    site. Finally, NAGPRA requires that remains be “returned.”
    
    25 U.S. C
    . § 3005. This assumes that the human remains
    were moved from their intended final resting place. Thorpe
    was buried in the Borough by his wife, and she had the legal
    authority to decide where he would be buried. Thus, there is
    nowhere for Thorpe to be “returned” to. As the House Report
    explains: “[f]or many years, Indian tribes have attempted to
    have the remains and funerary objects of their ancestors
    returned to them.” H.R. Rep. (emphasis added).
    Thorpe’s remains are located at their final resting place
    and have not been disturbed. We find that applying
    NAGPRA to Thorpe’s burial in the Borough is such a clearly
    absurd result and so contrary to Congress’s intent to protect
    Native American burial sites that the Borough cannot be held
    to the requirements imposed on a museum under these
    circumstances. We reverse the District Court and hold that
    the Borough is not a “museum” under NAGPRA for the
    purposes of Thorpe’s burial.18
    V. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the
    judgment of the District Court as to the applicability of
    NAGPRA to the burial of Jim Thorpe in the Borough, and
    affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ § 1983
    claim. We will remand the action for the District Court to
    enter judgment in favor of Appellant, the Borough of Jim
    Thorpe.
    18
    In the cross-appeal, the Plaintiffs challenge the District
    Court’s finding that they cannot obtain relief for a violation of
    NAGPRA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In light of our finding
    that NAGPRA is not applicable to Thorpe’s burial in the
    Borough, Plaintiffs cannot sustain a claim for a violation of
    NAGPRA under either that statute or § 1983. Therefore we
    will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ § 1983
    claim.
    20