Lacy Goggans v. United States , 580 F. App'x 105 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                              NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 13-2239
    _____________
    LACY J. GOGGANS,
    Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    ______________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civ. Action No. 3-11-cv-06776)
    District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson
    ______________
    Argued September 9, 2014
    ______________
    Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges.
    (Opinion Filed: October 27, 2014)
    Carolyn E. Isaac, Esq. [ARGUED]
    Stuart T. Steinberg, Esq.
    Dechert
    2929 Arch Street
    18th Floor, Cira Centre
    Philadelphia, PA 19104
    Counsel for Appellant
    Mark E. Coyne, Esq.
    Office of United States Attorney
    970 Broad Street
    Room 700
    Newark, NJ 07102
    Glenn J. Moramarco, Esq. [ARGUED]
    Office of United States Attorney
    Camden Federal Building & Courthouse
    401 Market Street
    Camden, NJ 08101
    Counsel for Appellee
    ______________
    OPINION
    ______________
    GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
    In his motion filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Lacy J. Goggans (“Goggans”)
    sought relief on multiple grounds, all of which were denied by the District Court. This
    Court granted a certificate of appealability on two related questions: “(1) whether trial
    counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the District Court’s failure to submit [the
    conspiracy count] on special interrogatories or, in the alternative, for failing to request
    submission on special interrogatories, and (2) whether counsel was ineffective for failing
    to raise these same claims on appeal.” (J.A. 28.) For the reasons set forth below, we will
    affirm the District Court’s order.
    I.     Background Facts
    We write primarily for the benefit of the parties and recount only the essential
    2
    facts.
    Lacy Goggans, along with co-defendants Ronald Blackwell, Trenell Coleman, and
    Ryan Washington, were indicted for various offenses relating to nine violent bank
    robberies and the attempted robbery of a tenth bank. Goggans was convicted of
    conspiracy to commit bank robbery; attempted bank robbery; two counts of using and
    carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence; and one count of being a
    felon-in-possession. On direct appeal, a panel of this Court affirmed his conviction and
    the two mandatory 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) sentencing enhancements, but remanded for
    resentencing pursuant to United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    (2005). United States v.
    Goggans, 257 F. App’x 515, 517-18 (3d Cir. 2007). After resentencing, we affirmed his
    judgment of conviction. United States v. Goggans, 386 F. App’x 171, 174 (3d Cir.
    2010).
    Goggans filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, raising various issues. The
    District Court denied the motion and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. A
    motions panel of this Court granted a certificate of appealability on the two related claims
    of ineffective assistance of counsel. 1
    II.    Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
    1
    In his opening brief, Goggans raises a question as to the sufficiency of the
    evidence and claims that “the District Court committed a fundamental error of law by
    improperly sentencing Goggans twice under § 924(c).” (Br. for Pet’r-Appellant 31.)
    Since these issues are beyond the scope of the certificate of appealability, we may not
    consider them. Villot v. Varner, 
    373 F.3d 327
    , 337 n.13 (3d Cir. 2004); see also 28
    U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 22.1 (2011).
    3
    The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We have jurisdiction
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. “In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, we
    exercise plenary review of the [D]istrict [C]ourt’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly
    erroneous standard to the court’s factual findings. We review the District Court’s denial
    of an evidentiary hearing in a habeas case for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Lilly,
    
    536 F.3d 190
    , 195 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
    III.   Analysis
    Goggans argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
    request that the District Court submit to the jury special interrogatories on the conspiracy
    count. His second claim alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
    this claim on direct appeal. According to Goggans, special interrogatories were needed
    to determine whether he had conspired to commit the completed robberies, the attempted
    robbery, or both.
    In Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984), the Supreme Court established
    a two-part test to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The first part of the
    Strickland test “requires [a] showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
    not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” 
    Id. at 687.
    The second part specifies that “[t]he defendant must show that there is a
    reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
    proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
    sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 
    Id. at 694.
    “‘The purpose of the
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    Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance
    necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding.’” Marshall v. Hendricks,
    
    307 F.3d 36
    , 107 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92
    ). “Because
    under Strickland either prong can be dispositive, if we can conclude that there is no
    prejudice — i.e., that even if counsel had not failed in the ways alleged, there is no
    reasonable probability that the outcome would be different — our analysis would be at an
    end.” 
    Id. On direct
    appeal Goggans argued that the criminal course of conduct included in
    the conspiracy count and the attempted robbery count “were not only continuous but
    involve[d] the same attempted bank robbery.” (J.A. 1073). According to Goggans,
    “[a]ppellant’s second conviction under § 924(c)(1) . . . involve[d] the same predicate
    offense included under the first conviction under § 924(c)(1) . . . and, thus, should be
    vacated.” (Id. at 1074).
    This Court has already reviewed the issue presented here and affirmed the two
    § 924 convictions and sentences. As a result, we can find no prejudice resulting from
    either trial counsel’s or appellate counsel’s performance.
    IV.     Conclusion
    We conclude that Goggans failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.
    We therefore will affirm the District Court’s order.
    5