Debora Schmidt v. Mars Inc , 587 F. App'x 12 ( 2014 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 13-1048
____________
DEBORA A. SCHMIDT,
Appellant
v.
MARS, INC.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D. C. No. 3-09-cv-03008)
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on April 10, 2014
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 7, 2014)
OPINION
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Debora A. Schmidt, a former federal tax analyst employed by Mars, Inc., filed this
lawsuit in 2009 in New Jersey Superior Court, alleging that Mars had terminated her
employment because of sex discrimination and in retaliation for Schmidt’s complaints
about sex discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.1
Mars removed the action to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, and the
parties submitted these claims to a trial by jury. After a nine-day trial, the jury found for
Mars and the District Court entered judgment in Mars’s favor. Shortly thereafter,
Schmidt made a post-verdict motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59, asserting several arguments that she had previously made in pretrial
motions as well as throughout trial.2 The District Court denied Schmidt’s motion on
December 5, 2012. Schmidt appealed. We will affirm.
I. Background
Schmidt was hired by Mars in 1997. For the first two years of her employment,
Schmidt reported to Wayne Monfries, who at that time was the federal tax manager for
Mars. In 1999, Monfries moved to Europe as Mars’s European Tax Manager, a role he
held until 2004, when he returned to the United States to be the Americas Tax Manager
for Mars. Except for the time Monfries was in Europe, and a brief period of 2006 when
he was on disability leave, Schmidt reported to Monfries. While Monfries was working
in Europe, Schmidt reported to Ira Siegel or Steven Altamore.
1
Schmidt’s complaint also included a claim of disability discrimination, but Schmidt
abandoned the claim in response to Mars’s motion for summary judgment.
2
Schmidt also brought a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, ostensibly
pursuant to Rule 50. The District Court properly denied this motion, however, because
Schmidt failed to move for judgment as a matter of law “before the case [was] submitted
to the jury” and therefore there was no motion to “renew[]” after the entry of judgment on
the jury’s verdict. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b); see also Pediatrix Screening, Inc. v. TeleChem
Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 541, 545–46 (3d Cir. 2010).
2
Schmidt received a performance review each year she worked at Mars, which was
prepared by her supervisor. For her first seven years of employment, Schmidt received a
performance rating of “Good” or its equivalent. In her 2005 review, however, Monfries
rated Schmidt’s performance as “Below Expectations.” Schmidt responded to this rating
by submitting a fifteen-page document attempting to refute each factual assertion
Monfries had made in the review. In early August 2006, Schmidt met with Monfries to
conduct a mid-year evaluation. In that meeting, Monfries informed Schmidt that her
performance was continuing to fall below his expectations. On August 20, 2006,
Schmidt submitted a written complaint to Mars’s human resources personnel alleging the
Monfries was engaging in harassment. More than two weeks later, Schmidt
supplemented this complaint by asserting that Monfries was discriminating against her
based on her sex.
Schmidt provided Mars’s human resources personnel with a detailed description of
her allegations of sex discrimination in an eight-page memorandum. In this
memorandum, she asserted that she felt she was being “held to higher standards” than her
male co-worker, Mark Dunckle, who was the State Tax Manager for Mars. Mars
investigated these claims, but took no action in response to Schmidt’s allegations.
Because Schmidt’s performance had not improved, on August 31, 2006, Mars put
Schmidt on a performance improvement plan. In May 2007, Mars terminated Schmidt’s
employment, citing declining performance.
Schmidt’s claims were presented to a jury during a nine-day trial in May 2013. In
defense, Mars submitted evidence to support its assertion that Schmidt was terminated for
3
performance reasons, and not because of her sex. In addition, Mars submitted evidence
that Dunckle’s position as State Tax Manager was not comparable to Schmidt’s position
as a Federal Tax Manager. The jury found for Mars. Schmidt appeals.
II. Standard of Review
As a general matter, we review a District Court’s order on a motion for a new trial
for abuse of discretion. Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 383–84 (3d Cir.
2002). Similarly, we review a District Court’s rulings on motions to change venue,
discovery orders, efforts to control the conduct of trial, and evidentiary rulings for abuse
of discretion. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 665 F.3d 524, 542 (3d Cir.
2011) (evidentiary rulings); Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 348 n.6 (3d Cir.
2011) (discovery matters); Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d
604, 609–10 (3d Cir. 1995) (conduct of trial); see Research Automation, Inc. v. Schrader-
Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 2010) (motions to transfer). The
District Court’s interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, is subject to
plenary review. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 665 F.3d at 542.
Moreover, because this is a post-judgment appeal, Schmidt must do more than
simply show that the District Court committed some error. Rather, Schmidt must also
show that any error committed by the District Court affected her substantial rights, i.e.,
that the District Court’s error was not harmless. Morgan v. Covington Twp., 648 F.3d
172, 180 (3d Cir. 2011).
III. Discussion
A. Motion to Change Venue
4
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Schmidt’s motion to
change venue. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “[f]or the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought.” Although Schmidt now
argues to the contrary, Trenton was a proper venue for this case. See 28 U.S.C. §
1391(c). Schmidt contends that this case should have been tried in Newark, because
traveling to Trenton each day added an hour of commuting time in each direction. While
this was no doubt an inconvenience, Schmidt does not identify any negative effect, such
as the unavailability of witnesses, that this extra commuting time had on the presentation
of her case. See, e.g., Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879–80 (3d Cir.
1995). We conclude that the District Court acted within its discretion in denying
Schmidt’s motion.
B. Discovery Issues
We also conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Schmidt’s pretrial motion to compel discovery. In order to succeed on this aspect of her
appeal, Schmidt must show “that the district court’s denial of discovery made it
impossible to obtain crucial evidence, and implicit in such a showing is proof that more
diligent discovery was impossible.” Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v.
American Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1032 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The District Court acted within its discretion in denying Schmidt’s motion
because it was filed after the close of discovery. In addition, we defer to district courts
on “matters of docket control and conduct of discovery.” See In re Fine Paper Antitrust
5
Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1982). Nothing prevented Schmidt from making a
timely motion to compel. Therefore, she has failed to show that more diligent discovery
was impossible.
We will also affirm the District Court’s ruling not to deem admitted certain
requests for admissions propounded upon Mars by Schmidt. We see no reason to disturb
the District Court’s conclusion that the format and content of the requests violated local
rules and that they were improperly served.
C. Evidentiary Rulings
Schmidt argues that the District Court committed reversible error by excluding
most evidence that related to events occurring prior to 2004. Schmidt’s claims were
based on her termination from Mars, which she asserted was based on sex discrimination
and in retaliation for complaints she had made about treatment she received from her
manager, Monfries. Despite Schmidt’s assertions to the contrary, the District Court
permitted Schmidt’s counsel to question Monfries about the full period of his relationship
with Schmidt. This included questioning about events that occurred between 1997 and
1999, as well as after 2004. Evidence regarding events that occurred between 1999 and
2004 could not have been relevant to Schmidt’s claims, however, because Monfries was
not her manager at that time.
Moreover, the District Court permitted Schmidt to challenge the non-
discriminatory reason Mars relied upon to terminate Schmidt’s employment. Mars
argued that Schmidt’s employment was terminated and cited her negative performance
review in support of this position. The District Court not only permitted Schmidt to
6
present evidence challenging the assertions made in that performance review, it also
permitted Schmidt to present evidence regarding her other performance reviews without
date restriction. Given the tangential relevance of the additional evidence Schmidt
sought to admit, it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to exclude it.
D. Exclusion of Undisclosed Witnesses and Exhibits
Next, Schmidt argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the District Court
excluded testimony from fifteen witnesses Schmidt identified in the Pretrial Order shortly
before trial, but had failed to disclose during pretrial discovery. Schmidt does not contest
that she did not identify these witnesses as part of her initial disclosures or in response to
an interrogatory requesting the identity of each person she intended to call as a witness at
trial. Rather, she argues that the witnesses could not be unknown to Mars because they
were either identified in Mars’s interrogatory answers or documents, mentioned in
Schmidt’s deposition testimony, or were employees of Mars.
A party is required to disclose the names of witnesses that may be called to testify
at trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. Failure to do so will preclude the party’s use of those
witnesses, unless such failure was substantially justified or harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(c)(1); see also Konstantopoulous v. Westvaco Corp., 112 F.3d 710, 719 (3d Cir.
1997). Upon reviewing the record, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding the witnesses. Schmidt did not properly disclose these witnesses
or otherwise indicate that she might call them to testify at trial until after the discovery
period had closed and shortly before the beginning of trial, which substantially prejudiced
Mars’s ability to cross-examine those witnesses. Furthermore, the topics on which
7
Schmidt sought to have these witnesses testify were not so critical that they raise the
possibility that the jury’s verdict would have been different had Schmidt been allowed to
call them. See Quinn v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del., 283 F.3d 572, 577–78
(3d Cir. 2002).
For similar reasons, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that
Schmidt could not use at trial documents she had failed to produce in discovery. Schmidt
does not contest that she failed to produce or identify the documents she later sought to
admit at trial. Further, the asserted prejudice Schmidt claims to have suffered from the
District Court’s ruling on appeal is unpersuasive because she was able to introduce
several of the topics through witness testimony and cross-examination.
E. District Court Control Over Presentation of Evidence
Finally, Schmidt is not entitled to a new trial because of the time limitations the
District Court placed on the trial, and its refusal to permit Schmidt to call rebuttal
witnesses. District courts “have discretion to impose limits on a party’s trial
presentation,” including by placing time limits on a party’s case. Duquesne Light Co., 66
F.3d at 608–11. Upon review of the record, we see no abuse in discretion in the District
Court’s efforts to streamline the presentation of evidence.3
IV. Conclusion
3
There is also no merit to Schmidt’s argument that she is entitled to a new trial because
the District Court ordered that an exhibit regarding another female employee’s complaint
be redacted to exclude hearsay. The alleged declarant of the statement at issue testified at
trial, but Schmidt’s counsel declined to question her on this issue. Even assuming
error—which we do not—Schmidt has not met the burden of establishing that the trial
would have had a different outcome.
8
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court did not commit reversible error in this
case. We will therefore affirm.
9