Shane Buczek v. Charles Maiorana , 526 F. App'x 152 ( 2013 )

AMENDED GLD-112 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-1050
___________
SHANE CHRISTOPHER BUCZEK,
Appellant
v.
CHARLES MAIORANA; PAMELA BUTLER, CCM, Pittsburgh;
CRAIG SWINEFORD, Caseworker
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3:12-cv-00191)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 31, 2013
Before: FUENTES, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 15, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Shane Christopher Buczek, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing as moot his
habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. There being no substantial question
presented on appeal, we will grant the Government‟s motion for summary action and
affirm the decision of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary
for our discussion. In September 2012, while incarcerated at FCI Loretto in Loretto,
Pennsylvania, Buczek filed a § 2241 petition alleging that the date of his placement at a
residential re-entry center (“RRC”) was inconsistent with the Second Chance Act of
2007. In November 2012, Appellees suggested that Buczek‟s petition was moot because
he had been placed in an RRC in Buffalo, New York on November 6, 2012. A
Magistrate Judge recommended that Buczek‟s § 2241 petition be dismissed as moot, and
on December 12, 2012, the District Court adopted the recommendation and dismissed
Buczek‟s petition as moot. Buczek then timely filed this appeal.1
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).2 “The standard
of review over the District Court‟s mootness determination is plenary.” Burkey v.
Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009). We may summarily affirm on any basis
supported by the record. Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per
curiam).
Article III of the Constitution provides that federal courts may only adjudicate
“actual, ongoing cases or controversies.” Lewis v. Cont‟l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477
(1990). This requirement continues throughout all states of federal judicial proceedings.
1
Buczek was released from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons shortly before filing his
notice of appeal.
2
A certificate of appealability is not required to appeal the denial of a § 2241 petition.
Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009).
2
See Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2009). “This means that, throughout
the litigation, the plaintiff „must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury
traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.‟”
Spencer v. Kemma, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477).
We agree with the District Court that Buczek‟s transfer to an RRC rendered his
habeas petition moot. See Demis v. Sniezek, 558 F.3d 508, 513 (6th Cir. 2009). Even if
the District Court were to render a decision in Buczek‟s favor regarding RRC placement,
it could provide no redress for any injury that Buczek may have suffered from the Bureau
of Prisons‟ action. Furthermore, the District Court correctly noted that Buczek has not
asserted any “collateral consequences” to overcome the finding of mootness. See id. at
516 (“Because [petitioner] can point to no „collateral consequences‟ that are the result of
his delayed placement in [an RRC], and certainly none that persist after the expiration of
his sentence or which this Court to remedy in the habeas context, [petitioner‟s] reliance
on the „collateral consequences‟ exception to mootness is unavailing.”). Notably, Buczek
has not claimed any collateral consequences based on delayed commencement of any
term of supervised release that he may be serving, and such a claim would be insufficient
in light of his recent release from custody. See Burkey, 556 F.3d at 148.
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the Government‟s motion for summary action
and will summarily affirm the District Court‟s order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P.
10.6. We deny as moot the Government‟s motion to stay the briefing schedule and deny
Buczek‟s motion to take mandatory judicial notice.
3