Sybil Ahmad v. Commissioner Social Security ( 2013 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 12-4367
_____________
SYBIL AHMAD,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 4-11-cv-01342
District Judge: The Honorable William J. Nealon
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 16, 2013
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 23, 2013)
_____________________
OPINION
_____________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Sybil Ahmad appeals from the judgment of the United State District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for disability benefits
under Title II and supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the
Social Security Act. 1 We exercise plenary review over legal issues. Chandler v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). Judicial review of the
Commissioner‟s factual findings is limited to determining whether the findings are
supported by substantial evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which is “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the judgment of
the District Court.
Ahmad applied for disability and supplemental security income benefits in
2008, alleging an onset of disability in April of 2008 due to persistent neck and
lower back pain. An MRI in January of 2008 revealed the presence of an Arnold-
Chiari malformation (ACM) of the brain and spinal cord. Ahmad‟s ACM involved
the “extension of the cerebellar tonsils below the level of the foramen magnum” by
6.5 millimeters, with the extension measuring 8.3 millimeters in an MRI completed
in November of 2008. The latter MRI revealed no other intracranial abnormalities.
Dr. Cantando, a neurosurgeon who examined Ahmad, documented that there was
mild disc degeneration of the C5-6 and C6-7 discs, but no cord compression. An
MRI of the lumbar spine showed “[m]inimal degenerative changes of the discs at
1
The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and
1383(c)(3). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
2
L4-5 levels with slight encroachment,” and minimal disc bulging at L5-S1.
Ahmad submitted the results of these diagnostic tests as well as the medical reports
of Dr. Lombard, her treating physician; Dr. Paz, a pain specialist; and Dr.
Cantando, a neurosurgeon. In Ahmad‟s view, she was disabled because she was
unable to work due to difficulties with walking, sitting, and using her arms to lift,
pull or push. She complained of difficulties with grasping, which affected her
dominant right hand more than her left hand. Headaches and pain also limited her
ability to work.
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing, during which
Ahmad and a vocational expert testified. Thereafter, in a written decision, the ALJ
conducted the five step sequential analysis and concluded that Ahmad was not
disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The ALJ determined that Ahmad‟s
degenerative joint disease and ACM were severe impairments, that these
impairments did not meet or equal any of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 of
the regulations, see 20 C.F.R. Part 404, App. 1, and that Ahmad was limited to
certain sedentary work and unable to perform postural maneuvers. In addition, the
ALJ found that Ahmad had limitations in her ability to reach overhead and to use
her dominant right upper extremity. Based on the testimony of the vocational
expert, the ALJ determined that there was other work in the national economy that
Ahmad could perform. Therefore, the ALJ concluded Ahmad was not disabled.
3
Ahmad‟s appeal to the District Court was unsuccessful. This appeal
followed. She contends that the ALJ erred by discounting her subjective
complaints and the opinions of her physicians. In Ahmad‟s view, the medical
evidence “clearly and unequivocally” showed that she was disabled for purposes of
the Social Security Act.
It is well settled that “[a]n ALJ must give serious consideration to a
claimant‟s subjective complaints of pain” and “[w]here medical evidence does
support a claimant‟s complaints of pain, the complaints should then be given „great
weight.‟” Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1067 (3d Cir. 1993). Great weight
also should be accorded a report from a treating physician, and an ALJ may not
substitute her judgment on a medical question for that of a treating physician.
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999). An ALJ, however, “may
afford a treating physician‟s opinion more or less weight depending upon the
extent to which supporting explanations are provided.” Id. (citing Newhouse v.
Heckler, 753 F.2d 283, 286 (3d Cir.1985)).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the ALJ carefully considered
the evidence and accorded great weight to Ahmad‟s testimony and her physicians‟
reports by finding that she was limited to less than the full range of sedentary
work. Indeed, this finding was more limited than the opinion of the state agency
4
medical consultant who reviewed the medical evidence and opined that she was
capable of performing light work with postural limitations.
Ahmad asserts that her treating physicians opined that she was incapable of
performing even sedentary work. Scrutiny of these medical reports, however, fails
to reveal any express opinion that she was unable to perform the sedentary work
identified by the ALJ. Instead, as the ALJ noted, the medical reports confirmed the
presence of the ACM and mild degenerative disc disease and consistently
documented numerous normal findings. The ALJ appropriately considered this
evidence in finding that Ahmad was limited to less than the full range of sedentary
work.
Finally, Ahmad contends that the ALJ erred in finding that Ahmad could
“perform the requirements of representative occupations such as a surveillance
system monitor,” for which there were “569 available jobs in the Pennsylvania
State economy.” In Ahmad‟s view, this position “does not exist in significant
numbers to render it meaningful” for purposes of the final step in the sequential
analysis. This final step places upon the Commissioner the burden of showing that
Ahmad is capable of performing other work that exists in significant numbers in
the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v) & (g), 404.1560(c),
416.920(a)(4)(v) & (g), 416.960(c).
5
As support for this argument, Ahmad cites a single case in which the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the existence of 135 regional jobs as a surveillance system
monitor was not a sufficient number of jobs to support a finding that the plaintiff
could perform other work in the national economy. Beltran v. Astrue, 676 F.3d
1203, 1207 (9th Cir. 2012) (reversing the determination that a plaintiff was not
disabled because she was capable of performing a single position for which there
were 135 regional jobs). Beltran, however, is not controlling. In light of our
determination in Craigie v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 56, 58 (3d Cir. 1987), that 200 jobs in
the regional economy was a “clear indication” that other meaningful work in the
national economy existed, we conclude that the ALJ did not err by concluding that
the 569 jobs available as a surveillance system monitor was evidence of other work
in significant numbers in the national economy.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
6