Patrick Daniel Tillio, Jr. v. Narberth Ambulance , 532 F. App'x 109 ( 2013 )


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  • BLD-376                                                          NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 13-2468
    ___________
    PATRICK TILLIO, JR.,
    Appellant
    v.
    NARBETH AMBULANCE; BRYN MAWR AUTO BODY
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 2-13-cv-02518)
    District Judge: Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to Jurisdictional Defect or
    Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    August 8, 2013
    Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: August 21, 2013)
    _________
    OPINION
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Patrick Tillio appeals pro se from the dismissal of his complaint by the District
    Court. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm. See LAR 27.4; I.O.P.
    10.6.
    As best we can construe Tillio’s complaint, it appears to be some kind of action
    under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983.1
     This conclusion is supported by 1) numerous references within
    the complaint to the Lower Merion Police Department, and 2) an allegation that some
    employee of one of the defendants caused a personal injury of some kind. Our
    understanding is in part informed by Tillio’s previous appeal in a related case. Tillio v.
    Lower Merion Police, No. 12-2381, 481 F. App’x 715 (3d Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential).
    It appears that someone, who is not identified by name, has allegedly caused an injury to
    Tillio and Tillio’s father. There is also an allegation that an unknown person (identified
    as the “chop shop man”) moonlights for the Lower Merion Police Department. The
    District Court granted Tillio’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, then dismissed his
    complaint without prejudice “because his complaint is rambling and unclear.” The
    District Court gave Tillio leave to amend within 30 days, and Tillio filed a timely notice
    of appeal.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . “Ordinarily, an order that dismisses
    a complaint without prejudice . . . is neither final nor appealable.” Redmond v. Gill, 
    352 F.3d 801
    , 803 (3d Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (citing Borelli v. City of Reading, 
    532 F.2d 950
    , 951 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam)). But when a District Court gives a specific amount
    of time in which to amend and the plaintiff chooses to file a notice of appeal in that time
    1
    Tillio has checked civil rights, validity of a patent, and habeas corpus at various points
    on the form complaint. But in the “Basis for Jurisdiction” section of the form, he has
    marked federal question jurisdiction and written in that the federal right at issue is “civil
    rights for me and people.”
    2
    instead, that is sufficient to demonstrate an intention to stand on the complaint. See
    Frederico v. Home Depot, 
    507 F.3d 188
    , 193 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Batoff v. State
    Farm Ins. Co., 
    977 F.2d 848
    , 851 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992). Accordingly, the order here is both
    final and appealable. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal for
    failure to state a claim. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 
    591 F.3d 666
    , 670 (3d Cir. 2010) (per
    curiam).
    The District Court did not err in determining that Tillio had failed to state a viable
    claim. See Aschroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)
    (“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”).
    We see no factual allegations of any kind against Bryn Mawr Auto Body, one of the two
    named defendants. Even assuming, doubtfully, that the other defendant, Narberth
    Ambulance, would qualify as a state actor for the purposes of § 1983, we perceive no
    factual allegations suggesting it violated any right. Indeed, the complaint makes no
    attempt to tie the allegation about the moonlighting employee to the injury Tillio alleged.
    Tillio’s complaint does not even rise to the level of a “formulaic recitation of the
    elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 555
    (2007). Dismissal with leave to amend was appropriate. See Grayson v. Mayview State
    Hosp., 
    293 F.3d 103
    , 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Tillio chose to stand on his complaint, and we
    agree with the District Court that it was insufficient.
    For the reasons given, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District
    Court.
    3