Samuel Opara v. , 532 F. App'x 119 ( 2013 )


Menu:
  •        CLD-385                                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 13-3323
    ___________
    IN RE: SAMUEL OPARA,
    Petitioner
    ____________________________________
    On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
    United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
    (Related to D.C. Civil No. 1:13-cv-00748)
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
    August 15, 2013
    Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed August 30, 2013 )
    _________
    OPINION
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Pro se litigant Samuel J. Opara petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the
    United States District Court for the District of New Jersey to reopen D.C. Civil No. 1:13-
    cv-00748 so that the District Court may enter a final and appealable order in that case.
    Mandamus is a drastic remedy available in extraordinary circumstances only. In re: Diet
    Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 
    418 F.3d 372
    , 378 (3d Cir. 2005). A petitioner seeking the writ
    “must have no other adequate means to obtain the desired relief, and must show that the
    right to issuance is clear and indisputable.” Madden v. Myers, 
    102 F.3d 74
    , 79 (3d Cir.
    1996). For the reasons that follow, those circumstances are not present here.
    Accordingly, we will dismiss Opara’s mandamus petition as moot.
    In February 2013, Opara filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
     in the District Court. He also filed a motion pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2247
    to unseal the record and transcripts from his criminal trial, which had been held in
    another federal district court. On May 30, 2013, the District Court entered an order
    dismissing Opara’s habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the petition
    was actually an unauthorized second or successive 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     motion. In that
    same order, the District Court denied Opara’s § 2247 motion.
    Opara now argues that the District Court’s order was not a final and appealable
    order, and that, as a result, we should grant his mandamus petition and direct that court to
    issue such an order in his case. We disagree. Pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we have
    jurisdiction to review “final” orders of the district courts. “A final order is one that ends
    the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
    judgment.” Hagan v. Rogers, 
    570 F.3d 146
    , 151 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and
    citation omitted). The District Court’s order here satisfied those requirements, because it
    disposed of the only two filings before it (the habeas petition and the § 2247 motion) and
    directed the District Court Clerk to close the case. Although Opara alleges that the
    District Court failed to consider some of his claims in adjudicating his habeas petition, it
    is clear that the District Court “intended its ruling to have a final rather than a tentative
    2
    effect.” Caver v. City of Trenton, 
    420 F.3d 243
    , 261 (3d Cir. 2005); see also 
    id.
     (“In
    determining whether [an order] constitutes an appealable final decision, we are mindful
    that § 1291 is to be given a practical rather than a technical construction.”) (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, although Opara claims that the
    District Court’s order did not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58’s separate
    document requirement, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a), that claim, which is not supported by
    the record,1 does not render the District Court’s order non-final. See Local Union No.
    1992 v. Okonite Co., 
    358 F.3d 278
    , 286 (3d Cir. 2004). Opara’s remaining arguments,
    too, are unpersuasive.
    Because the District Court has entered a final and appealable order in Opara’s
    habeas action, Opara has already obtained the relief he seeks here. Accordingly, we will
    dismiss as moot his petition for a writ of mandamus.
    1
    The District Court in fact complied with the requirements of Rule 58 because its order
    that (1) was self-contained and separate from the accompanying opinion, (2) noted the
    relief granted, and (3) omitted the District Court’s reasons for its decision. See LeBoon
    v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 
    503 F.3d 217
    , 224 (3d Cir. 2007).
    3