United States v. Franklin Thompson , 532 F. App'x 169 ( 2013 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-2761
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
FRANKLIN THOMPSON,
a/k/a ROCK
a/k/a HARD ROCK,
Franklin Thompson,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2:07-cr-00303-002)
District Judge: Hon. Joy Flowers Conti
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 10, 2013
BEFORE: McKEE, Chief Judge, and AMBRO and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: July 29, 2013)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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McKEE, Chief Judge.
Franklin Thompson appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the
indictment against him. Thompson argues that undue delay in bringing his case to trial
1
violated his rights under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), and the Sixth
Amendment. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 1
I.
As we write only for the parties who are familiar with the facts and procedural
history of this case, we set forth only those facts relevant to our conclusion.
Thompson argues that the District Court granted an unreasonable number of
extensions of time to file pretrial motions, resulting in undue delay in bringing his case to
trial in violation of the Speedy Trial Act. He focuses on the District Court’s grant of five
extensions requested by Mark Lancaster, Thompson’s second attorney.
The Speedy Trial Act provides that if “a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a
defendant . . . shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making
public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared
before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever occurs
last.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Despite the time limits that the Act places on commencing
trial, it also recognizes that criminal cases vary in complexity and there may be valid
reasons for delay. Accordingly, “the Act includes a long and detailed list of periods of
delay that are excluded in computing the time within which trial must start.” Zedner v.
United States, 547 U.S. 489, 497 (2006).
1
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 3742(a). “We
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s application of the Speedy Trial Act,”
United States v. Willaman, 437 F.3d 354, 357 (3d Cir. 2006), and its interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, Douglas v. Cathel, 456 F.3d 403, 417 (3d Cir.
2006).
2
The Supreme Court has held that time granted to a party to prepare pretrial
motions is not automatically excludable from the Act’s seventy day limit under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(1). Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 203-04 (2010). However, such time
may be excluded if the court finds that “the ends of justice served by taking such action
outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(7)(A); Bloate, 559 U.S. at 204.
Here, as Thompson concedes, the District Court’s orders granting his requests for
an extension of time were accompanied by the requisite “ends of justice” finding. Given
the circumstances of the case, including its complexity, the voluminous records, the
number of defendants, the time needed to prepare a Pre-Plea Investigation Report, and
on-going plea negotiations, the District Court appropriately determined that the ends of
justice served by granting each extension outweighed the interests of the defendant and
the public in a speedy trial.
Nevertheless, Thompson attempts to make much of the fact that despite all the
extensions, Attorney Lancaster ultimately adopted the initial set of pretrial motions filed
by Thompson’s first attorney. However, Lancaster requested extensions of time because
he was engaged in plea negotiations and/or awaiting a Pre-Plea Investigation Report from
the Probation Office in order to conduct informed negotiations. Moreover, the issue of
Thompson’s status as a career offender was a legitimate and quite understandable
concern to the defense. Indeed, under the plea agreement, the parties agreed, to
Thompson’s benefit, that a departure from the career offender classification guideline
was warranted. Contrary to what Thompson suggests, the fact that Lancaster ultimately
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adopted the first attorney’s pretrial motions does not necessarily establish that the
extensions of time were unreasonable.2
Thus, although the delay here was considerable, it was not in violation of the
Speedy Trial Act.
II.
Thompson also argues that the delay in bringing him to trial violated his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial. In evaluating whether there has been a violation of
the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, we consider and weigh the four factors set
out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972): the “‘[l]ength of delay, the reason for
the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.’” Burkett
v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1219 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530).
Here, the District Court weighed the length of the delay in Thompson’s favor and
also found that Thompson had asserted his right to a speedy trial. However, the court
determined that the reasons for the delay did not count against the government because
2
Further, each of the contested extensions of time took place after Dwayne
Thompson filed his pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on January 13, 2009 and
before the resolution of that motion at the pretrial motions hearing on September 8-9,
2010. This entire time period is excludable as to both Dwayne Thompson, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(1)(D) (excluding “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of
the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such
motion”); Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 330 (1986) (“Congress intended . . .
to exclude from the Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day limitation all time between the filing of a
motion and the conclusion of the hearing on that motion, whether or not a delay in
holding that hearing is ‘reasonably necessary.’”); and Thompson as a codefendant, see
United States v. Novak, 715 F.2d 810, 814 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), “an exclusion applicable to one defendant applies to all
codefendants . . . subject to a reasonableness limitation”) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Felton, 811 F.2d 190,
200 (3d Cir. 1987).
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the government did not instigate any of the delays. The court also found that there was
no evidence that Thompson was prejudiced by the delay. The court thus concluded that
the long delay was not unwarranted given the number of Defendants and complexity of
the case. For substantially the same reasons given by the District Court, we conclude that
there has been no Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation.
III.
For the reasons we have explained, we will affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
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