James Knox v. Quest Diagnostics Inc , 522 F. App'x 150 ( 2013 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No: 12-1718
JAMES KNOX,
Appellant
v.
QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INC.;
CRANSTON/DOTTIN BIO-MEDICAL LABORATORIES INC.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of the Virgin Islands
(Civ. No. 3-06-cv-00097)
District Judge: Hon. Curtis V. Gomez
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
Tuesday, April 23, 2013
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 11, 2013)
OPINION
McKEE, Chief Judge.
James Knox appeals the District Court’s grants of summary judgment in favor of
Quest Diagnostics, and Cranston/Dottin Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. For the reasons
that follow, we will affirm.1
1
We exercise plenary review over grants of summary judgment and orders
denying a motion for remand. See Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co.,
316 F.3d 431, 443 (3d Cir. 2003); Werwinksi v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 665 (3d
As we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and
procedural history of this case, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
Knox’s central argument is that his complaint was based exclusively on state law
claims, and that it merely referenced provisions of the FCRA that do not provide a federal
cause of action. Thus, Knox contends that the District Court erred both in denying his
second motion for remand and in exercising jurisdiction over defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. We disagree.
A federal court has original jurisdiction over a cause that arises “under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Knox explicitly
asserted a federal claim in his complaint when he alleged that the “defendants violated
provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and [are] liable to plaintiff under 15 U.S.C.
1681o.” App. 17. See Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 430 (7th Cir. 2009).
In addition, section 1681o of the FCRA provides a private right of action. See Cushman
v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 1997). Thus, the District Court
properly denied Knox’s first motion for remand and correctly exercised jurisdiction over
the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.2
Cir. 2002). We assess the record using the same summary judgment standard used by
district courts. See Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).
2
Knox makes several additional arguments concerning judicial bias and attorney’s
fees that do not merit comment. See United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 574 (3d Cir.
1995); Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-Bohler, 624 F.2d 7, 9 (3d Cir.
1980) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54). Also, the District Court’s failure to rule on Knox’s first
2
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
motion to remand did not effectively dismiss his case, because the District Court granted
Knox’s motion to reopen the case three years after it was administratively closed.
3