United States v. Brown , 261 F. App'x 371 ( 2008 )

Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
1-24-2008
USA v. Brown
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 06-4031
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008
Recommended Citation
"USA v. Brown" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1709.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1709
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 06-4031
United States of America
v.
Akey Brown,
Appellant
___________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Crim. No. 05-cr-00890)
District Judge: The Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr.
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 30, 2007
Before: BARRY, FUENTES, Circuit Judges, and DIAMOND,* District Judge
(Opinion Filed January 24, 2008)
OPINION
*
The Honorable Paul S. Diamond, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
DIAMOND, District Judge.
Akey Brown appeals from his conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute and possession of a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon. 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Brown challenges the District Court’s denial
of his motion to suppress physical evidence and a statement he made to the police.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For the reasons that follow,
we affirm.
I. Standard of Review
We review the denial of a suppression motion for clear error as to the factual
findings, and exercise plenary review of the District Court’s application of law to those
facts. United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Veal,
453 F.3d 164, 166 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2006). Under the clear error standard, “[t]he district
court's conclusion will stand unless it ‘(1) is completely devoid of minimum evidentiary
support displaying some hue of credibility, or (2) bears no rational relationship to the
supportive evidentiary data.’” United States v. Antoon, 933 F.2d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 1991)
(quoting Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1302 (3d Cir. 1972)).
II. Background
The District Court found the following facts. On June 30, 2005, Police Detectives
Travis Maxwell and Louis Vega were patrolling in Trenton in an unmarked car. When
they saw Brown driving without wearing a seatbelt – a violation of New Jersey law – they
stopped Brown’s car. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:3-76.2f. Detective Maxwell approached the
2
driver’s side window, which was open, and asked Brown for his license and registration.
As Brown leaned over to retrieve these items, Detective Maxwell – an experienced
narcotics officer – smelled raw marijuana and saw a partially open backpack containing
marijuana in the car’s backseat. Detective Maxwell ordered Brown out of the vehicle.
The detective retrieved the partially open backpack, concluded that it did contain
marijuana, and told Detective Vega to arrest Brown. As he was being handcuffed, Brown
blurted out that there was a gun in the backpack. Detective Maxwell searched the
backpack’s main compartment, finding more marijuana, two scales, and a box of ziploc
bags. He then searched a smaller compartment of the backpack and found a loaded gun
with an obliterated serial number.
On December 15, 2005, a grand jury in the District of New Jersey returned an
indictment charging Brown with possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. On February
2, 2006, the same grand jury returned a superseding indictment, adding a charge of
possession with intent to distribute over 100 grams of marijuana.
Brown moved on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds to suppress the marijuana
and weapon, as well as his statement that there was a gun in the backpack. The District
Court held a suppression hearing on February 28, 2006 at which Detective Maxwell,
Detective Vega, and Brown testified. Crediting the testimony of the officers and
discrediting the testimony of Brown, the Court denied the suppression motion, concluding
that (1) marijuana odor in the car provided Detective Maxwell with probable cause for the
search; and (2) because Brown volunteered his statement, there was no Miranda violation.
3
III. Discussion
Brown argues that there was no probable cause supporting the search of his
backpack, and that the District Court should have suppressed the drugs and the gun as
fruits of the illegal backpack search. He further argues that his statement about the gun
was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment because it was not preceded by
Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
As an initial matter, we reject Brown’s argument that the District Court erred in its
factual findings. The version of the events accepted by the District Court – based on the
testimony of both officers – certainly has evidentiary support. See United States v.
Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 1074, 1078 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e will not review a district court’s
credibility determination.”). Accordingly, we will accept the District Court’s factual
findings.
A. Physical evidence
We have held that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. See United
States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2005). We have also held that law
enforcement officials may search an automobile without a warrant if there is probable
cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband. United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d
91, 100 (3d Cir. 2002). If probable cause exists, officers may search any part of the
vehicle – including containers – that might conceal contraband. United States v. Salmon,
944 F.2d 1106, 1123 (3d Cir. 1991).
4
Based upon the facts it found, the District Court properly concluded that there was
probable cause for the officers to search Brown’s vehicle and its contents. Detective
Maxwell smelled marijuana coming from the car. This alone was enough to establish
probable cause. United States v. Ramos, 443 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2006) (“It is well-
settled that the smell of marijuana alone, if articulable and particularized, may establish
not merely reasonable suspicion, but probable cause.”). The detective had an additional
reason to search the car, however: standing outside the vehicle, he saw a ziploc bag
containing marijuana in a backpack in the back seat of the car. See United States v.
Yamba, 506 F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[P]recedent has ‘come to reflect the rule that
if, while lawfully engaged in an activity in a particular place, police officers perceive a
suspicious object, they may seize it immediately.’”) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730, 739 (1983)). The sight and smell of marijuana certainly provided probable cause for
the detective to search Brown’s car and its contents. Brown contends that because the
New Jersey state courts have articulated a more stringent probable cause standard under
the New Jersey Constitution, Detective Maxwell’s search cannot pass muster in federal
court under the less stringent Fourth Amendment standard. To state this contention is to
refute it. In Rickus, we held that “evidence obtained in accordance with federal law is
admissible in federal court – even though it was obtained by state officers in violation of
state law.” United States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 363-64 (3d Cir. 1984).
In these circumstances, whatever the merits of Brown’s contention regarding the
New Jersey Constitution, under our well-settled interpretation of the Fourth Amendment,
5
the search of Brown’s car was proper. See Salmon, 944 F.2d at 1123.
B. Brown’s Statements
Miranda warnings are required only when a suspect is both in custody and subject
to interrogation. Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1246-47 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980)). Interrogation means “express questioning or
its functional equivalent . . . any words or actions on the part of police (other than those
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” United States v. Brownlee,
454 F.3d 131, 146 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01).
The Government concedes that Brown was in custody and had not received
Miranda warnings when he told the police about the gun in his backpack. The District
Court found, however, that the police never interrogated Brown, who volunteered his
statement without any prompting by police. Accordingly, the District Court correctly
concluded that there was no Fifth Amendment violation. In asking us to reverse, Brown
does little more than take issue with the District Court’s decision to credit Detectives
Maxwell and Vega and discredit Brown. The District Court saw and heard all three
witnesses; we will not disturb its credibility determinations. See United States v. Voigt,
89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996) (“It is not for us to . . . determine the credibility of the
witnesses.”) (quoting United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1989)). Thus,
Brown was not subject to interrogation, Miranda warnings were not required, and there
was no violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Alston, 34 F.3d at 1246-47.
6
In these circumstances, the District Court properly denied Brown’s motion to
suppress the statement.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
7