No Given Name Deny v. Attorney General ( 2008 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2008 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    1-9-2008
    Deny v. Atty Gen USA
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 06-3416
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008
    Recommended Citation
    "Deny v. Atty Gen USA" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1780.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1780
    This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 06-3416
    NO GIVEN NAME DENY;
    NO GIVEN NAME IRWANTO,
    Petitioners
    v.
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
    _____________
    On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Agency No. A96-253-558, 559
    Immigration Judge: Charles Honeyman
    ____________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    on January 8, 2008
    ____________
    Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN AND ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: January 9, 2008)
    OPINION
    ALDISERT, Circuit Judge
    No Given Name Deny and No Given Name Irwanto petition this Court for review
    of the Board of Immigration Appeal’s denial of their motion to reopen their removal
    proceedings. On January 11, 2006, the BIA adopted and affirmed the Immigration
    Judge’s denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under
    the Convention Against Torture. Petitioners did not file a petition for review of the BIA’s
    decision in this Court. On April 6, 2006, Petitioners filed a motion to reopen their
    immigration proceedings with the BIA, and the BIA denied the motion on June 15, 2006.
    We will deny the petition for review.
    We review the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. INS v.
    Doherty, 
    502 U.S. 314
    , 323 (1992). This Court disfavors motions to reopen immigration
    proceedings “because ‘as a general matter, every delay works to the advantage of the
    [removable] alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States.’” Lu v. Ashcroft,
    
    259 F.3d 127
    , 131 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 
    Doherty, 502 U.S. at 323
    ). The Supreme Court
    has noted that the granting of “such motions too freely will permit endless delays of
    [removal] by aliens creative and fertile enough to continuously produce new and material
    facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case” for relief. INS v. Abudu, 
    485 U.S. 94
    , 108
    (1988). Accordingly, the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen will be upheld unless it was
    arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law. Guo v. Ashcroft, 
    386 F.3d 556
    , 562 (3d Cir. 2004).
    In their motion to reopen, Petitioners state that various documents detailing the
    worsening situation for Chinese Christians in Indonesia were attached to it. The BIA,
    however, did not receive such documents and therefore did not abuse its discretion by not
    considering those documents. Petitioners also submitted this Court’s decision in
    Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 
    434 F.3d 627
    (3d Cir. 2006), as new evidence of a pattern of
    2
    persecution in Indonesia. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that
    Sukwanputra was not persuasive. In Sukwanputra, this Court specifically stated that it
    was “not hold[ing] that a pattern or practice of persecution in Indonesia in fact exists.” 
    Id. at 637
    n.10. Therefore the BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to view
    Sukwanputra as new evidence warranting the reopening of Petitioners’ immigration
    proceedings.
    We conclude that the BIA properly denied Petitioners’ motion to reopen because
    Petitioners have not met their heavy evidentiary burden. The BIA determined that the
    outcome of Petitioners’ removal proceedings would be the same if the proceedings were
    reopened and the proffered new evidence presented. See Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N.
    Dec. 464, 473 (BIA 1992) (“[T]he Board ordinarily will not consider a discretionary grant
    of a motion to remand unless the moving party meets a ‘heavy burden’ and presents
    evidence of such a nature that the Board is satisfied that if proceedings before the
    immigration judge were reopened, with all the attendant delays, the new evidence offered
    would likely change the result in the case.”).
    We have considered all of the contentions raised by the parties and conclude that
    no further discussion is necessary.
    Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review of the BIA’s decision not to
    reopen Petitioners’ immigration proceedings.
    3