In Re: Robinson ( 2006 )

Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
2-8-2006
In Re: Robinson
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-5421
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"In Re: Robinson " (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 1617.
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HPS-34 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-5421
________________
IN RE: RUSSELL ROBINSON,
Petitioner
____________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
District Court of the Virgin Islands
(Related to D.V.I. Crim. No. 04-cr-00005-2)
_____________________________________
Submitted Under Rule 21, Fed. R. App. Pro.
January 27, 2006
Before: CHIEF JUDGE SCIRICA, WEIS AND GARTH, CIRCUIT JUDGES
Filed: February 8, 2006
____________
PER CURIAM.
Following the Government’s successful pretrial appeal in United States v.
Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 184 (3d Cir. 2005), a jury convicted Russell Robinson. A
hearing on post-trial motions is set for February 13, 2006. Robinson asks that we issue a
writ of mandamus directing the District Court to also hold a hearing on his claims that
retained counsel performed ineffectively at trial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 694 (1984). We will deny the petition.
More than a dozen times since the jury’s verdict, Robinson—acting pro
se— has asked the District Court to hear his Strickland claims now. In a single order
entered on December 27, 2005, the District Court denied Robinson’s motions, explaining
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that they were premature. The District Court noted that it had not yet determined whether
a new trial might be warranted, and it stressed that Robinson would have ample
opportunity to allege ineffectiveness after sentencing. See District Court Order of
December 27, 1.
Mandamus is an appropriate remedy only in the most extraordinary of
situations. Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 1985). To justify such a remedy, a
petitioner must show that he has (i) no other adequate means of obtaining the desired
relief and (ii) a “clear and indisputable” right to issuance of the writ. See Haines v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Kerr v. United States Dist.
Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976)). Robinson has not demonstrated a “clear and
indisputable” right to mandamus relief.
As the District Court explained, Robinson’s request for a Strickland hearing
was premature. We have repeatedly expressed a strong preference that Strickland claims
be pursued “through a collateral proceeding in which the factual basis for the claim[s]
may be developed.” United States v. Haywood, 155 F.3d 674, 678 (3d Cir. 1998). There
exists a narrow exception to this preference, but it permits this court to review
ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal only when factual development of the claims is
unnecessary. See United States v. Headley, 923 F.3d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991). The
District Court’s reasoning for denying Robinson’s motions for a pre-sentencing
Strickland hearing is consistent with these precepts. Indeed, it is difficult to see how, as a
practical matter, Robinson could develop any factual basis for his ineffective claims while
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counsel continues to represent him in post-trial proceedings. See Robinson’s
“Informative Motion,” 5-6 (detailing several claims, including that counsel was
unprepared for trial). In any event, if necessary, Robinson will be able to pursue his
ineffectiveness claims in due course.1
For the reasons given, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.
1
We note, too, that the District Court’s refusal to schedule a post-trial hearing for a
particular purpose, or entertain certain post-trial claims, would be reviewable on direct
appeal. See In re Kensington Int’l, Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 219 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[i]f, in effect,
an appeal will lie, mandamus will not”).
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