Alpha Painting & Construction Co. v. Delaware River Port Authority , 853 F.3d 671 ( 2017 )


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  •                                        PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 16-3791
    _____________
    ALPHA PAINTING & CONSTRUCTION CO INC.
    v.
    DELAWARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY OF
    THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA AND
    THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Appellant
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (District Court No.: 1-16-cv-05141)
    District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman
    Argued February 9, 2017
    Before: MCKEE, RENDELL, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion Filed: April 6, 2017)
    John M. Elliott, Esq. [ARGUED]
    Bruce W. Kauffman, Esq.
    Thomas J. Elliott, Esq.
    Stewart J. Greenleaf, Jr., Esq.
    Elliot Greenleaf, P.C.
    925 Harvest Drive
    Suite 300
    Blue Bell, PA 19422
    Counsel for Appellant Delaware
    River Port Authority of the
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
    & the State of New Jersey
    Jennifer A. Hradil, Esq. [ARGUED]
    Kaitlyn E. Stone, Esq
    Peter J. Torcicollo, Esq.
    Kevin W. Weber, Esq.
    Gibbons P.C.
    One Gateway Center
    Newark, NJ 07102
    Counsel for Appellee Alpha
    Painting & Construction
    Company, Inc.
    ____________
    OPINION
    ____________
    RENDELL, Circuit Judge:
    2
    This case arises from a bitter bidding dispute for a
    contract to strip and repaint the Commodore Barry Bridge.
    The Delaware River Port Authority (“DRPA”) rejected the
    lowest bidder, Alpha Painting & Construction Company, Inc.
    (“Alpha”), because it determined that Alpha was not a
    “responsible” contractor. Instead, DRPA awarded the contract
    to Corcon, Inc. (“Corcon”). After its bid protest was denied,
    Alpha filed this lawsuit in District Court on an expedited
    basis seeking an injunction against DRPA. The District Court
    promptly held a four-day trial and concluded that DRPA
    acted arbitrarily and capriciously. It then entered an order
    directing DRPA to award the contract to Alpha. DRPA
    appeals.
    For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District
    Court’s ruling that DRPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
    However, because we conclude that the District Court abused
    its discretion by directing that the contract be awarded to
    Alpha, we will vacate that portion of the order and remand to
    the District Court for the entry of a more limited injunction.
    I. Background
    A. Factual Background
    DRPA is a bi-state corporate instrumentality that
    owns, operates, and maintains four bridges that span the
    Delaware River between New Jersey and Pennsylvania,
    including the Commodore Barry Bridge, a mile-long structure
    that supports five lanes of traffic. DRPA is governed by a
    Board of Commissioners and operated on a day-to-day basis
    by its staff of engineers, contracting administrators, legal
    counsel, and administrative support professionals. Recently,
    3
    DRPA’s staff determined that the Commodore Barry Bridge’s
    lead-based paint coating is deteriorating. DRPA decided to
    repaint the entire bridge, a substantial capital construction
    project that requires hiring a contractor capable of using
    highly specialized abrasive blast cleaning equipment to strip
    and contain the lead paint (hereinafter the “Bridge Project”).
    This equipment is necessary to protect workers, the public,
    and the environment from hazardous lead contaminants.
    DRPA divided the Bridge Project into three phases.
    Phase 1, now near completion, involved stripping and
    repainting the New Jersey approach spans. Corcon is
    performing that work. Phase 2, which DRPA is now
    soliciting, will involve repainting the Pennsylvania approach
    spans. Phase 3, which has not yet begun, will involve
    repainting the center span portion. The Phase 2 contract is the
    subject of the instant dispute (identified herein as “Contract
    No. CB-31-2016” or the Phase 2 contract).
    In early May, 2016, DRPA began soliciting bids for
    the Phase 2 contract. On June 16, 2016, the due date for
    submissions, DRPA received seven bids, including Alpha’s
    and Corcon’s. That same afternoon, DRPA assembled the
    bidders for Phase 2 in its conference room to open the bids
    publicly. Among those present were Adam Jacurak, DRPA’s
    senior engineer in charge of the Phase 2 project, Amy Ash,
    DRPA’s Director of Contract Administration, as well as the
    bidders. Ash opened the bid packages and declared Alpha the
    “apparent low bidder” because it bid the lowest price,
    $17,886,000. Corcon bid $17,896,200 (the second lowest
    price, $10,200 more than Alpha).
    4
    Both Alpha and Corcon have significant experience
    painting bridges. Alpha, a Maryland-based industrial painting
    contractor, has painted numerous bridges across the country
    and is prequalified to bid for such work in 40 states. Alpha
    has previously worked for DRPA, painting the Pennsylvania
    approach span of another one of its bridges between 2007 and
    2009. Alpha also worked on a non-DRPA project at
    Philadelphia’s 30th Street Station in 2014 as part of a joint
    venture with another contractor. Alpha has not performed any
    other work in Pennslyvania or New Jersey over the last five
    years.
    Corcon, a national bridge painting contractor, has also
    worked for DRPA. Currently, it is painting Phase 1 of the
    Bridge Project and there is evidence that it has recently
    painted other DRPA bridges as well. Moreover, DRPA is
    collaborating with Corcon on an extracurricular film project
    concerning Corcon’s work on the Commodore Barry and
    other DRPA bridges. 1
    After DRPA determined that Alpha and Corcon were
    the lowest and second lowest bidders, respectively, it
    undertook a review of the bids. Over the next two months,
    after a process largely characterized by inaction and delay,
    DRPA ultimately rejected Alpha’s bid and selected Corcon’s.
    1
    At trial, no one from Corcon testified. DRPA’s chief
    engineer, Michael Venuto, acknowledged the film project
    during a line of questioning by Alpha’s counsel ostensibly
    aimed at suggesting possible motives for DRPA to favor
    Corcon over Alpha. While Venuto admitted that this film
    required access to the bridge, Venuto did not think DRPA had
    any financial stake in the project.
    5
    Two determinations form the heart of Alpha’s challenge.
    First, DRPA declared that Alpha was “not [a] responsible”
    contractor under its guidelines because Alpha failed to remit
    certain accident experience forms (called OSHA 300 forms)
    and insurance data (in the form of Experience Modification
    Factors, or EMFs) in its bid package. A.1037. As discussed
    infra, DRPA uses this data to assess a bidder’s job-site
    “safety culture.” A.1756. Second, DRPA declared that
    Corcon was in fact the lowest bidder because of a
    “miscalculation” that DRPA perceived in Corcon’s bid.
    A.3821. DRPA’s conduct leading to these determinations (all
    of which occurred sometime between June 16 and August 9,
    2016) was the subject of Alpha’s challenge before the District
    Court.
    We too will focus on this time period. At trial, DRPA
    presented documentary evidence including its guidelines,
    emails to and from certain employees, and emails between
    DRPA and certain bidders, as well as the testimony of four of
    its employees. We think it most helpful to proceed by first
    briefly reviewing applicable portions of DRPA’s bidding
    guidelines. Next, we will discuss how DRPA analyzes OSHA
    300 forms and EMFs. Finally, we will recount the specific
    aspects of DRPA’s two determinations that are challenged by
    Alpha.
    1. DRPA’s Bidding Guidelines
    DRPA’s bidding guidelines are internal regulations
    adopted by DRPA that govern its procurement of services for
    6
    work on its bridges. 2 When DRPA seeks construction and
    maintenance services, in particular, it uses the Competitive
    Sealed Bid procurement method. Under that method, DRPA
    must issue an Invitation for Bids (“IFB”) detailing the project,
    collect and publically open sealed bids at a set time and place,
    and declare an apparent low bidder. Then, after a subsequent
    investigation, the guidelines require that DRPA award the
    contract to the “lowest responsible and responsive [b]idder”
    unless all bids are rejected or the lowest bidder is allowed to
    withdraw its bid. A.110 (emphasis added).
    The guidelines thus set up a process whereby DRPA
    must perform two distinct review inquiries. First, DRPA must
    determine, within ten days of submission, whether a bid is
    responsive. See A.495 (“Responsiveness of a bid is
    determined within ten (10) business days from the bid itself . .
    . .”). A responsive bid is one that “conforms in all material
    respects to the requirements and criteria in the invitation for
    bids.” A.489. DRPA may, however, “waive technical defects
    or immaterial items” that would otherwise make a bid
    nonresponsive so long as the waiver does not undermine the
    competitive character of the bidding process. A.495.
    Second, DRPA must separately determine whether the
    lowest bidder is responsible. A “responsible bidder . . .
    possess[es] the capability to fully perform the contract
    requirements in all respects and the integrity and reliability to
    assure good faith performance.” A.524 (internal quotation
    2
    By “bidding guidelines,” we refer to the set of
    documents DRPA submitted to the District Court which
    govern its procurement process, particularly the Invitation for
    Bids, the Procurement Manual, and Engineers Manual.
    7
    marks omitted). Unlike responsiveness, this requirement
    “goes to the capacity of the bidder . . . rather than its
    willingness to perform on [DRPA’s] terms.” Id. “[C]apacity
    to perform involves not only its ability to meet quality,
    quantity and time requirements, but its business integrity to
    assure honest, good faith performance.” Id. DRPA “may not
    presume that all bidders . . . are responsible,” but instead has
    an “affirmative duty” to make this determination with respect
    to the lowest bidder and to document its reasons for doing so
    in the contract file. Id.
    If DRPA determines that the lowest bidder is
    responsible, DRPA must accept that bidder. DRPA may reject
    a bidder as “not responsible” and select a higher bidder, but
    only if its “investigation discloses a substantial reason” for
    doing so. Id. (emphasis added). The guidelines are clear that
    “[DRPA] should not base a determination of
    nonresponsibility on a single bad item or report unless the
    behavior or financial condition . . . is of a sufficiently serious
    nature as to call into question the ability or integrity of the
    bidder . . . to perform the contract.” A.526 (emphasis added).
    The guidelines go on, in a lengthy chapter dedicated
    entirely to the responsibility inquiry, to describe the rigorous,
    wide-ranging investigation that DRPA should undertake to
    fulfill this duty. The guidelines state that DRPA “is not
    limited in its investigation to reviewing information provided
    by the bidder[] with its bid[]” and “should take any steps it
    determines are necessary to ensure that a bidder . . . is
    responsible.” A.526. Such steps include “request[ing] a
    bidder . . . to supply financial, educational, and experience
    information as well as references” or “requesting further
    clarification from the bidder[] as appropriate” during its
    8
    review. A.526. DRPA may also perform news and internet
    searches or public record database searches, and may review
    corporate filings, published consumer ratings, and
    certifications, just to mention a few.
    2. DRPA’s Review of OSHA 300 Forms and EMF Factors
    According to DRPA, an important part of its
    responsibility investigation involves determining whether the
    bidder has a history of performing safely on the job. To
    facilitate this review, the IFB (§ A.10.3) states that all bidders
    “will supply with its [b]id, accident experience in the form of
    the standard OSHA 300 Report and its Experience
    Modification Factors [(“EMFs”)] for all work completed in
    the State of New Jersey and the Commonwealth of
    Pennsylvania, covering the preceding three (3) reporting
    years.” A.84. DRPA then uses these EMFs and OSHA 300
    forms to assess the “safety culture” of the bidder. A.1756.
    OSHA 300 forms are completed by the contractor
    annually and provide a summary of the total number of
    company employees, total hours worked by those employees,
    the number of injuries reported, and a brief description of
    each injury.
    EMFs are a creature of the insurance industry. They
    are numerical multipliers generated yearly by state-designated
    ratings bureaus, and they are assigned to every company that
    performs work within a particular state. The EMF calculation
    that produces this multiplier takes into account the frequency
    and severity of workers’ compensation claims filed against
    9
    the company in that state. It does not account for workplace
    injuries to non-employees or injuries that do not result in a
    workers’ compensation claim. Insurance firms then use a
    company’s EMF to adjust the amount of workers’
    compensation insurance premium it has to pay for that year.
    For example, a company assigned a 1.00 EMF pays the
    standard market rate for insurance. A company assigned an
    EMF of less than 1.00 will get a “credit” on its premium and
    will pay less than the standard market rate for its insurance,
    while a company assigned an EMF greater than 1.00 will pay
    more.
    Some states assign new contractors (or contractors
    who have never performed work in that state) an EMF of
    1.00. But other states, like Pennsylvania, report that a new
    contractor “does not qualify” for an EMF (because it does not
    meet Pennsylvania’s payroll threshold to qualify). From an
    insurance premium perspective, however, a company that
    “does not qualify” is indistinguishable from a firm assigned a
    1.00 EMF because both would pay the standard market rate of
    insurance. 3
    How DRPA actually goes about employing this
    information to assess “safety culture” was the subject of much
    discussion at trial. As best we can tell, once DRPA receives
    bids for a given project, the senior engineer separates the bid
    3
    DRPA’s Director of Risk Management and Safety,
    Marianne Staszewski did not disagree. She only noted that
    from a “safety” review perspective, “does not qualify” means
    that there “is no measurement of [a firm’s] safety
    performance” and its record in this regard would therefore be
    “inconclusive.” A1782.
    10
    into its constituent parts and sends the OSHA 300 forms and
    EMFs to DRPA’s Department of Risk Management and
    Safety. Marianne Staszewski, the Department’s director (and
    the Department’s only employee), then “[performs] a risk
    management review” of the OSHA 300s and EMFs, A.1709,
    which essentially amounts to determining whether the bidder
    has a positive “safety culture,” A.1756.
    DRPA’s review, however, seems more perfunctory
    than analytic. In order to determine the “safety culture” of the
    bidder, Staszewski averages the three EMFs supplied with the
    bid. 4 A.1756. If the average is 1.25 or greater, she concludes,
    in her words, that the “contractor has had significant
    frequency or severity of losses within the last three years . . .
    which translates into not working safely on the job.” A.1747.
    If the EMF average is less than 1.25, she approves the bidder
    because she is satisfied that it is “not suffering frequency and
    severity of losses.” Id. During this process, Staszewski also
    considers the quantitative aspects of a bidder’s OSHA 300s—
    the number of employees, hours worked, injuries reported—
    to contextualize its EMF score, although it was not clear from
    her testimony how this impacts her final analysis. 5 She does
    4
    Staszewski testified that she considers EMFs only
    from the three most recent completed calendar years because
    the current, unfinished year provides a “green” number that
    indicates only a partial picture of safety for that year. A.1713.
    So for the Phase 2 contract, DRPA considered 2015, 2014,
    and 2013 EMFs.
    5
    Compare A.1757 (“[T]he EMF factor is a statistical
    result of this OSHA 300 form, so you cannot take that out of
    the equation.”), with A.1759 (“The consequence of my
    analysis is, if the prior three years averaged 1.25 or less, then
    they are approved.”).
    11
    not consider the portion of the OSHA 300 form that describes
    the reported injuries. 6
    We now turn to the two disputed portions of DRPA’s
    review in this case.
    3. DRPA’s Evaluation of Alpha’s and Corcon’s OSHA 300
    and EMFs
    With respect to Alpha’s bid: on June 16, 2016, the day
    of the bid opening, DRPA’s staff undertook a quick
    responsiveness review to determine compliance with §
    A.10.3. Jacurak and Ash testified that they flipped through
    Alpha’s bid and noticed that it did not include OSHA 300
    forms. DRPA, however, did not declare Alpha’s bid “not
    responsive” to the IFB. Instead, Jacurak and Ash notified
    DRPA’s general counsel to get guidance. Very little emerged
    about these discussions at trial, but apparently, counsel
    instructed the staff to circulate both Alpha’s and Corcon’s
    bids, rather than just Alpha’s, to DRPA’s various departments
    for a responsibility determination.
    Three weeks later, on July 7, 2016, Jacurak emailed
    Staszewski with Alpha’s EMF letter attached. 7 Alpha had
    6
    In fact, Staszewski admitted that some rather
    egregious safety violations would not affect her analysis in
    any way. Alpha’s counsel posed a hypothetical wherein a
    contractor drops an I-beam on a train passing on the bridge
    below, killing all aboard. Staszewski stated that so long as
    none of the persons on the train were employees, this fact
    would not be considered in DRPA’s safety analysis.
    7
    The documents presented at trial indicated that
    Jacurak also sent Staszewski a Department of Labor website
    12
    submitted a letter from its insurance broker which stated that
    “[Alpha] did not qualify for experience [EMF] rating[s] in
    2016, 2015, 2014 and 2013” in either Pennsylvania or New
    Jersey. A.1021. It is undisputed that Alpha had not performed
    work in Pennsylvania or New Jersey as an individual entity in
    the last five years, although it had done work in Pennsylvania
    as part of a joint venture in 2013 and 2014 (which resulted in
    the joint venture being assigned an EMF of .933 and .837,
    respectively). 8 Staszewski determined that she could not
    effectively review Alpha’s safety record under her EMF
    policy because “[Alpha] did no work in the State of
    Pennsylvania, . . . did no work in the State of New Jersey,
    [and thus] ha[d] no work experience” over these three years,
    A.1760, from which she could “conclusively” determine its
    safety culture, A.1786.
    After roughly three more weeks of silence, on July 28,
    2016, Ash prepared and sent Alpha a letter rejecting its bid
    (the “July 28 Rejection Letter”). The letter first cited the
    requirement that the bidder supply OSHA 300 forms and
    EMFs. Then it stated that Alpha’s “failure to provide the
    OSHA Form 300 and its inability to provide experience
    modification factors back through 2013 prevent[ed DRPA]
    printout containing information about Alpha’s experience.
    Jacurak claimed that this printout was submitted with Alpha’s
    bid in lieu of its OSHA 300 forms. The record is unclear
    what, if any, impact this had on DRPA’s analysis.
    8
    These 2013 and 2014 EMFs were not reported in the
    broker letter. Alpha’s insurance broker later mailed DRPA a
    second letter containing these EMFs and reporting that it had
    incorrectly stated Alpha had not performed any work in
    Pennsylvania.
    13
    from substantially evaluating Alpha’s safety record.” A.1037.
    As a result, DRPA declared that it found “Alpha ‘not
    responsible’ for the subject Project, and therefore, [that]
    Alpha’s bid [was] rejected.” Id.
    At trial, the parties vigorously disputed whether Alpha
    actually submitted its OSHA 300 forms, an inquiry which
    consumed much of the District Court’s time. Tom Kousis,
    Alpha’s project manager in charge of its Phase 2 bid, testified
    at length that he remembered submitting the forms. He
    pointed to a box on the bid form that he checked
    contemporaneously to his binding the bid package together.
    Jacurak and Ash maintained that none were submitted.
    Because no copies of Alpha’s paper bid were made and all
    submissions were unbound during the subsequent bid review
    phase, it was impossible to determine from the documentary
    evidence whether Alpha had submitted these records.
    The remainder of the testimony at trial focused on
    DRPA’s determination that Alpha was “not responsible.”
    Alpha’s counsel tried to pinpoint exactly who made this
    guidelines determination. But no one seemed to know.
    Staszewski testified that she had no idea who made that
    determination in this case, and had only the faintest clue who
    does so in the ordinary course. Her “understanding” was that
    Amy Ash would make that call. A.1794. Ash, however,
    declined having anything to do with the responsibility
    determination. She testified that Jacurak told her “the director
    of risk management [i.e., Staszewski] found Alpha to be
    nonresponsible.” A.1618. Jacurak reported “that is either – I
    have to say it’s between legal and contracts administration.”
    A.1532. DRPA’s general counsel did not testify, nor is it clear
    14
    what business input, if any, he or she had in these
    determinations.
    Alpha’s counsel also questioned whether Staszewski,
    who the District Court described as “visibly flummoxed” at
    trial, 9 had identified anything in Alpha’s submission or
    otherwise that suggested it was not a safe contractor. She
    maintained that Alpha’s record, without EMFs, was
    inconclusive and therefore could not be approved. When
    asked about Alpha’s out-of-state record painting bridges, she
    claimed that it was “not pertinent” to her analysis for DRPA’s
    New Jersey and Pennsylvania bridges, although she conceded
    that it might be relevant to assessing Alpha’s “safety.”
    A.1782. She insisted that it was “not feasible” to even ask
    Alpha about its out-of-state record, A.1783, intimating only
    that her superior told her once not to contact bidders during
    her review. She also admitted to knowing that Alpha had
    previously performed work in Pennsylvania in 2014 as part of
    a joint venture.
    Alpha’s counsel also asked Staszewski whether, as a
    consequence of her EMF analysis, DRPA would only
    “approve” contractors that had previously performed work in
    New Jersey or Pennsylvania in the last three years. She said
    no. In fact, Staszewski admitted that it was “possible” that a
    new contractor that had never been assigned an EMF in
    Pennsylvania or New Jersey and had done no work there
    could be approved under her EMF policy, although she could
    9
    Alpha Painting & Constr. Co., Inc. v. Delaware
    River Port Auth., No. 116-CV-05141 (NLH)(AMD), 
    2016 WL 5339576
    , at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2016).
    15
    not list, when asked, what other factors she might consider in
    so finding.
    Staszewski disclosed that she did contact Alpha’s
    insurance broker to confirm that Alpha had not performed any
    work in Pennsylvania or New Jersey. She did not contact
    Alpha directly. No one at DRPA did. To the contrary, because
    he had not heard from DRPA since being declared the lowest
    bidder, Kousis repeatedly called and emailed DRPA staff to
    inquire whether DRPA had sufficient information to complete
    its review. Most calls and emails were ignored. Kousis
    reached Jacurak once by phone sometime in July, but Jacurak
    did not mention that Alpha failed to submit its OSHA 300s.
    Not much else exists in the record regarding DRPA’s
    review of Alpha. Other portions of the bid were sent to other
    DRPA departments, but the status of their review is not
    known. DRPA’s chief engineer, Michael Venuto testified that
    because Staszewski withheld her approval, he never contacted
    Alpha’s references from other jobs, performed due diligence
    with respect to noise control, assessed compliance with Coast
    Guard requirements, or investigated Alpha’s ability to
    provide under-deck staging.
    With respect to Corcon, its bid was missing the
    requisite 2013 EMF—its broker letter provided usable EMFs
    for 2014 and 2014 only. Upon noticing its absence,
    Staszewski called Corcon’s broker, who provided an updated
    insurance letter containing the missing 2013 EMF.
    Staszewski then concluded, after averaging Corcon’s EMFs,
    that it “embrace[d] a safety culture.” A.1756. She then
    approved its bid from a safety review perspective. It is not
    16
    clear from the record, what, if any, other responsibility
    investigation DRPA undertook with respect to Corcon.
    4. DRPA’s Modification of Corcon’s Bid on August 9,
    2016
    Alpha also challenged DRPA’s subsequent
    modification of Corcon’s bid, which had the effect of making
    Corcon the lowest bidder. The IFB required bidders to
    propose a price for “Mobilization and Clean-up” costs, which,
    according to the IFB, was not to exceed 7.5% of the total bid
    price. A.361 (“Section Q”). Corcon’s bid exceeded this 7.5%
    limitation. Jacurak testified that he noticed this on June 17,
    2016, when he performed an initial review of the price
    schedules. However, he did not declare Corcon nonresponsive
    to the IFB.
    Instead, on August 9, 2016, nearly two months after
    discovering the discrepancy (and about two weeks after
    Alpha filed its bid protest), DRPA sent letters to all bidders
    stating that DRPA had “discovered” that three bidders (one of
    whom was Corcon) “may have incorrectly computed the
    Mobilization and Clean-up line item.” A.3820. It then cited
    IFB § A.7.5, which states in full:
    The Bidder shall state in the Form of Proposal
    the price per unit of measure or lump sum price,
    in words and in figures, for each scheduled item
    of Work, and the Total Price for the
    performance of the Work, as determined by
    17
    multiplying each estimated quantity by the price
    per unit of measure bid therefore and adding
    together the resulting amounts and any lump
    sum prices required. For the purposes of
    comparison of Bids received, the Total Price,
    correctly computed, stated in the Proposal will
    be considered to be the amount Bid for the
    Work and the award will be made on that Total
    Price.
    A.81 (italic and bold emphasis added). Relying on the
    italicized portion, and in particular the bolded phrase,
    “correctly computed,” DRPA asked each firm that bid more
    than 7.5% of its total bid price to “confirm” that the
    Mobilization costs quote “was, in fact, a miscalculation.”
    A.3821. DRPA then declared Corcon the lowest responsible
    bidder. Finally, after approving Corcon’s bid, DRPA’s staff
    recommended Corcon to the Board of Commissioner’s
    Operations and Maintenance Committee.
    B. Proceedings before DRPA’s Board of Commissioners
    Alpha protested the July 28 Rejection Letter on July
    29, 2016 in a letter to DRPA, noting in particular that if
    DRPA’s decision was based on responsiveness, it should have
    been made earlier and that DRPA “could have easily asked
    for the documents.” A.421. DRPA’s General Counsel denied
    a hearing and rejected the protest, although he permitted
    DRPA to file a written appeal to DRPA’s Board of
    Commissioners.
    The Operations and Maintenance Committee took up
    Alpha’s appeal and the recommendation to accept Corcon’s
    18
    bid at a special meeting dedicated solely to these matters on
    August 10, 2016. Alpha did not attend this meeting. The
    meeting began at 10:40 am and the Committee immediately
    moved into executive session. No transcript or minutes were
    taken. The Committee then went back on the record at 10:51
    am, approved DRPA’s recommendation to award the Phase 2
    contract to Corcon without discussion, and adjourned at 10:54
    am, three minutes later.
    DRPA’s full Board considered the Committee’s
    resolution to accept Corcon’s bid on August 17, 2016, at its
    regularly scheduled meeting. At the meeting, Alpha’s counsel
    gave a lengthy and detailed statement outlining its protest.
    The Board then moved into executive session for 20 minutes,
    although, again, no minutes were taken. When it emerged, it
    resolved to accept Corcon’s bid without acknowledging
    Alpha or hearing any public discussion of the Committee’s
    resolution. It then directed DRPA’s staff to enter negotiations
    with Corcon.
    C. Alpha’s Federal Lawsuit
    On August 23, 2016, Alpha filed suit in the District
    Court for the District of New Jersey on an expedited basis
    claiming that DRPA’s award violated its guidelines and thus
    was arbitrary and capricious under New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
    and federal common law. 10 The complaint requested
    10
    Alpha also claimed that DRPA’s conduct violated its
    due process rights, the New Jersey Open Public Meetings
    Act, 
    N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:4-6
    , and the Pennsylvania Sunshine
    Act, 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. 701.
    19
    injunctive relief including an order directing DRPA to award
    the contract to Alpha.
    The District Court held a four-day bench trial. In a
    lengthy opinion, the District Court separately considered and
    rejected both of DRPA’s stated reasons—lack of OSHA 300
    forms and lack of EMFs—although it focused on DRPA’s
    EMF policy. 11 Alpha Painting & Constr. Co., Inc. v.
    Delaware River Port Auth., No. 116-CV-05141
    (NLH)(AMD), 
    2016 WL 5339576
    , at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 23,
    2016). It found DRPA’s reliance on EMFs troubling. Because
    EMFs only accounted for workers’ compensation injuries, it
    deemed them an underinclusive proxy for a bidder’s safety
    record. It also found, based on the testimony of Alpha’s
    insurance broker, that Alpha’s failure to qualify for EMFs
    was not indicative of a poor safety record. Alpha’s record was
    no different, in the District Court’s view, from the
    hypothetical new contractor, who Staszewski said could be
    approved under her test. Thus, it ultimately concluded that
    “[n]othing in the record before [DRPA] prior to its final
    decision to characterize Alpha as non-responsible justified
    11
    As noted, the parties disputed whether Alpha
    submitted the OSHA 300 forms. The District Court, however,
    declined to find one way or the other, characterizing the
    evidence as being in “equipoise” on that issue. Alpha
    Painting, 
    2016 WL 5339576
    , at *3. Nevertheless, the District
    Court found that the “OSHA 300 forms played no meaningful
    role . . . in DRPA’s risk management and safety review.” Id.
    at 5. Because we ultimately conclude that Staszewski failed to
    point to any evidence going to Alpha’s inability to do the
    bridge work safely, OSHA forms included, we do not focus
    on this reason separately in our analysis.
    20
    that conclusion and nothing before [the District] Court
    support[ed] it either.” Id. at *8.
    The District Court also rejected DRPA’s claim that the
    agency had authority to modify Corcon’s Mobilization and
    Clean-up cost quote. It concluded that DRPA did not have
    authority to make that change under IFB § A.7.5 and that
    DRPA’s delay in exercising this alleged authority, despite
    being aware of the defect on June 17, 2016, suggested that the
    modification was a pretext to ensure that Corcon was awarded
    the contract. 12
    With respect to the remedy, the District Court found
    that irreparable harm would result if DRPA were not enjoined
    from proceeding on the contract with Corcon and reasoned
    that “there is no need to start the bidding process over, as
    such a remedy would be adverse to the public good, and
    12
    The District Court also found that DRPA’s review
    process was “[o]paque and [u]nreviewable.” Alpha Painting,
    
    2016 WL 5339576
    , at *11. It was troubled by DRPA’s
    counsel’s “intimate[] involve[ment in] the bid review
    process,” which resulted in DRPA claiming attorney client
    privilege “at every turn when . . . DRPA’s employees were
    questioned about any decision-making.” Id. at *12. This, in
    the District Court’s view, effectively prevented review of
    DRPA’s decision.
    The District Court declined to rule on Alpha’s due
    process, Open Public Meetings Act, or Sunshine Act claims.
    Id. at *15 n.34. Instead, it noted DRPA’s lack of transparency
    “buttressed” its finding that DRPA acted arbitrarily and
    capriciously. Id. at *15 n.33.
    21
    unfair to Alpha.” Id. at *15. To the contrary, it found Alpha
    was “fully capable and qualified to perform the work required
    under the contract, and [was] ready to mobilize immediately.”
    Id. As support, it cited that Alpha’s OSHA 300 forms showed
    Alpha had only one workers’ compensation injury reported
    nationally over the last three years, while Corcon had seven
    on the Phase 1 project alone; that Alpha had been issued QP1
    and QP2 certifications from the Society for Protective
    Coatings “which confirm[ed] that Alpha is capable of
    removing industrial hazardous paint,” id. at *8 n.21; and that
    Alpha has significant experience painting bridges. The
    District Court then entered an order “permanently enjoin[ing
    DRPA] from awarding Contract No. CB-31-2016 (Phase II)
    to any entity other than [Alpha], and [DRPA] shall award
    Contract CB-31-2016 (Phase II) to [Alpha].” A.13.
    This expedited appeal followed.
    II. Analysis 13
    After a bench trial, as here, we review the District
    Court’s factual findings, and mixed questions of law and fact,
    for clear error, and we review the Court’s legal conclusions
    de novo. VICI Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 
    763 F.3d 273
    , 282-83 (3d Cir. 2014) (“On appeal from a bench trial,
    our court reviews a district court’s findings of fact for clear
    error and its conclusions of law de novo. For mixed questions
    of law and fact we apply the clearly erroneous standard
    except that the District Court’s choice and interpretation of
    13
    The District Court had jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    . We have appellate jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    22
    legal precepts remain subject to plenary review.” (internal
    quotations and citations omitted)); see also Free Speech
    Coal., Inc. v. Attn’y Gen., 
    825 F.3d 149
    , 159 (3d Cir. 2016);
    In re Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., 
    718 F.3d 184
    , 196 (3d Cir.
    2013); Country Floors, Inc. v. P’ship Composed of Gepner &
    Ford, 
    930 F.2d 1056
    , 1062 (3d Cir. 1991). We review an
    order granting injunctive relief under an abuse of discretion
    standard. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med.
    Ctr., 
    838 F.3d 327
    , 335 (3d Cir. 2016).
    DRPA raises numerous challenges to the District
    Court’s order, but we consider only three material to
    resolving its appeal. 14 DRPA claims (A) that the District
    Court abused its discretion by declaring that DRPA arbitrarily
    and capriciously rejected Alpha and selected Corcon; (B) that
    it was reversible error to fail to join Corcon, who DRPA
    claims was a necessary party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19; and
    (C) that the District Court erred when it directed DRPA to
    14
    Because the District Court declined to rule on
    Alpha’s due process claim and other state law claims under
    the Open Meetings Act and Sunshine Act, we find it
    unnecessary to consider DRPA’s arguments regarding these
    issues. DRPA also argues that the District Court’s lengthy
    discussion about DRPA’s repeated invocation of attorney-
    client privilege during trial amounted to an adverse inference
    that influenced its ultimate arbitrary and capricious ruling.
    See supra, note 12. We do not read the opinion this way. The
    District Court noted only that DRPA’s use of privilege
    prevented the District Court from effectively reviewing
    DRPA’s conduct. Regardless of whether DRPA claimed
    privilege, DRPA still had the burden to provide a rational
    basis for its action. As we conclude below, it failed to do so.
    23
    award the Phase 2 contract to Alpha. We consider each
    below.
    A. DRPA’s Rejection of Alpha and Selection of Corcon
    With respect to the first issue, DRPA maintains that it
    was not arbitrary and capricious (1) to label Alpha “not
    responsible” or (2) to modify Corcon’s Mobilization line
    item. Both determinations had the effect of making Corcon
    the lowest, responsible bidder.
    A District Court’s review of an agency’s procurement
    decision “is extremely limited in scope.” Princeton
    Combustion Research Labs., Inc. v. McCarthy, 
    674 F.2d 1016
    , 1021 (3d Cir. 1982). Because such decisions implicate
    an agency’s expertise, we must be careful not to “substitute
    [our] judgment for the agency’s.” 
    Id.
     At the same time, we
    may not shirk our judicial duty to ensure that a government
    agency has complied with applicable bidding rules and
    regulations, which exist in part for the public’s benefit by
    ensuring that the agency obtains the most advantagous
    contract available. Thus, a district court may not overturn a
    procurement decision “unless the aggrieved bidder
    demonstrates that there was no rational basis for the agency’s
    decision.” Sea–Land Servs., Inc. v. Brown, 
    600 F.2d 429
    , 434
    (3d Cir. 1979); see also R.A. Glancy & Sons, Inc. v. U.S.
    Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 
    180 F.3d 553
    , 557 (3d Cir. 1999);
    Coco Bros. Inc. v. Pierce, 
    741 F.2d 675
    , 679 (3d Cir. 1984)
    (recoginzing that discretion to award injunctive relief in
    24
    procurement cases “is restricted to circumstances where the
    governmental agency’s action is illegal or irrational”).
    However, if the agency provides a rational basis for its
    action, our inquiry comes to an end. See Princeton
    Combustion, 
    674 F.2d at 1022
     (holding that, as a matter of
    law, where the procurement decision was rational, a
    reviewing court may not award injunctive relief despite the
    presence of procurdural irregularities in the procurement
    process). 15
    15
    The parties rely on our previous bidding dispute
    cases without addressing a crucial distinction present here:
    nearly all of those cases involve challenges to contract awards
    by federal agencies brought under the Administrative
    Procedures Act. DRPA, however, is a bi-state corporate
    instrumentality created under the Compact Clause of the U.S.
    Constitution. See Allied Painting, Inc. v. Del. River Port
    Auth., No. CIV.A. 04-1032 (MAM), 
    2005 WL 724107
    , at *1
    (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2005) (recognizing that it is an open
    question whether DRPA is a federal agency governed by the
    APA or a state agency governed by state administrative law).
    For purposes of review in this diversity case, we do not think
    this distinction is material. Compare 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (permitting federal courts to set aside agency action under the
    APA that is “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of
    discretion”), with Textar Painting Corp. v. Del. River Port
    Auth., 
    600 A.2d 795
    , 799-800 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div.
    1996) (noting, in bid dispute case, that “the actions of . . .
    DRPA are reviewable by [the] court,” and applying “arbitrary
    and unreasonable” standard).
    25
    Accordingly, we turn now to DRPA’s arguments that it
    had a rational basis under its guidelines for its actions.
    1. Alpha’s Failure to Submit OSHA 300 Forms and EMFs
    DRPA argues that it has a rational basis for labeling
    Alpha not responsible. We cannot see how. DRPA essentially
    faults the responsiveness of Alpha’s bid package and relies
    exclusively on Alpha’s failure to provide OSHA forms and
    EMFs. But DRPA did not label Alpha non-responsive.
    Instead, it rejected Alpha as “not responsible.” We have
    closely scrutinized the record and have been unable to find
    any justification casting doubt on Alpha’s “capability” or
    “capacity” to perform abrasive lead paint stripping and
    repainting. 16 Moreover, we do not think DRPA’s guidelines
    16
    Most of DRPA’s arguments on appeal, in an
    apparent effort to distract us from this glaring deficiency in
    proof, are directed at the District Court’s finding that DRPA’s
    EMF policy was an underinclusive safety metric. DRPA
    argues that the District Court impermissibly substituted its
    personal judgment and opinion on this safety issue in
    violation of our standard. We think, however, that DRPA’s
    arguments miss the mark. The real issue is whether DRPA
    had any evidence—as a result of its EMF policy or
    otherwise—to support its determination that Alpha was “not
    responsible,” i.e., not capable. For the reasons herein, we
    think it did not.
    26
    allowed it to reject a bidder as not responsible based on this
    type of justification. 17
    We begin with Marianne Staszewski, as her testimony
    was a focus of the parties’ briefing and DRPA’s contentions
    at oral argument. She did not identify any facts that could
    support DRPA’s responsibility finding. Staszewski simply did
    not approve Alpha because it had not supplied the bid safety
    information she was accustomed to receiving. That
    conclusion ultimately—and for reasons unknown—
    manifested as DRPA’s affirmative finding that Alpha was
    “not responsible” in the July 28 Rejection Letter. DRPA
    maintains this was rational. However, we fail to see how
    Alpha’s failure to “qualify” for EMFs permitted DRPA to
    conclude that Alpha was “not responsible.” At least in terms
    of insurance risk, Alpha’s EMF history made it no different
    from a new contractor who had never performed work in
    Pennsylvania or New Jersey—both would pay the same
    standard market rate of insurance. 18 Yet Staszewski said that
    she could not approve Alpha’s record, but could “possibl[y]”
    approve a hypothetical new contractor without EMFs.
    17
    Assuming, without deciding, that DRPA enjoys the
    same Skidmore deference afforded to administrative agencies
    when they interpret their own regulations, such deference
    would be minimal in this case given the lack of any binding
    effect outside DRPA, the lack of thoroughness in DRPA’s
    consideration, and the lack of persuasive reasoning. See
    Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    694 F.3d 287
    , 300 (3d Cir.
    2012) (setting forth the factors that determine how much
    deference we owe to an agency’s interpretation of its own
    regulations).
    18
    DRPA has not challenged this finding as clearly
    erroneous.
    27
    A.1784. She offered no reasoned explanation why. Surely, the
    absence of EMFs in a bidder’s record does not show
    “frequen[t] and sever[e] losses” on the job, which was
    Staszewski’s central safety criterion. A.1747. An absence of
    EMFs shows nothing one way or the other, and therefore was
    not evidence of Alpha’s inability to do the work safely.
    What we find so puzzling is that DRPA was aware of
    at least some evidence from which it could evaluate Alpha’s
    past safety performance. For example, Staszewski knew about
    Alpha’s 2014 joint venture work on another project in
    Pennsylvania. The joint venture was assigned an EMF of
    .837, which fell well below Staszewski’s 1.25 bright-line rule.
    She simply did not consider it. Moreover, DRPA maintains
    on appeal that it is “infeasible” to inquire into Alpha’s out-of-
    state bridge painting experience, despite some evidence that
    most states subscribe to a national and uniform rating service.
    DRPA has not persuasively explained why this data was not
    at least relevant to assessing Alpha’s safety culture. 19
    At most, Alpha’s bid was “not responsive” under the
    guidelines. Its alleged failure to submit OSHA 300 forms and
    EMFs (or a suitable equivalent) failed to “conform” to §
    A.10.3’s clear text. DRPA all but concedes this point, and
    essentially argues that it may also label a bidder “not
    19
    DRPA’s counsel urged at oral argument that it could
    accept only in state-bidders if it chose to do so. We are not
    persuaded. The bidding guidelines do not permit DRPA to
    narrow its field of potential contractors in this way, nor did
    DRPA discuss this at the pre-bid meeting, which many out-
    of-state bidders attended.
    28
    responsible” at any time in the procurement process for the
    same reason.
    This line of argument, however, conflicts with
    DRPA’s own guidelines. The guidelines establish that
    responsiveness and responsibility are mutually exclusive
    inquiries. DRPA had ten days from bid submission to declare
    Alpha non-responsive to the IFB. It did not elect to do so here
    (nor do we think it could have done so on July 28, thirty-two
    days after this ten-day window closed). DRPA instead labeled
    Alpha “not responsible.” This designation triggered a
    different set of obligations and standards under the guidelines.
    DRPA had an affirmative duty to determine the lowest
    bidder’s responsibility, and could only reject its bid and select
    a higher bid if its investigation unearthed a “substantial
    reason” why the bidder was not “capable” or did not have the
    “capacity” to do the work. A.524. Indeed, the guidelines
    specifically contemplate that DRPA might have to look
    outside the four corners of the lowest bidder’s submission to
    fulfil that duty, including “requesting further clarification
    from the bidder[] as appropriate.” A.526.
    Here, for reasons that still elude us, DRPA appears to
    have simply given up once it determined that Alpha’s EMF
    record was inconclusive. DRPA did not contact Alpha to
    “request[] further clarification.” A.526. Jacurak, DRPA’s
    senior project engineer who knew about Alpha’s paperwork
    deficiencies, did not ask Kousis, Alpha’s project manager,
    about them during their call. 20 DRPA also failed to perform
    20
    Jacurak and Staszewski cited DRPA’s practice of
    not contacting bidders during their review, which DRPA’s
    counsel emphasized to us at oral argument. We understand
    29
    many other responsibility inquiries, as DRPA’s chief engineer
    Venuto noted, such as contacting Alpha’s references. No
    public searches were done; no news searches; no certification
    assessments. Certainly nothing in the guidelines prohibited
    these sorts of inquiries. Rather, they are encouraged, if not
    mandated. In short, DRPA appears to have actually gone out
    of its way to avoid relevant safety history information with
    respect to Alpha.
    There is yet another problem with DRPA’s argument.
    Even if we were to agree with DRPA that it could designate a
    bidder as “not responsible” because the bidder’s safety record
    was unknowable from the four corners of its submission,
    DRPA does not seem to have applied that rule consistently in
    this case. Corcon failed to submit three years of EMFs
    (providing only two usable years—2015 and 2014). DRPA
    should have rejected Corcon for the same reason. We
    therefore agree with the District Court that DRPA’s
    application of its rules in this case gave unequal treatment to
    Alpha and Corcon. Cf. Nazareth Hosp. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of
    Health & Human Servs., 
    747 F.3d 172
    , 179–80 (3d Cir. 2014)
    (quoting Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, 
    708 F.3d 209
    ,
    216 (D.C. Cir. 2013)) (“Agency action is arbitrary and
    capricious if the agency offers insufficient reasons for treating
    similar situations differently.”).
    DRPA’s desire to maintain the appearance of impartiality,
    but, as Jacurak noted in his testimony, there is no provision in
    the guidelines prohibiting contact with a bidder. To the
    contrary, the provisions we note supra counsel DRPA to do
    exactly the opposite.
    30
    In sum, neither Staszewski nor any other employee or
    document proffered a rational basis—pursuant to DRPA’s
    1.25-or-lower EMF policy or otherwise—for labeling Alpha
    “not responsible.” DRPA’s testimony in fact revealed that no
    one knew who ultimately translated Staszewski’s conclusion
    that Alpha’s record contained insufficient materials to assess
    responsibility into the July 28 Rejection Letter, which
    affirmatively determined that Alpha was not responsible. We
    find that the District Court was correct in concluding that
    DRPA acted irrationally.
    2. DRPA’s Modification of Corcon’s Mobilization and
    Clean-up Cost Price
    DRPA next challenges the District Court’s finding that
    DRPA acted without authority when it subsequently limited
    Corcon’s Mobilization and Clean Up line item. Jacurak
    recognized on June 17, 2016 that, contrary to what the IFB
    required, Corcon had bid more than 7.5% of its total bid price
    for this line item. Although DRPA characterized this as a
    computation error within the meaning of IFB § A.7.5, DRPA
    did not move to “correct” the alleged miscalculation until two
    months after learning about it, and only until after Alpha had
    filed a bid protest. The District Court concluded that DRPA’s
    “discovery” was merely a pretext to ensure that Corcon was
    awarded the contract. On appeal, DRPA does not try to
    explain away the suggestive timing of this revision. Instead, it
    contends that Section Q and § A.7.5 of the IFB “expressly
    permit[]” it to reduce Corcon’s bid so that it complies with
    the IFB. DRPA Br. 41.
    This argument, however, borders on the frivolous.
    Section Q, which defines how DRPA will pay its contractor
    for each unit of work performed, says nothing about DRPA’s
    31
    power to modify a bidder’s final quote during its subsequent
    investigation. Section A.7.5, which is titled “Preparing
    Proposals,” is similarly unavailing because it merely instructs
    contractors how to add or multiply their bid prices. In this
    context, the phrase “correctly computed” can only plausibly
    refer to a limited authority to correct mathematical errors in
    the contractor’s computations of his Total Bid Price. A.81.
    The following section, § A.7.6, actually explains this. See
    A.82 (“If, during the tabulation of Bids, the Total Price on
    any Proposal is found to be incorrectly computed, [DRPA]
    reserves the right to make such changes as are necessary in
    the extended Amounts and Total Price, on the basis of the
    unit and lump sum prices given in words and the approximate
    quantities stated for the scheduled items therein.” (emphasis
    added)). Moreover, much like DRPA’s responsibility
    determination, the decision to modify Corcon’s bid appeared
    out of thin air. There is nothing in the IFB or otherwise that
    gives DRPA such expansive authority. The District Court
    correctly concluded that DRPA lacked the authority to
    modify Corcon’s bid. On August 9, 2016, Alpha was still the
    lowest bidder.
    ***
    In sum, we agree with the District Court that DRPA’s
    conduct over this two-month period, taken together, suggests
    that it has gone out of its way to award the Phase 2 contract to
    Corcon and not Alpha. We are equally alarmed that DRPA’s
    Board of Commissioners gave virtually no attention to
    Alpha’s protest. And, after months of litigation, much still
    remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that DRPA’s
    actions defy reasonable explanation. Accordingly, we hold
    that DRPA’s rejection of Alpha and its eventual award to
    Corcon was “illegal [and] irrational,” Coco Bros., 
    741 F.2d at
    32
    679, and that the District Court’s order setting it aside was not
    an abuse of discretion.
    B. Corcon as a necessary party under Rule 19 21
    Next, DRPA urges that we vacate the District Court’s
    order because Corcon, who was not joined in this action, was
    a necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    19(a)(1)(B)(i). This rule provides that a party must be joined
    if the party has “an interest relating to the subject of the
    action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the
    person’s absence may . . . as a practical matter impair or
    impede the person’s ability to protect the interest.” Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i). We fail to see, however, how Corcon
    had a protectable interest relating to this dispute that would
    have necessitated its joinder.
    DRPA relies on Independent Enterprises Inc. v.
    Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Authority, wherein we rejected a
    disappointed bidder’s procedural due process claim. 
    103 F.3d 1165
    , 1178 (3d Cir. 1997). Because the bidder’s bid had
    21
    We undertake plenary review of a District Court’s
    ruling under Rule 19 that an absent party’s rights were not
    necessary. Gen. Refractories Co. v. First State Ins. Co., 
    500 F.3d 306
    , 312 (3d Cir. 2007). We may reach this issue on
    appeal, even if it was not raised in the district court. Disabled
    in Action v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., 
    635 F.3d 87
    , 97 (3d Cir.
    2011).
    33
    never been accepted by the state authority, we held that it
    “had no legally enforceable interest in receiving the
    contracts.” Id. at 1179. In so finding, we said that “one who
    bids on a public contract has no legitimate expectation of
    receiving it until the contract is actually awarded.” Id.
    (emphasis added) (citing Highway Express Lines v. Winter,
    
    200 A.2d 300
    , 303 (Pa. 1964)). DRPA seizes on this
    distinction between bidder and awardee to argue that because
    Corcon was “awarded” the contract, it obtained an
    enforceable property right.
    We disagree. We had no occasion in Independent
    Enterprises to explore, much less decide for Rule 19
    purposes, what it meant to “actually award[]” a contract. 
    Id.
    Whatever that threshold may require, we think it clear that
    DRPA’s guidelines do not vest any property right in a DRPA
    awardee. DRPA’s Board’s resolution merely “authorize[ed]
    [DRPA’s] staff to negotiate a construction contract with . . .
    Corcon.” Supp. App. A.5. It did not create any contract rights.
    Moreover, the guidelines accord significant discretion to
    DRPA to negotiate with and even reject the eventual awardee
    specified in that resolution. For example, DRPA may seek to
    negotiate discounts with the awardee, see A.495, or may even
    reject the awardee as not responsible “later in the process and
    until the contract is fully executed,” A.524 (emphasis added).
    DRPA has not “fully executed” a contract with Corcon and
    thus it had no protectable property right. Cf. Coco Bros., 
    741 F.2d at 677
     (recognizing that “negotiations after initial
    acceptance of a bid postponed the date of the ‘final award’”).
    Even if it did have a property right, Alpha persuasively
    points out that Corcon’s interests were fully represented by
    DRPA, which zealously sought to uphold its designation of
    34
    Corcon as the lowest responsible bidder. See Owens-Illinois,
    Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 
    610 F.2d 1185
    , 1191 (3d Cir.
    1979) (“The fact that the absent person may be affected by
    the judgment does not of itself require his joinder if his
    interests are fully represented by parties present.”).
    We note, too, that DRPA’s own representations in this
    case tend to undermine its claim that Corcon has a right to the
    Phase 2 contract. During trial, DRPA represented to the
    District Court that it would not award the contract until the
    litigation had been resolved. Moreover, during the pendency
    of this appeal, DRPA sent at least two letters to bidders
    requesting that they agree to “an extension of the date of
    award.” Supp. App. A1, A3. We decline to vacate the order
    on this ground.
    C. Remedy
    Finally, we must decide whether the District Court
    erred when it directed DRPA to award the Phase 2 contract to
    Alpha. Because we conclude that the District Court exceeded
    its authority by deeming Alpha “responsible” under DRPA’s
    guidelines, we will vacate the portion of the order directing
    the contract award and remand for the entry of a more limited
    injunction.
    We have said that even when a disappointed bidder has
    shown an agency procurement decision to be irrational or
    illegal, “prudent judicial discretion may still refuse
    declaratory or injunctive relief because of overriding public
    interests.” Sea-Land Servs., 600 F.2d at 434. This is because
    “[j]udicial intrusion into government purchases necessarily
    delays completion of the contract and increases costs, with
    35
    little measurable benefit to the public.” Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
    Hydro-Turbine Div. v. Friedkin, 
    635 F.2d 248
    , 252-53 (3d
    Cir. 1980). Thus to determine whether injunctive relief should
    be granted, district courts should weigh (1) the practical
    considerations of efficient procurement of supplies for
    continuing government operations, (2) the public interest in
    avoiding excessive costs, and (3) the bidder’s entitlement to
    fair treatment through adherence to statutes and regulations.
    Sea-Land, 600 F.2d at 434.
    This case implicates a subsequent question in the
    remedy analysis: what is the appropriate scope of injunctive
    relief. The District Court directed DRPA to award the
    contract to Alpha. Although Sea-Land does not preclude this
    coercive form of relief, we have been clear that a district
    court “must not succumb to the temptation of substituting its
    judgment” for that of the agency’s procurement expertise. Id.
    at 435; see also Princeton Combustion, 
    674 F.2d at 1021
    (“The district court is not to substitute its judgment for the
    agency’s . . . .”). This is especially true where, as here, the
    agency is charged with determining whether a contractor is
    safe, responsible, and capable of performing a highly
    specialized and potentially hazardous construction project.
    Depending on the posture of the procurement, directing an
    agency to award a contract to a specific bidder has the high
    potential of transgressing this limitation. Accordingly, district
    courts should not direct an agency to award a contract to a
    specific bidder “unless it is clear that, but for the illegal
    behavior of the agency, the contract would have been
    awarded to the party asking the court to order the award.”
    Delta Data Sys. Corp. v. Webster, 
    744 F.2d 197
    , 204 (D.C.
    Cir. 1984); Cf. Choctaw Mfg. Co. v. United States, 
    761 F.2d 609
    , 620 (11th Cir. 1985).
    36
    Here, the District Court weighed the Sea-Land factors
    and concluded, relevant to the first factor, that there was no
    need to “start the bidding process over, [which] would be
    adverse to the public good” and, relevant to the third, that
    irreparable harm to Alpha would result if DRPA was not
    enjoined from proceeding. Alpha Painting, 
    2016 WL 5339576
    , at *15. We agree, and note in addition only that the
    second factor in this case is largely neutral given the
    relatively small gap between both Alpha’s and Corcon’s bid
    price. The Sea-Land factors, therefore, favor injunctive relief.
    However, we also agree with DRPA that the District
    Court abused its discretion by directing the agency to award
    the contract to Alpha because it is not clear that Alpha would
    have received the contract “but for” DRPA’s illegal conduct.
    We can sympathize with the District Court’s sentiment that
    Alpha appeared perfectly qualified to perform abrasive blast
    cleaning and painting. It possessed QP1 and QP2
    certifications from a recognized trade association and
    significant bridge painting experience. Alpha also seemed to
    be a safe contractor as its OSHA 300 forms show only one
    incident over three years.
    But DRPA never determined that Alpha was
    “responsible” with respect to safety, capability, or otherwise.
    In fact, there is clear testimony in the record that the July 28
    Rejection Letter effectively ended any further review of
    Alpha’s file. DRPA’s chief engineer noted that, as a result of
    that letter, DRPA never bothered to contact Alpha’s
    references from other jobs, never performed due diligence
    with respect to noise control, and never assessed compliance
    with respect to Coast Guard requirements or Alpha’s ability
    37
    to provide under-deck staging. We simply cannot be certain
    what those inquires might reveal or how DRPA’s engineering
    team might weigh them. We therefore do not know whether,
    but for the July 28 Rejection Letter, Alpha would have
    received the contract. Because DRPA never completed its
    responsibility investigation, the District Court’s factual
    finding that Alpha was “responsible” was an impermissible
    “substitut[ion] [of] judgment.” Sea-Land, 600 F.2d at 435.
    The directed contract award, therefore, was an abuse of
    discretion.
    Alpha responds by citing Ulstein Maritime Ltd. v.
    United States, 
    833 F.2d 1052
     (1st Cir. 1987), as support for
    the District Court’s directed award. There, the court
    concluded that “but for” the violations of the applicable
    guidelines, “one of the other bidders” would have received
    the award. 
    Id.
     at 1058 (citing Delta Data Sys., 
    744 F.2d at 204
    ). But, unlike here, the court did not award the contract to
    “any specific plaintiff.” 
    Id.
     Instead, it ordered the Navy to
    “review the bids previously received and to award the
    contract to the next low, responsive and responsible bidder”
    because it was “possible,” upon remand, that “[the plaintiffs]
    may be rejected for defects in . . . responsibility, leading to
    the award of the contract to a higher bidder or to no bidder at
    all.” 
    Id.
     Thus the order in Ulstein, far from lending support
    for the directed award here, “merely un[did] the illegal
    agency actions and instruct[ed] the agency to proceed with
    the procurement which [was] in progress.” 
    Id.
    Therefore, we think Ulstein actually counsels in favor
    of a more limited injunction, the goal of which, in the
    circumstances of this case, should be to undo the illegal
    action and return Alpha to competition. See Delta Data Sys.,
    38
    
    744 F.2d at
    206–07 (“[T]he main objective of our effort at
    framing a [bidding violation] remedy is to assure that the
    government obtains the most advantageous contracts by
    complying with the procedures . . . . Putting the disappointed
    bidder in the economic position it would have occupied but
    for the error is normally the best approach to this result.”);
    BCPeabody Constr. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 
    112 Fed. Cl. 502
    , 514 (2013) (ordering agency to restore apparent-low-
    bidder to competition for contract and requiring agency to
    “reevaluate [the] proposals”); Beta Analytics Int’l, Inc. v.
    United States, 
    75 Fed. Cl. 155
    , 159 (2007) (“A reevaluation
    restores to a victim of arbitrary and capricious procurement
    activity its substantial chance to receive the contract award.”).
    Here, DRPA arbitrarily removed Alpha from
    contention for the Phase 2 contract. Accordingly, Alpha
    should be restored to competition and DRPA should evaluate
    Alpha’s bid and affirmatively determine, per its guidelines,
    whether Alpha, the lowest bidder, is a “responsible”
    contractor. We therefore will vacate the portion of the District
    Court’s order directing DRPA to award CB-31-2016 to Alpha
    and remand to the District Court for it to fashion a more
    limited injunction consistent with this opinion.
    III. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in
    part, and remand to the District Court.
    39