Gilbert Martinez v. Commissioner Social Security ( 2016 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 16-1956
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GILBERT M. MARTINEZ,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5:14-cv-01860)
District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 19, 2016
Before: VANASKIE, SCIRICA and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 6, 2016 )
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Gilbert M. Martinez appeals from an order of the District Court affirming the
Commissioner’s decision to deny Martinez’s claim for supplemental security income.
We will affirm.
Martinez applied for supplemental social security income on August 31, 2011,
alleging disability starting on August 19, 2011 resulting from arthritis, nerve damage, and
acid reflux. The agency denied the application on January 5, 2012, and Martinez
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). After a video hearing
on July 23, 2013, the ALJ determined that Martinez was not disabled pursuant to
§ 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act and denied the application for benefits. In its
written opinion of August 15, 2013, the ALJ found that Martinez had a severe
impairment in his right hand resulting from a gunshot wound that Martinez had suffered
as a child. However, considering the record as a whole, the ALJ found that Martinez did
not suffer from rheumatoid arthritis or any other condition that met the criteria for listed
impairments that would render him statutorily disabled. The ALJ also found further that
Martinez had some use of his right hand and had compensated for the impairment to that
hand through the use of his left hand. Consequently, the ALJ found that Martinez was
not disabled and that there were occupations available to him that would require only
partial use of his right hand.
Martinez appealed. The Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration
declined further review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security. Martinez then sought judicial review of the ALJ’s
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decision. After considering a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation and
Martinez’s objections thereto, the District Court affirmed the ALJ’s decision and entered
judgment in favor of the Commissioner. This appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is deferential, as it
is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence. Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). Substantial evidence is
“‘more than a mere scintilla,’ and is defined as ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate.’” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999)
(quoting Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995)). If substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s findings of fact, those findings bind us even if we would have settled
the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
An individual who is disabled, and otherwise eligible based on income and
resources, is entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1381a. To
establish disability, “a claimant must demonstrate [that] there is some ‘medically
determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him from engaging in any ‘substantial
gainful activity’ for a statutory twelve-month period.’” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427(quoting Stunkard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 841 F.2d 57, 59 (3d Cir. 1988)).
A claimant is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity “only if his physical or
mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his
previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in
any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id. at
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427-28 (quotation marks omitted). To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the
Social Security Administration considers, in sequence, whether the claimant: (1) is
engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an
impairment that is the same as or equivalent to an impairment listed by the
Administration as presumptively precluding any gainful activity; (4) can return to past
relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) is capable of performing other work in the
national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581, 583-84 (3d
Cir. 1986).
As noted above, the ALJ found that Martinez had a severe impairment, but not one
that precluded any gainful activity, and that other work was available to Martinez in the
national economy that he could perform despite his impairment. Martinez now argues on
appeal that the ALJ: (1) failed to credit or ignored certain probative evidence; (2) failed
to give sufficient weight to the opinions of Martinez’s treating physician; (3) failed to
expressly consider Martinez’s testimony; (4) failed to weigh the evidence and explain
how contrary evidence was rejected, and (5) failed to consider Martinez’s reports of
subjective pain and specify reasons for rejecting that testimony.
The administrative record belies these contentions, and we find no fault in the
District Court’s discussion of the ALJ’s decision. We comment briefly on Martinez’s
two main procedural objections that the five separate points named in Martinez’s brief on
appeal comprise.
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First, the evidence that Martinez says that the ALJ should have considered was not
part of the administrative record. Martinez attached two documents to his brief before
the District Court that purport to show a diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis from two of his
treating physicians. Martinez did not present those documents as part of his case before
the ALJ, even though the ALJ invited Martinez to provide additional documentation
following the hearing. Consequently, we may not consider that documentation in our
evaluation of whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision. See Matthews
v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 593 (3d Cir. 2001). Furthermore, that documentation post-dates
the ALJ’s decision, and Martinez does not explain why he did not provide it earlier.
Consequently, Martinez could not have satisfied the materiality and good-cause
requirements to justify a remand to the ALJ to consider that new evidence. See Szubak v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 745 F.2d 831, 833 (3d Cir. 1984).
Second, although Martinez argues that the ALJ overlooked his subjective
complaints, the ALJ’s written opinion in fact considered Martinez’s testimony and found
it not credible to the extent that the medical evidence contradicted it. In over two full
pages of discussion, the ALJ identified potential contradictions within Martinez’s
testimony and medical evidence that was inconsistent with his subjective reports. That
discussion was more than adequate to satisfy the ALJ’s duty to provide explicit reasons
for rejecting Martinez’s subjective contentions. See Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 2000).
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Overall, the record reflects that there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s
determination that Martinez’s physical impairments did not match or equal the criteria for
the relevant listed impairments necessary for a finding that Martinez was statutorily
disabled. Although Martinez was able to present certain pieces of evidence that
potentially supported his claim of disability, the ALJ identified “more than a mere
scintilla” of medical and testimonial evidence to contradict Martinez’s potentially
favorable evidence, and carefully explained how each piece of evidence supported the
conclusion that Martinez was not statutorily disabled.
In addition, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that
Martinez had the residual functional capacity to perform light work subject to some
limitations in light of his impairments. The ALJ cited specific items of medical evidence
and points from Martinez’s testimony to show how Martinez was able to perform basic
tasks in his employment and in his daily life that were reasonably equivalent to light
work that would be available to Martinez in the economy.
Consequently, we will affirm the decision of the District Court that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Martinez was not disabled during the
relevant time period.
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