Hill v. Nigro ( 2008 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2008 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    2-27-2008
    Hill v. Nigro
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 07-3871
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    Recommended Citation
    "Hill v. Nigro" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1515.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1515
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    ALD-139                                                         NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 07-3871
    ___________
    WILLIAM D. HILL, III
    Appellant
    v.
    OFFICER JOSEPH NIGRO,
    Harrison Police Department
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-5117)
    District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
    or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    February 22, 2008
    Before: SLOVITER, FISHER and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: February 27, 2008)
    _________
    OPINION
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant William D. Hill, III, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
    Officer Joseph Nigro alleging that he had violated his constitutional rights when he fired
    shots at him while Hill was fleeing arrest. The United States District Court for the
    District of New Jersey entered summary judgment in favor of Officer Nigro, concluding
    that his use of force was reasonable as a matter of law under the Fourth Amendment.
    Hill, who is proceeding pro se, timely appealed.
    Because we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with the case, we need
    not set forth the factual background or procedural history except insofar as it may be
    helpful to our discussion. In brief, on September 22, 2004, Hill was driving a stolen
    vehicle on a highway entrance ramp in Harrison, New Jersey. Hill contends that Officer
    Nigro pursued him used excessive force against him because Nigro fired “numerous”
    shots at Hill, who was unarmed. 1 Officer Nigro contends that he fired the shots because
    Hill attempted to run him over in the stolen car and because Hill’s reckless driving in the
    course of attempting to elude arrest placed the lives of the other drivers around Hill in
    danger. It is undisputed that, while attempting to elude arrest, Hill crashed into another
    vehicle, sending its driver, Jason Barrus, to the hospital. Hill later pled guilty to the
    aggravated assault of Jason Barrus in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(6) and also pled
    guilty to fleeing or attempting to elude arrest in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b. In his
    1
    Hill’s complaint also contained a claim that the Harrison Police Department had
    failed to properly supervise and train Officer Nigro, but this claim was dismissed without
    prejudice by the District Court. Although Hill was granted leave to amend his complaint
    with respect to this claim, he never filed an amended complaint. In any event, Hill does
    not challenge this dismissal on appeal.
    2
    guilty plea, Hill admitted to driving away at high speeds and creating a serious risk of
    death or injury to others.
    This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We subject the District
    Court’s grant of summary judgment to plenary review, and apply the same standard that
    the District Court should have applied. McLeod v. Hartford Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 
    372 F.3d 618
    , 623 (3d Cir. 2004). We may affirm the District Court on any grounds
    supported by the record. See Nicini v. Morra, 
    212 F.3d 798
    , 805 (3d Cir. 2000) (en
    banc). Because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the
    District Court’s August 29, 2007 order. 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
    We agree with the District Court that Hill’s excessive force claim is not barred by
    Heck v. Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
    (1994). See Nelson v. Jashurek, 
    109 F.3d 142
    , 145-46
    (3d Cir. 1997). For the following reasons, we nonetheless agree that summary judgment
    was properly entered against Hill.
    A police officer’s use of deadly force constitutes a seizure within the meaning of
    the Fourth Amendment and therefore it must be reasonable. See Tennessee v. Garner,
    
    471 U.S. 1
    , 7 (1985). Where a police officer has probable cause to believe that the
    suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not
    constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. 
    Id. at 11.
    The
    issue of whether an intentional use of deadly force by a police officer is permissible under
    the Fourth Amendment requires an objective reasonableness inquiry. See Graham v.
    3
    Connor, 
    490 U.S. 386
    , 399 (1989); Abraham v. Raso, 
    183 F.3d 279
    , 290 (3d Cir. 1999).
    Giving due regard to the pressures faced by the police, the proper inquiry is whether it
    was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe, in light of the totality of the
    circumstances, that deadly force was necessary to prevent the suspect’s escape, and that
    the suspect posed a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or
    others. 
    Abraham, 183 F.3d at 290
    . Summary judgment is appropriate when the court
    resolves all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff and concludes that the use of force
    was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. 
    Id. We conclude
    that, giving due regard to the pressures faced by the police, it was
    objectively reasonable for Officer Nigro to believe, in light of the totality of the
    circumstances, that deadly force was necessary to prevent Hill’s escape, and that Hill
    posed a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to Officer Nigro or others.
    See 
    Abraham, 183 F.3d at 289
    . See also Scott v. Edinburg, 
    346 F.3d 752
    , 758 (7th Cir.
    2003) (concluding that officer’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable where the
    suspect attempted to run over the police officer and then drove the stolen vehicle at a high
    rate of speed through a parking lot containing twelve to fourteen bystanders). Even
    assuming arguendo that a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether
    Hill attempted to run over Officer Nigro, the record is clear that a reasonable officer
    could have reasonably believed that Hill posed a significant threat of death or serious
    physical injury to others. During his guilty plea, Hill conceded that the police asked him
    4
    to pull over, but that he refused and drove away at a speed high enough to cause the death
    or serious injury of anyone he hit. Indeed, while attempting to elude arrest, Hill crashed
    into another car and its driver had to be taken to the hospital for injuries he sustained.
    Under these circumstances, we conclude that summary judgment was properly entered in
    favor of Officer Nigro.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order
    entered August 29, 2007.
    5