Energy Future Holdings Corp v. ( 2018 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 17-1958
_____________
In re: ENERGY FUTURE HOLDINGS CORP. a/k/a TXU Corp. a/k./a TXU Corp a/k/a
TEXAS Utilities, et al.,
Debtors
MARATHON ASSET MANAGEMENT LP;
POLYGON CONVERTIBLE OPPORTUNITY MASTER FUND;
POLYGON DISTRESSED OPPORTUNITIES MASTER FUND,
Appellants
v.
WILMINGTON TRUST N.A. as First Lien Collateral Agent
and First Lien Administrative Agent;
ANGELO GORDON & CO. L.P.; APOLLO ADVISORS VII, L.P.;
BROOKFIELD ASSET MANAGEMENT PRIVATE INSTITUTIONAL CAPITAL
ADVISOR (CANADA) L.P.;
JOHN DOE #1 THROUGH JOHN DOE #10
________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-16-cv-00287)
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews
________________
Argued November 15, 2017
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 7, 2018)
Philip D. Anker, Esquire
George W. Shuster, Jr., Esquire (Argued)
WilmerHale
7 World Trade Center
250 Greenwich Street
New York, NY 10007
Benjamin W. Loveland, Esquire
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr
60 State Street
Boston, MA 02109
Adam G. Landis, Esquire
Matthew B. McGuire, Esquire
Landis Rath & Cobb
919 Market Street
Suite 1800, P.O. Box 2087
Wilmington, DE 19899
Counsel for Appellants
Michael D. DeBaecke, Esquire
Blank Rome
1201 Market Street, Suite 800
Wilmington, DE 19801
Mark D. Kotwick, Esquire
Seward & Kissel
One Battery Park Plaza
New York, NY 10004
Bradley R. Aronstam, Esquire
Nicholas D. Mozal, Esquire
Benjamin J. Schladweiler, Esquire
Ross Aronstam & Moritz
100 South West Street, Suite 400
Wilmington, DE 19801
George A. Davis, Esquire
Jonathan Rosenberg, Esquire
Daniel S. Shamah, Esquire
2
Andrew Sorkin, Esquire
O’Melveny & Myers
7 Times Square
Times Square Tower, 33rd Floor
New York, NY 10036
Peter M. Friedman, Esquire (Argued)
O’Melveny & Myers
1625 I Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
Counsel for Appellees
Neil B. Glassman, Esquire
GianClaudio Finizio, Esquire
Bayard, P.A.
600 North King Street, Suite 400
Wilmington, DE 19801
Michael S. Kim, Esquire
Jeremey C. Hollembeak, Esquire
Kobre & Kim LLP
800 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
In Support of Appellants
________________
OPINION *
________________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Texas Competitive Electric Holdings Company LLC (“TCEH”) filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy relief in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
3
Lenders of $24.5 billion to TCEH were among its creditors. In an inter-creditor dispute,
entities now in the shoes of those who funded a letter of credit facility (collectively,
“Appellants”) seek payment of certain funds before the other lenders (the “Other
Lenders”). They appeal the dismissal by the Bankruptcy Court, affirmed by the District
Court, of their Complaint. We also affirm. In doing so, we deal with many definitions in
a complex set of documents. Thus this not-precedential opinion (it makes no new law
nor clarifies existing precedent) is longer than normal.
I. Background
A. The Loans
In 2007 a private equity group bought for $45 billion TXU Corporation, which
later became Energy Future Holdings Corp., the principal debtor in the Chapter 11
bankruptcy cases in the District of Delaware. The transaction—called a leveraged buyout
because the purchased assets secured (that is, leveraged) the loans made for the
purchase—involved in part TCEH, a TXU subsidiary, borrowing $24.5 billion in the
aggregate per three credit facilities—a term loan, a revolving line of credit arrangement,
and a deposit letter of credit facility (the last, hereinafter capitalized as a defined term, is
the subject of this appeal). The loans involved nine different lenders (collectively, with
their successors and assigns, the “Lenders”), including entities associated with Citibank,
JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, and Morgan Stanley. Though the
credit facilities had but one Credit Agreement, different (though overlapping) subgroups
of the Lenders funded each of them. Hence the Lenders, among others, entered into an
intercreditor agreement (hereinafter also capitalized as a defined term). To repeat,
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Appellants are successors to the entities whose $1.25 billion aggregate loan funded the
Deposit Letter of Credit Facility (those entities are referred to as “Deposit L/C Lenders”).
B. The Deposit Letter of Credit Facility
A letter of credit reduces the risk of payment default. Suppose an entity purchased
gas to be extracted from the Gulf Basin a year later, promising the seller payment on
delivery. To back up its promise, the purchaser could ask a bank to agree with the seller
that, among other things, it will cover amounts in default if the company fails to pay what
it owes. That back-up support, a letter of credit, would shift the risk of nonpayment from
the purchaser to the bank, which typically is in a better position to know the former’s
creditworthiness. The bank would, after a payment on its letter of credit, seek
reimbursement from the purchaser.
As already noted, this appeal involves the Deposit Letter of Credit Facility. A
“deposit” letter of credit is backed by a cash deposit used to reimburse the letter of credit
bank (a “Deposit Letter of Credit Issuer” or “Issuer”; as noted below, here it is Citibank).
In this way, the risk of nonpayment shifts from the Issuer back to the debtor—TCEH in
our case. After the Deposit L/C Lenders furnished the $1.25 billion for the Deposit
Letter of Credit Facility, those funds were deposited into a segregated account called the
Deposit L/C Loan Collateral Account (sometimes referred to simply as the “Account”).
Essentially, the facility consisted of Citibank’s agreement to issue deposit letters of credit
for TCEH (the “Deposit Letters of Credit” or “Deposit L/Cs”) plus Citibank’s right to
have drawings reimbursed from this account. (Although the loan transactions allowed for
the addition of multiple Deposit Letter of Credit Issuers, we understand no party other
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than Citibank signed on.) There was always enough on balance to cover the full amount
of the Deposit Letters of Credit that had been or could be issued. Moreover, Citibank
was appointed the custodian of the account (in this capacity, the “Collateral Agent”), so it
was able to release the reimbursement funds to itself for Deposit L/Cs.
Appellants seek to be paid from the remaining money in the Deposit L/C Loan
Collateral Account before the Other Lenders who participated in loaning the remaining
$23.25 billion of the overall credit facilities. They claim common sense supports their
expectation that, as the deemed funders of the Deposit L/C Loan Collateral Account, they
be accorded, when the Deposit Letter of Credit Facility ended, payment priority over the
Other Lenders who did not fund that Account. The problem, as Appellants concede, is
that, “[t]o be sure, the applicable credit documents do not expressly state [that] common-
sense conclusion . . . because, unfortunately and mistakenly, the documents do not
contain any express statement of who gets paid any leftover portion of the $1.25 billion.”
Appellants’ Br. at 4.
C. The Intercreditor Agreement § 4.1(b) Priority Scheme
The Lenders have a first lien on TCEH’s collateral. They agreed among
themselves that, once the company was in bankruptcy, they would stand on equal footing
in proportion to what they loaned (they used the Latin phrases pro rata and pari passu),
with no one Lender “entitled to any preferences or priority over any other . . . (except as
otherwise provided in Section 4.1 [of the Intercreditor Agreement]).” Intercreditor
Agreement § 2.1 (emphasis added).
6
Thus the priority of distribution for the funds in the Deposit L/C Loan Collateral
Account (those funds are called the “Deposit L/C Collateral”) is governed by § 4.1 of the
Intercreditor Agreement. The section contains a pair of “waterfall” provisions. They
describe the order of payments from specified funds; once the amounts due at the first
level are completely satisfied, then the funds flow over the waterfall to the next level,
which must also be satisfied before funds can flow to the next level, and so on.
The first waterfall, in subsection (a), which governs the distribution of all funds
other than the funds in the Deposit L/C Loan Collateral Account, is not relevant for our
analysis. The second waterfall, found in subsection (b), governs distribution of the
Deposit L/C Collateral. It is a five-tier “waterfall” provision that states the funds shall be
applied:
first, on a pro rata basis, to the payment of all amounts due to the Deposit
Letter of Credit Issuer under any of the Financing Documents, excluding
amounts payable in connection with any unreimbursed amount under any
Letter of Credit;
second, on a pro rata basis, to the payment of all amounts due to the
Deposit Letter of Credit Issuer in an amount equal to 100% of the Unpaid
Drawings under any Deposit Letter of Credit;
third, on a pro rata basis, to any Secured Party which has theretofore
advanced or paid any fees to the Deposit Letter of Credit Issuer, other than
any amounts covered by priority second, an amount equal to the amount
thereof so advanced or paid by such Secured Party and for which such
Secured Party has not been previously reimbursed;
fourth, on a pro rata basis, to the payment of all other Deposit L/C
Obligations; and
last, the balance, if any, after all of the Deposit L/C Obligations have been
indefeasibly paid in full in cash, as set forth above in Section 4.1(a).
7
Intercreditor Agreement § 4.1(b) (emphases in original). In simple language, financing
fees owed to the Deposit Letter of Credit Issuer come first; second are unreimbursed
amounts on Deposit Letters of Credit already issued; third are any Lender’s advances or
payments of fees owed to the Deposit Letter of Credit Issuer by TCEH and not
reimbursed; what is fourth in priority is discussed below; and, last, any remaining
amounts are remitted pro rata to the general Lenders per § 4.1(a) (in effect, the waterfall
covering collateral other than the Deposit L/C Collateral). Appellants claim to be owed a
priority payment at the fourth level, which directs the satisfaction of “all other Deposit
L/C Obligations.”
There are two components to the Deposit L/C Obligations. “[A]t any date of
determination” these are “the aggregate Stated Amount of all outstanding Deposit Letters
of Credit plus the aggregate principal amount of all Unpaid Drawings under all Deposit
Letters of Credit.” Credit Agreement § 1.1 (emphasis in original). As the Stated Amount
includes “the maximum amount from time to time available to be drawn thereunder,
determined without regard to whether any conditions to drawing could then be met,” id.,
a Deposit Letter of Credit Issuer still obligated to pay amounts that TCEH’s creditors
could draw under outstanding Deposit L/Cs would be derelict not to require
reimbursement priority for those potential payments.
Also included in the Stated Amount are, as noted in the second waterfall priority,
sums on drawn Deposit Letters of Credit for which TCEH has yet to reimburse the Issuer.
This second part can only be owed by TCEH to Citibank as reimbursement for any
drawings under a Deposit Letter of Credit. The parties agree that Appellants cannot be
8
owed this portion of the Deposit L/C Obligations, as they never issued a Deposit Letter of
Credit.
Another way to think about the Deposit L/C Obligations is that they correspond to
TCEH’s potential liability to Citibank as the Deposit Letter of Credit Issuer. The Unpaid
Drawings are the amounts currently due, and added to those amounts are the outstanding
Deposit L/Cs that might later result in Unpaid Drawings. The aggregate is a changing
figure that can be pinned down only at a “date of determination.”
D. The Credit Agreement § 3.9 Security Interests
Section 3.9 of the Credit Agreement grants security for the Deposit L/C
Obligations and, for that reason, may aid in construing that term. Section 3.9 begins by
stating that the Deposit L/C Loan Collateral Account exists “for the purpose of cash
collateralizing [TCEH]’s obligations to the Deposit Letter of Credit Issuer in respect of
the Deposit Letters of Credit.” Next, the Collateral Agent (i.e., Citibank in that capacity)
is granted two security interests in the Account. The first is “for the benefit of all Deposit
Letter of Credit Issuers . . . as security for the Deposit L/C Obligations[.]” The second
security interest is “in addition . . . for the benefit of the Secured Parties as collateral
security for the Obligations.”
The second interest is a catch-all. Per the definitional section, “Obligations” refers
to every obligation stemming from the credit documents, and “Secured Parties” includes,
among others, the Lenders in the loan transactions. The second grant, therefore, secures
everything (including the Deposit L/C Obligations) owed under the credit documents.
9
The second security interest is qualified by a tiered repayment priority that
preserves the primacy of Citibank’s rights to the Deposit L/C Collateral Account; the
“amounts on deposit” in the Account must first be used to repay Deposit L/C Obligations
“in respect of Citibank Deposit Letters of Credit.” Next, the funds can go toward the
Deposit L/C Obligations in respect of “all other Deposit Letters of Credit.” Finally, the
amounts can be used “to repay all other Obligations.” 1 Funds in the Account can be
remitted to TCEH only “after the termination or cancellation of all Deposit Letters of
Credit and the repayment in full of all outstanding Deposit L/C Loans [known also as the
Deposit Letter of Credit Facility] and Deposit L/C Obligations.” Id. 2
E. The Bankruptcy Court’s Decision
Appellants filed a complaint in the Bankruptcy Court seeking a declaration that
they had priority rights to the undrawn Deposit L/C Collateral, and the Defendants-
Appellees responded with a motion to dismiss. As noted in more detail below, the
Bankruptcy Court previously held that the conditions precedent to the 4.1 waterfall’s
applicability were not satisfied. It followed this holding in our case. In re Energy Future
Holdings Corp., 548 B.R. 79, 90 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016). As a result, it explained, the
Bankruptcy Code, Court orders, and the plan of reorganization governed the distribution
of the Deposit L/C Collateral. Id.
1
There is also a repayment priority applicable to accounts set up to facilitate the
addition of Deposit Letter of Credit Issuers other than Citibank. As noted, no other issuer
signed up.
2
The parties mention in passing other provisions of the credit documents to support
their positions, but no one appears particularly relevant to our decision.
10
Alternatively, the Court determined that the plain language of the Intercreditor
Agreement does not give Appellants any payment priority. It reasoned that the fourth
level of the 4.1(b) waterfall was a catch-all designed to protect the Deposit L/C Issuer and
that the Deposit L/C Obligations included only the obligations related to Deposit Letters
of Credit despite the definition's failure to identify a payee expressly. Id. at 93–94.
F. The District Court’s Decision
The District Court affirmed. Unlike the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court, on
request of the parties, did not consider whether the conditions precedent to distribution
under the § 4.1 waterfall had been met. (Appellants ask that we also avoid this issue, and
we will oblige. 3) Rather, the Court focused on whether, assuming the § 4.1 waterfall
3
This bankruptcy set of cases has spun off many other opinions. There are
inevitably some overlapping issues—the question of whether the § 4.1 waterfall is
inapplicable is one of these. In two opinions in a case between different parties than
those before us, the Bankruptcy Court ruled on that issue. See Delaware Trust Co. v.
Wilmington Trust, N.A. (In re Energy Futures Holdings Corp.), 546 B.R. 566, 578-84
(Bankr. D. Del. 2016); Delaware Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust, N.A. (In re Energy
Futures Holdings Corp.), 566 B.R. 669, 683-88 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017). We understand
its ruling has been appealed to our Circuit, but briefing is in the early stages.
As noted, the parties asked the District Court to rule only on the question of
whether the Deposit L/C Lenders had a priority interest in the Deposit L/C Collateral.
JA16. It obliged and read “the mechanics of the Section 4.1(b) Waterfall to parallel the
mechanics of [S]ection 3.9 [of the Credit Agreement].” JA28. On appeal, Appellants
neither included the question of the waterfall’s applicability in their statement of issues
nor addressed the merits of that issue in their Opening Brief. See also Appellants’ Br. at
6 n.3. In Appellees’ Brief, however, they resurrected the issue, arguing that we can
alternatively affirm on the basis that the § 4.1 waterfall was inapplicable. Appellees’ Br.
at 3-4, 41-43.
As did the District Court, we do not consider the issue of § 4.1’s applicability. See
Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 149 (3d Cir. 2016) (“a federal appellate
court does not consider an issue not passed upon below” (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428
U.S. 106, 120 (1976)). The parties appear to be on the same page, as but for a passing
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applied, the Deposit L/C Lenders had a priority interest in the Deposit L/C Collateral. In
that context, it relied on § 3.9 of the Credit Agreement, which distinguishes between
Deposit L/C Obligations and Obligations. That section mandates that the Deposit L/C
Collateral be used first to satisfy Deposit L/C Obligations associated with Citibank’s
Deposit Letters of Credit. Second, the Deposit L/C Collateral must be used to satisfy
Deposit L/C Obligations associated with all other Deposit Letters of Credit, i.e., Deposit
L/C Obligations owed to other Deposit L/C Issuers (of which there were none). Any
remaining Deposit L/C Collateral would go to repay all other Obligations. The District
Court reasoned that, because all Deposit L/C Obligations are satisfied under the first two
steps of § 3.9, and because neither of those provisions refer to Deposit L/C Lenders, they
are only owed Obligations, not Deposit L/C Obligations. With this in mind, the Court
surveyed the rest of the relevant provisions in the credit documents and determined that
none altered this understanding.
II. Jurisdiction, Standard of Review, and Applicable Law
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d)(1) and 1291. Our review of the
District Court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss, which involved legal questions of
contract interpretation, is anew. See United States v. Hardwick, 544 F.3d 565, 570 (3d
Cir. 2008).
New York law governs the contracts before us. Intercreditor Agreement § 9.10.
Under it, where the contract provisions at issue are ambiguous, a motion to dismiss
comment of Appellants’ counsel, no one raised the issue of § 4.1’s applicability at oral
argument. Thus we assume it applies and address the merits.
12
must be denied. Serdarevic v. Centex Homes, LLC, 760 F. Supp. 2d 322, 328
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). “[A] contract is ambiguous if its terms could suggest more than
one meaning when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has
examined the context of the entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of the
customs, practices, usages and terminology as generally understood in the particular
trade or business.” Chesapeake Energy Corp. v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co.,
N.A., 773 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III. Discussion
A. Section 4.1(b) of the Intercreditor Agreement gives priority only to the
Issuers
The 4.1(b) waterfall, as noted, is a five-tier provision governing the distribution of
the Deposit L/C Collateral. It provides for payment priority of all amounts currently
owed on the drawn Deposit Letters of Credit and all amounts which might be owed on
outstanding (i.e., then-undrawn) Deposit Letters of Credit. In other words, it is
comprehensive. Payment of the amounts immediately due on the Deposit Letters of
Credit is provided for by the first three levels of the waterfall. The Deposit L/C
Collateral is applied first
to the payment of all amounts due to the Deposit Letter of Credit Issuer
. . . , excluding amounts payable in connection with any unreimbursed
amount under any Letter of Credit . . . .
Intercreditor Agreement § 4.1(b). Then
to the payment of all amounts due to the Deposit Letter of Credit Issuer in an
amount equal to 100% of the Unpaid Drawings under any Deposit Letter of
Credit . . . .
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Id. And third in priority is
any Secured Party which has theretofore advanced or paid any fees to the
Deposit Letter of Credit Issuer . . . an amount equal to the amount thereof so
advanced or paid . . . .
Id.
The parties agree that these levels describe only TCEH’s obligations to the Deposit Letter
of Credit Issuer and any eligible entity that spotted fees owed to Citibank as the Issuer.
Our take is that the first three priority levels describe all that TCEH then owed in
relation to the Deposit Letters of Credit. They, however, do not reach contingent liability
on outstanding Deposit Letters of Credit—those amounts are neither “due,” “payable,”
“advanced,” nor “paid.” And there was no guarantee that every Deposit Letter of Credit
would be off the table at the time (or times) the parties paid out the Deposit L/C
Collateral. An outstanding Deposit Letter of Credit might have had a maturity date up to
a year in the future. Though there may at the time be no “amounts due” on the Deposit
L/Cs, it was almost certain to be drawn when the bankrupt TCEH failed to pay. Citibank
then would be on the hook, even after the insolvency case began, for the amount owed by
TCEH to a third party backed by a Deposit L/C. Without access to the Deposit L/C
Collateral, Citibank would need to seek repayment from the general collateral as a
general creditor. It is hard to imagine the parties did not plan to avoid this scenario, as
there is little use for security that is not available in times of financial distress.
Thus the fourth priority comes into play to secure with the Deposit L/C Collateral
the contingent obligations on outstanding Deposit Letters of Credit. The funds, as noted,
are applied “to the payment of all other Deposit L/C Obligations.” Read along with the
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definition of Deposit L/C Obligations, the fourth priority allows the payment of “all
Unpaid Drawings” “at any date of determination[.]” When a drawing is later made, the
amount owed to Citibank can be “determin[ed]” and paid. This security for the Deposit
L/C Obligations provides continued dollar-for-dollar support while the Deposit Letter of
Credit Facility winds down.
The crux of Appellants’ claim—that the fourth priority is redundant if it does not
provide for payment to a party other than the Deposit Letter of Credit Issuer because, by
the time it is reached, Citibank has been paid all the amounts either payable or
outstanding—relies on their misapprehension about contingent liability being determined.
As explained above, “determining” liabilities does not convert amounts that could one
day be drawn on outstanding Deposit L/Cs “at any date of determination” into “amounts
due” and therefore payable under the earlier priorities. The fourth priority is there to
provide for those outstanding, and contingent, amounts.
Section 4.1(b) sets out provisions aimed exclusively at protecting Deposit Letter of
Credit Issuers. And the fourth level, where the claimed entitlement is located, seems far
from “meaningless,” as Appellants argue. Appellants’ Br. at 36. Citibank, as the Issuer,
got continued security if any of its Deposit Letters of Credit were still outstanding. The
Appellants – successors to Lenders, not Issuers – do not appear to fit anywhere within
this scheme. The fifth priority level remits the remaining funds to the general pool of
ordinary collateral for normal distribution to all Lender parties. Appellants can collect
their pro rata share there, but only after Citibank is paid any amounts owed to it as the
Issuer at the fourth priority level. If, as Appellants argue, nothing is needed to pay
15
Citibank under the fourth priority level because no previously undrawn L/Cs are later
drawn, so much the better, as there may be funds still in the Deposit L/C Collateral
Account. But Appellants’ sharing with all Lenders is pro rata, for it enjoys no payment
priority over them.
B. The security interests granted by § 3.9 of the Credit Agreement
Section 3.9 of the Credit Agreement was dealt with in depth by the District Court.
Rather than repeat here that comprehensive analysis, suffice it to say § 3.9 supports
strongly that § 4.1(b) does not give priority to any party other than a Deposit Letter of
Credit Issuer. Section 3.9 explains that the purpose of the Deposit L/C Loan Collateral
Account is to secure TCEH’s obligations to the Deposit Letter of Credit Issuers, and then
it gives those Issuers a right to be paid first from the funds in the Account. All other
parties, including Appellants, are given an equal right to any remaining funds as
collateral for the other Obligations. Again, Appellants’ sharing with all Lenders is pro
rata.
C. Other provisions
“Admittedly, the farther afield from the key provisions of the Credit Documents
one travels, the more remote are the signals as to whether Appellants’ or Appellees’
arguments for payment priority are correct.” Appellants’ Br. at 45. Appellants have
scoured the credit documents searching for contrary meaning in far-flung provisions. For
instance, they ask us to find an implicit structure in the nomenclature selected for the
defined terms—Obligations versus Deposit L/C Obligations, and the like. But the
principal action is in the sections noted above. If these highly sophisticated parties had
16
intended for Deposit L/C Collateral to be paid to the Deposit L/C Lenders, then they
would have specifically said so in those operative provisions.
* * * * *
Our “primary objective . . . is to give effect to the intent of the parties as revealed
by the language of their agreement.” Chesapeake Energy Corp., 773 F.3d at 113–14. The
Intercreditor Agreement § 4.1(b) waterfall requires the Deposit L/C Collateral be used
first to pay off amounts due to the Deposit Letter of Credit Issuer (Citibank), then the
amounts due to Secured Parties who advanced fees to the Issuer by TCEH. The
remaining funds are set aside in an amount equal to the Issuer’s contingent liability on
outstanding Deposit Letters of Credit and remain available to reimburse the Issuer for any
subsequent drawings. This is a protection for the Issuer, not the Deposit L/C Lenders.
Section 3.9 of the Credit Agreement reinforces that conclusion.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
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