Consolidation Coal Co. v. District 2, United Mine Workers ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2006 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    3-1-2006
    Consol Coal Co v. Dist 2 UMWA
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 05-2342
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    Recommended Citation
    "Consol Coal Co v. Dist 2 UMWA" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 1491.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/1491
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 05-2342
    CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY
    v.
    DISTRICT 2, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA;
    LOCAL 1983, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,
    Appellants
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    D.C. Civil 03-cv-01704
    District Judge: The Honorable Terrence F. McVerry
    Argued: February 14, 2006
    Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, BARRY and FISHER, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion Filed March 1, 2006)
    Michael J. Healey, Esq. (Argued)
    Healey & Hornack
    1100 Liberty Avenue
    The Pennsylvania, Suite C-2
    Pittsburgh, PA 15222
    Counsel for Appellants
    Michael D. Glass, Esq. (Argued)
    Polito & Smock
    444 Liberty Avenue
    Suite 400, Four Gateway Center
    Pittsburgh, PA 15222
    Counsel for Appellee
    OPINION
    BARRY, Circuit Judge
    District 2 and Local 1980 of the United Mine Workers of America (“UMWA”)
    appeal the order of the District Court vacating an arbitrator’s award of benefits to Thomas
    R. Zajac, a coal miner for Consolidation Coal Company (“Consol”) and a member of
    UMWA. We will reverse.1
    I.
    Consol, a private company, is in the business of operating bituminous coal mines
    in western Pennsylvania. Consol and UMWA are signatories to the National Bituminous
    Coal Wage Agreement (“NBCWA”) of 2002,2 which provides a detailed grievance
    procedure, the final step of which is binding arbitration. On May 9, 2001, Zajac struck
    1
    The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Section 301(a) of
    the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). We have appellate
    jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
    2
    The parties are also signatories to the 1998 NBCWA, which is identical in all
    pertinent respects to the 2002 agreement.
    2
    his head while working in a mine.3 He submitted a Sickness and Accident claim pursuant
    to the NBCWA, which was approved, permitting him to be out of work for up to 52
    weeks. Zajac returned to work on June 19, 2002. Two days later, he again struck his
    head, this time on the roof of the mine. He again sought Sickness and Accident Benefits
    pursuant to the NBCWA,4 a request Consol denied.
    Pursuant to the NBCWA, Zajac filed a grievance contending that Consol
    improperly denied him benefits, and the parties proceeded to arbitration. An arbitrator
    sustained the grievance on October 15, 2003, concluding that the June 21, 2002 injury
    “was not a reoccurrence of the previous injury.” Consol filed suit in the District Court.
    On March 28, 2005, the District Court adopted a magistrate judge’s Report and
    3
    Zajac reported head and neck injuries he sustained on two previous dates, August 25,
    1999 and March 19, 2001. The August 25, 1999 injury resulted from a fall out of a Jeep.
    Zajac filed a worker’s compensation claim, but, despite his injury, missed no work. On
    March 19, 2001, he struck his head while on the job. Again, he did not miss any work.
    4
    The NBCWA provides in pertinent part:
    If an Employee returns to work after receiving Sickness and Accident
    Benefits for less than the maximum number of weeks to which he is
    entitled, and is then absent again within 90 days due to the same sickness or
    accident which disabled him originally, there shall be no waiting period for
    benefits payable during the remaining weeks of his eligibility but the period
    during which he again receives benefits will be considered with the first
    period as one continuous period of disability. If the second absence results
    from a different sickness or accident, the first absence does not affect the
    duration of benefits for which the Employee shall be eligible for the second
    absence. If the Employee returns to work for 90 calendar days between the
    two periods of disability, the second period shall not be considered as being
    due to the same sickness or accident as the first disability.
    (NBCWA Art. XI(c), JA 40.)
    3
    Recommendation that the award of benefits be vacated, and granted Consol’s motion for
    summary judgment. UMWA appealed.
    II.
    Our “scope of . . . review . . . is an exceedingly narrow one.” Kane Gas Light &
    Heating Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers, Local 112, 
    687 F.2d 673
    , 675 (3d Cir.
    1982). As the Supreme Court stated in United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise
    Wheel & Car Corp., 
    363 U.S. 593
    (1960), “[t]he refusal of courts to review the merits of
    an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining
    agreements.” 
    Id. at 596.
    “[A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or
    applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is
    convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.” United
    Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 
    484 U.S. 29
    , 38 (1987).
    With that said, arbitral awards may be upset in limited circumstances. Although
    “[t]here is a need for flexibility in meeting a wide variety of situations . . ., an arbitrator is
    confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does
    not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice.” Enterprise 
    Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597
    ; Major League Baseball Players Assoc. v. Garvey, 
    532 U.S. 504
    , 509 (2001) (per
    curiam). An arbitrator’s award must “draw[] its essence from the collective bargaining
    agreement.” Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. United States Postal Serv., 
    272 F.3d 182
    ,
    185 (3d Cir. 2001). Moreover, “if an examination of the record before the arbitrator
    reveals no support whatever for his determinations, his award must be vacated.” NF & M
    4
    Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, 
    524 F.2d 756
    , 760 (3d Cir. 1975).
    The evidentiary question is simply whether there is any support for an arbitration
    award. Here, “[a]lthough the support is slender, the record reveals some basis for the
    arbitrator’s conclusion” that the injury on June 21, 2002 entitled Zajac to benefits under
    the NBCWA. Tanoma Mining Co. v. Local Union No. 1269, UMW, 
    896 F.2d 745
    , 748
    (3d Cir. 1990). Zajac had returned to work and had been able to perform his job for two
    days prior to striking his head. He testified before the arbitrator regarding his injury and
    was found credible. His June 21st injury was, in the words of the NBCWA, a “different
    sickness or accident” or, as the arbitrator described it, a “new injury.” JA29.
    Consol’s “position, simply put, is that the arbitrator committed grievous error.”
    
    Misco, 484 U.S. at 39
    . But “[n]o dishonesty is alleged; only improvident, even silly,
    factfinding is claimed. This is hardly a sufficient basis for disregarding what the agent
    appointed by the parties determined to be the historical facts.” 
    Id. The arbitral
    award
    here passed, albeit barely, “the minimum rationality threshold.” Brentwood Med. Assoc.
    v. UMW, 
    396 F.3d 237
    , 243 (3d Cir. 2005). We are not empowered to pass judgment on
    the wisdom of the arbitrator’s conclusion. See 
    id. at 242
    n.6.
    III.
    “Only rarely, and in the most compelling circumstances, will a federal court tinker
    with an arbitral award made under the aegis of a collective bargaining agreement. This
    case presents no such unusual occasion.” El Dorado Technical Services v. Union
    General de Trabajadores de Puerto Rico, 
    961 F.2d 317
    , 318 (1st Cir. 1992). We will,
    5
    therefore, reverse the order of the District Court and remand with instructions to confirm
    the arbitration award.
    6