Baker v. Summit Bank ( 2002 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2002 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    9-17-2002
    Baker v. Summit Bank
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 01-4438
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    Recommended Citation
    "Baker v. Summit Bank" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 574.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/574
    This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    __________________
    No. 01-4438
    __________________
    JOHN BAKER; MARGARET BAKER;
    ELAINE COOPERSMITH; ARNOLD COOPERSMITH,
    on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
    v.
    SUMMIT BANK,
    John Baker, Arnold Coopersmi
    Appellants.
    ____________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    D. C. Civil No. 99-cv-07947
    District Judge: Hon. Bruce W. Kauffman
    ____________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    July 18, 2002
    _____________________
    Before: McKEE, FUENTES, and ALDISERT Circuit Judges.
    (Opinion Filed: September 17, 2002 )
    ____________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ____________
    McKEE, Circuit Judge.
    John Baker, Margaret Baker, Elaine Coopersmith and Arnold Coopersmith, on behalf
    of themselves and all those similarly situated, appeal the decisions of the District Court
    dismissing their claims against Appellee Summit Bank, the successor indenture trustee of
    debt indentures owned by Appellants. Initially, the District Court granted Appellee’s Rule
    12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the state law count of the complaint. Subsequently, the District
    Court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 on the
    remaining counts of the complaint brought under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.
    77aaa et. seq on December 10, 2001. For the following reasons, we will affirm the
    decisions of the District Court.
    Because we write only for the parties and the District Court who are familiar with the
    factual and procedural background of this lawsuit, we need not recite the history of this case
    We have reviewed the District Court’s September 17, 1999 opinion dismissing Count IV of
    Appellants’ complaint. This count consisted of a claim against Appellee under the
    Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 73 P.S. 201 et. seq.
    We believe that the District Court properly applied Algrant v. Evergreen Valley Nurseries
    Ltd. Partners, 
    126 F.3d 178
     (3d Cir. 1997), and correctly determined that Summit Bank’s
    mere involvement as Indenture Trustee of the securities in question did not bring its conduct
    within the ambit of the Pennsylvania statute. Therefore, we will affirm the dismissal of
    Count IV substantially for the reasons set forth in the District Court opinion.
    We will also affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
    Summit Bank under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. It is well settled that under the Trust Indenture Act,
    the obligations of the Indenture Trustee are limited to the terms of the Indenture. Thus, pri
    to default, the Indenture Trustee owes the debenture holders no fiduciary duties beyond any
    that may be required by the Indenture instrument. See 15 U.S.C. 77ooo(a); Lorenz v. CSX
    Corp, 
    1 F.3d 1406
     (3d Cir. 1993); Meckel v. Cont’l Res. Co., 
    758 F.2d 811
    , 816 (2d Cir.
    1985).
    After our review of the record in this case, we believe the District Court correctly
    determined that prior to default, the relevant Indentures impose no duty to affirmatively
    evaluate the Obligors’ apparently precarious financial condition or to prevent the certificati
    of apparently genuine debt certificates of the Obligator. Its duties were explicitly spelled
    in the Indenture instruments, and its duties did not include a duty to perform the acts that
    Appellants now contend Appellee should have performed. Moreover, we agree with the
    District Court’s conclusion that Appellee did carry out its pre-default duties reasonably and
    in accordance with the Indenture and did not have a conflict of interest in its role as truste
    Therefore, we will affirm the District Court substantially for the reasons set forth in the
    court’s December 11, 2001 opinion.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decisions of the District Court.
    ________________
    TO THE CLERK:
    Please file the foregoing opinion.
    By the Court:
    /s/ Theodore A. McKee
    Circuit Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-4438

Judges: McKee, Fuentes, Aldisert

Filed Date: 9/17/2002

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024