United States v. Wall , 66 F. App'x 313 ( 2003 )

Opinions of the United
2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
4-16-2003
USA v. Wall
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket 02-1447
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Recommended Citation
"USA v. Wall" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 652.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No: 02-1447
________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ERNEST WALL,
a/k/a Rooster
Ernest Wall,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 96-CR-00190)
District Judge: Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie, Chief Judge
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on January 17, 2003
Before: ROTH, FUENTES
and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 16, 2003)
OPINION
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Ernest Wall appeals from a judgment in a criminal case for revocation of supervised
release. Wall admitted to violating the three conditions of his supervised release and the
District Court imposed the statutory maximum sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment. His
sentence was beyond the range of 8 to 14 months established in the policy statement
contained in U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4. Wall claims on appeal that imposition of the statutory
maximum sentence was “plainly unreasonable” under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4).
We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to exceed the policy statement
sentencing range. See United States v. Schwegel, 126 F.3d 551, 555 (3d Cir. 1997).
The facts of the case are known to the parties and will not be set forth here.
Wall first contends that imposition of the statutory maximum sentence undermines
a defendant’s incentive to admit to violations of his supervised release, thereby impeding
judicial efficiency. Secondly, Wall claims that the degree of departure was excessive, even
if permissible. We find neither claim to be persuasive. The District Court is not required
to impose a sentence that encourages a defendant to confess to his supervised release
violations. We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a two
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year sentence, as the sentence was not “plainly unreasonable.” The ranges set forth in the
policy statement at issue are not binding but are advisory. See Schwegel, 126 F.3d at 552.
We have previously held that it is proper for a court to exercise its discretion in imposing a
longer sentence than that recommended by a policy statement. See id. at 555. Here, the
court considered the recommended range but decided to impose a longer sentence, in part
so that Wall would abstain from cocaine use for the two years of his imprisonment. As in
Schwegel, the District Court properly exercised its discretion following proper
consideration of the policy statement sentencing range.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment and sentence of the District
Court.
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TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing Opinion.
By the Court,
/s/Jane R. Roth
Circuit Judge
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